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To be a charity fiduciary is to undertake a range of important
legal obligations. The practical challenges of governing a charity,
however, produce the concern that charity fiduciaries are not working
as well as they could-or should. The following four stories illustrate
four paradigmatic areas in which the law struggles to ensure that char-
ity fiduciaries carry out their duties:
Weak Board, Strong Executive. For a dozen years, Adelphi Uni-
versity's president Peter Diamandopoulos strove to recast the
tuition-dependent commuter school as "the Harvard of Long
Island,"1 but enrollment continued to plunge.2 Meanwhile,
Diamandopoulos's salary and benefits ballooned to $523,000
plus perquisites and expense reimbursements that included
use of a furnished Manhattan apartment and trips to
Greece.' Finally, the New York State Board of Regents re-
moved and replaced eighteen of Adelphi University's
nineteen trustees-not for failing to improve the university's
finances, but for acting "blindly, recklessly and heedlessly" in
setting the unreasonable compensation paid to Diamando-
poulos.4 New York's attorney general has sued the former
1. George Judson, Inquiry Faults Trustees'Acts at Adelphi U., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1996,
at BI, available in LEXIS, News Library, Nyt File.
2. See Lee A. Sheppard, Exempt Organizations: A Tale of Guyland Greed, 72 TAX NOTES
797, 800 (1996) (noting that Adelphi University's enrollment fell 37% during Diamando-
poulos's term).
3. See id. at 797-98 (detailing Diamandopoulos's compensation and fringe benefits).
4. Panel of New York State Board of Regents, Report and Recommendations After a
Hearing to the Full Board of Regents at 26-33, Committee to Save Adelphi v. Diamando-
poulos (Feb. 5, 1997) [hereinafter Panel] (discussing the failure to meet performance
objectives as evidence of unreasonableness of compensation); accord Jack Sirica et al., Board
Departs: Adelphi Trustees Resign; Way Cleared for New Board, NEWSDAY, Feb. 14, 1997, at A3,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Majpap File (noting that the Regents voted 14-1 to re-
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trustees, seeking, among other forms of relief, to surcharge
them for "any loss or waste of University assets" resulting
from their misconduct, plus interest.5 Separately, the Inter-
nal Revenue Service could make this a test case of its new
powers to recover "excess benefits" and penalty taxes from
the benefited insider and the assenting trustees.6
Fundamental Change. The Sisters of Charity of St. Augustine
(CSA) Health System, owner of four hospitals, desired to
enter into a fifty-fifty joint venture with the for-profit chain
Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corporation.7 When the seven-
teen-member board of one of the hospitals, Timken Mercy
Medical Center in Canton, Ohio, was asked to approve the
letter of intent, the twelve community trustees asked for de-
tails-including the terms of the deal and the identity of the
buyer.8 When this request was denied, the community trus-
tees unanimously voted not to proceed.9 Within a month,
they were dismissed, and the five remaining board members
(four from the CSA system and the president/CEO) ap-
proved the letter of intent.10 In succeeding months, the CSA
considered other offers, in part to satisfy its due diligence
and in part to allay the concerns of some bishops who ob-
move the trustees). Several trustees were also found to have conflicts of interest, and to
have violated their duty of loyalty. Panel, supra, at 33-46.
5. Plaintiff's Complaint at 44, Vacco v. Diamandopoulos, No. 97401253 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Mar. 24, 1997).
6. See I.R.C. § 4958 (West 1997) (imposing "excise taxes" against charity "insiders"
who receive private inurement through excess benefit transactions, as well as against con-
senting charity managers, occurring on or after September 14, 1995, unless pursuant to a
written contract that was binding on September 13, 1995); see also Sheppard, supra note 2,
at 799 (suggesting this as a test case).
7. Bruce Japsen & Sandy Lutz, Catholic System Drops Local Board Members, MOD. HEALTH-
CARE, May 29, 1995, at 2, 2-3.
8. Kurt Eichenwald, F.B.L Reported Examining Hospital Operator in Ohio, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
1, 1997, at D2, available in LEXIS, News Library, Nyt File.
9. Id.
10. See id.; Japsen & Lutz, supra note 7, at 2. See also Jay Greene, Power Struggle with
System Leads to Hospital Board's Ouster, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Aug. 12, 1996, at 8, 8, reporting
that the Eastern Mercy Health System, which operates in six states, fired the 23-member
board of a Fort Lauderdale hospital. Nineteen of those board members filed suit against
Eastern Mercy. Id. The 14 new members approved bylaws that weaken local control by
transferring authority to the system. Id. See generally Ellen Hale, Selling or Selling Out? How
Community Hospitals Are Changing Hands, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 13, 1996, at SII,
available in 1996 WL 4388615 (explaining how "dozens of community... hospitals.., have
been sold to for-profit companies"); Robert Kutmer, Patients or Shareholders, ST. PETERS-
BURG TIMES, Nov. 24, 1996, at DI, available in LEXIS, News Library, Stpete File (observing
that some for-profit hospital chains have gone on a "buying binge" during the 1990s).
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jected to the commodification of health care."' The Vatican,
however, following canonical law procedures regarding
church property, gave its blessing to the joint venture.1 2 The
CSA used the $200 million of cash proceeds to set up grant-
making foundations where the hospitals operated.13 Accord-
ing to a news report, the money would be used "to act on
issues that affect the quality of life, change attitudes and
structures that oppress people, provide direct relief to the
poor and listen to the poor and educate others to their
needs."1 4 Shortly after the closing, Columbia/HCA nomi-
nated Sister Judith Ann Karam, the major superior of the
CSA, to serve on its board.15 The Timken name was re-
moved from the Canton facility at the request of the family.16
Commingled Purpose. With its subscriber base aging and its
main product losing appeal, Reader's Digest lost more than
half its stock value between 1996 and 1997.17 Its decision to
halve its dividend payout threatened the financial comfort of
several major charities supported by foundations established
by Reader's Digest founders DeWitt and Lila Wallace with non-
voting stock of the company. 8 Such beneficiary charities as
the Metropolitan Museum of Art, Lincoln Center, Colonial
11. See, e.g., Jack Curley, President and CEO, Catholic Health Association of the United States,
Issues Statement, PR NEWSWIRE, Nov. 2, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File
("The arrangement is especially regrettable given that a comparable alternative proposal
was offered by several Catholic healthcare organizations, but subsequently rejected by the
Sisters of Charity of St. Augustine."); Raquel Santiago & BruceJapsen, CSA to Consider Other
Options, CRAIN'S CLEVELAND BUS., Sept. 11, 1995, at 3 (reporting that three Catholic bish-
ops urged CSA to consider other Catholic partners before linking with Columbia/HCA);
Cathy Tokarski, For Whom the Church Bell Tolls, HOSPITALS & HEALTH NETWORKS, Oct. 20,
1995, at 41, 41-42 (questioning "whether Catholic hospitals can retain their religious val-
ues" when they merge with non-Catholic hospitals).
12. Bruce Japsen, Vatican Allows Columbia, CSA to Complete Dea4 MOD. HEALTHCARE, Nov.
6, 1995, at 3, 3.
13. See Michael K. McIntyre, St. Augustine Sisters Start Foundation, PLAIN DEALER (Cleve-
land), May 11, 1996, at B3, available in LEXIS, News Library, Clevpd File (discussing what
portion of the proceeds each foundation received).
14. Id.
15. SisterJudith Ann Karam Nominated to Columbia Board of Directors, PR NEWSWIRE, Apr. 4,
1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
16. Mary Chris Jaklevic, Ohio Hospital's New Name Is More Than a Mouthful, MOD.
HEALTHCARE, July 1, 1996, at 12, 12.
17. SeeJill J. Barshay, Macalester's Stock Lagging: As Reader's Digest Shares Go, So Goes Col-
lege Endowment Fund, STAR TRiB. (Minneapolis), May 22, 1997, at D1, available in 1997 WL
7567281 (noting that Reader's Digest stock plunged from $51 to $24.37 between the begin-
ning of 1996 and May 1997).
18. See Geraldine Fabrikant, Reader's Digest Gives the Arts a Lesson in Finance, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 26, 1997, at A3, available in LEXIS, News Library, Nyt File (reporting that the Wallaces
had created nine charities, including two large foundations, during their lifetimes).
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Williamsburg, the Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center,
and Macalester College convinced their "supporting organi-
zations" to divest some of the Reader's Digest stock in the early
1990s, but as the stock soared, the charities allowed them-
selves to become complacent.1 9 Apparently, the charities
had a "tacit agreement ... that it [was] in the best interest of
the group to act in concert and not to sell shares unilater-
ally."2" Moreover, "[t]here [was] talk that some decision-
makers were keener to maintain good relations with
Reader's Digest than to create a prudent investment portfo-
lio and were fearful that a fuller divestment could be inter-
preted as an affront."21 Indeed, George Grune-who from
August 1997 to April 1998 was brought back from retirement
to rejoin the Reader's Digest Association as chairman and
chief executive-had never relinquished his chairmanship of
two other Wallace foundations that own over seventy percent
of the company's voting stock, and Grune also heads each of
the seven supporting organizations. 2
Trusting Relationships. Hundreds of charities and donors fell
for the "double your money" offer from the Foundation for
New Era Philanthropy.2" But the promised anonymous
matching donors never existed, and the collapse of the Ponzi
scheme threatened the stability of dozens of charities, rang-
ing from small bible colleges to mainstream Philadelphia cul-
tural institutions-and still threatens the credibility of the
entire charitable sector.2 4
19. See Barshay, supra note 17 (observing that Macalester's supporting foundation sold
40% of its 10 million shares in two public offerings in 1990 and 1991, but failed to under-
take further diversification).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See Vince Stehle, Falling Price of Reader's Digest Stock Is Big Blow to Wallace Funds,
CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Feb. 26, 1998, at 21, 21 ("So far, . . . none of the trustees of the
supporting organizations has been willing to take any action or to speak out publicly
against Mr. Grune and his management of the company."); see alsoJon Elsen, Vacco Probes
Why Mag's Woes Are Hard to Digest, N.Y. POST, Feb. 4, 1998, at 28, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Nypost File (reporting that the state attorney general has begun a preliminary
investigation of George Grune's reported conflicts of interest in order to protect the assets
of New York cultural institutions); Patrick M. Reilly, Reader's Digest Names Thomas Ryder of
American Express as Chairman, CEO, WALL ST. J., Apr. 29, 1998, at B6.
23. See G. Bruce Knecht & Jeffrey Taylor, SEC Charges New Era, Bennett Defrauded Chari-
ties, Big Investors, WALL ST. J., May 19, 1995, at A3, available in 1995 WL-WSJ 8712866 (re-
porting on the New Era fraud that cheated hundreds of charitable organizations and a
number of wealthy financiers).
24. See C. Quinn Hanchette & Grant Williams, Claims Against New Era Foundation Total
More Than $350-Million, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Oct. 19, 1995, at 34, 34-37 (listing the loss
claimed by each of hundreds of charities and individual donors, along with the net loss, or
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1998] THE LIMITS OF CHARIry FIDUCIARY LAW 1405
Looking to the law for a guarantee of a well-run charitable sector
invites disappointment. Our legal structure excels at establishing or
requiring processes in which individuals may make substantive deci-
sions, but it falters at dictating results.25 Consistent with their limited
role in our political economy, the best laws assist private parties in
enforcing their agreements; the worst laws tell private parties what
their agreements should be.26
Charity laws focus on three general areas: the relationship be-
tween the charity and its fiduciaries,27 fundraising and charitable so-
licitations, 28 and the tax requirements for exemption of the entity and
deductibility of contributions. 29 This Article concentrates on the first
even gain, for each as calculated by the bankruptcy trustee). Hundreds of the organiza-
tions that benefited from the scheme agreed to pay $41 million to reimburse those who
lost money. See Pyramid Scheme Victims to Be Paid $41 Million, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1997, at
A20, available in LEXIS, News Library, Nyt File [hereinafter Pyramid Scheme]. That figure is
in addition to the $30 million in existing assets and an expected $15-18 million settlement
from Prudential Securities (the escrow agent). Id. Bankruptcy officials now estimate losses
at $100 million. Id.
25. See generally Evelyn Brody, Institutional Dissonance in the Nonprofit Sector, 41 VIL. L.
REv. 433 (1996) [hereinafter Brody, Institutional Dissonance] (opining that significant re-
form of nonprofit laws would either fail to fix problems in the nonprofit sector or create
additional ones).
26. I use the terms "best" and "worst" in their positive, rather than normative, sense.
That is, assuming that private agreements do not violate fundamental public policy, a law is
good if it interferes as little as possible in private decisionmaking, and is bad if it distorts
behavior.
27. See, e.g., Brody, Institutional Dissonance, supra note 25, at 482 (stating that trustees
and directors of nonprofit organizations owe legal duties of loyalty and care).
28. According to a survey of top state charity officials (38 states responding), their "big-
gest problem" relates to charitable solicitations, and whether charities spend their money
as represented to donors. Sean Mehegan et al., Charity Regulation Today: How the States See
It, NONPROFIT TIMES, Mar. 1994, at 1, 1. Connecticut mentioned the improper use of char-
itable assets and management self-dealing. Id. at 13. Massachusetts mentioned "board
stewardship." Id. at 15. Oregon found "that a lot of small and medium-sized charities are
being run ... by one or two people rather than a board, or the board is not involved, or
there is self-dealing in terms of benefits." Id. at 17. Pennsylvania offers "training sessions
for charities." Id. at 18. Texas reported that "[m]oney is misspent or even outright stolen."
Id. Many complained of a lack of resources. See id. at 1 (citing lack of enforcement person-
nel as an obstacle to proper enforcement of charitable solicitation laws). Floyd Perkins,
chief of the Illinois Attorney General's charitable trusts and solicitation division, once sug-
gested, "'We should tell our citizens that nobody in Illinois is looking at this stuff . . . . 'If
you want to give to charity, you're on your own.'" Robert Franklin, Critics Say Charity Watch-
dogs Are Nearly Toothless; Many State Agencies Have Inadequate Staff Resources, STAR T~iB. (Min-
neapolis), Sept. 28, 1992, at 3B, available in LEXIS, News Library, Strib File (quoting
Perkins).
29. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann, The Evolving Law of Nonprofit Organizations: Do Current
Trends Make Good Policy?, 39 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 807, 807-12 (1988-1989) [hereinafter
Hansmann, The Evolving Law] (analyzing charity laws under three categories, including a
fiscal law category that focuses on tax exemptions and other tax treatment of charities).
For discussion of the tax issues, see generally Evelyn Brody, Of Sovereignty and Subsidy: Con-
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area. The law imposes on fiduciaries only the twin duties of loyalty
and care.30 Within broadly bounded charitable purposes, no law tells
the entity or its managers how to "do" charity. In general, moreover,
the same rules apply to fiduciaries in the full range of charitable insti-
tutions, from a small neighborhood soup kitchen to a major
university.
We might expect close regulation of charities, but this is not the
case. The state attorney general enjoys nearly exclusive authority and
discretion to challenge a charity manager's actions. Such a structure
puts pressure, as the Delaware Attorney General once complained, on
"'the inclination and budget of a public official to vindicate [the ben-
eficiaries'] rights.""'3  Weak enforcement, however, is a symptom
rather than a cause of the independence of the charitable sector.
While the state polices fiduciaries who breach their duty of loyalty
(such as by self-dealing), enforcement of the duty of care is weak be-
cause we do not want the state to run charities.3 2 Thus, on the duty-of-
care side, charities are not significantly more supervised than publicly
traded business corporations, and courts, by long tradition, only reluc-
tantly intrude in proprietary decisionmaking. 3
Good corporate governance often requires more than satisfying
the legal threshold.34 The admitted gaps between the legal require-
ments and sound business practices do not, however, necessarily mean
ceptualizing the Charity Tax Exemption, 23 J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 1998) (on file with au-
thor) [hereinafter Brody, Of Sovereignty and Subsidy], and Evelyn Brody, Charities in Tax
Reform: Threats to Subsidies Overt and Covert (Mar. 25, 1998) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author).
30. See DANIEL L. KURTZ, BOARD LIABILITY. GUIDE FOR NONPROFIT DIREcroRs ch. 4
(1988). Some commentators identify a third fiduciary duty, the duty of obedience to the
purposes of the charity. See, e.g., id. at 84-90. Others, including the author of this Article,
find the obligation subsumed under the directors' duties of care and loyalty.
31. Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 468 (Del. 1991) (quoting the Attorney General's
Opening Brief at 16).
32. See HARRIET BOGRAD, THE ROLE OF STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL IN RELATION TO
TROUBLED NONPROFITS 6 (Program on Non-Profit Orgs., Yale University, Working Paper
No. 206, 1994) (stating that nonprofit regulators believe that they "should not
'micromanage' a group nor substitute their own judgment for that of the board and staff").
33. Note that the vaunted oversight provided by self-interested shareholders founders
on many of the same economic forces that operate in the nonprofit sector. See Evelyn
Brody, Agents Without Principals: The Economic Convergence of the Nonprofit and For-Profit Orga-
nizational Forms, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 457, 490 (1996) [hereinafter Brody, Agents Without
Principals] (observing that, as with for-profit businesses, competition among nonprofit or-
ganizations "weed [s] out nonperforming or nonresponsive" agencies, thus creating a mar-
ket-driven control over directors).
34. For example, in the context of avoiding violations of the duty of loyalty, Daniel
Kurtz urges:
It is essential that organizations adopt policies to deal with conflicts or they will
have to rely on the law, which sets only minimum standards[,] or an ad hoc ap-
1406 [VOL. 57:1400
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that formal laws should be expanded or reformed to mandate those
practices." Charity management is located in the private sector pre-
cisely because society prefers reasonable discretion exercised by differ-
ent participants under different conditions to the uniformity of
government-directed action.
36
Some observers charge that charity fiduciary law has weakened in
recent years; they lament a perceived shift from strict trust-law fiduci-
ary standards to hands-off business-corporation director standards.
Critics fault the American Bar Association (ABA) for basing its model
nonprofit statutes on its model business corporation statutes.3 7 How-
ever, I do not believe that statutory reform is responsible for the judi-
proach, which tends to personalize decisions and either inhibit a frank exchange
of views among board members or alienate them....
... Thus, while the law both allows an interested director's voting on a trans-
action that involves a conflict and does not preclude his participating in discus-
sion and debate, there seems to be little good reason for allowing this
participation.
KURTZ, supra note 30, at 64-65.
35. For example, a leading scholar (and maker) of corporate law, Delaware Supreme
Court ChiefJustice E. Norman Veasey, seems untroubled by the difference between what
the law requires and the recent demands of shareholders (notably the activist institutional
investors):
There is a long checklist of issues regularly raised by institutional investors.
Many of these issues may never become issues in litigation. For example, in con-
tested litigation, courts might not find important those parts of an institutional
investor's agenda which would urge: (i) separation of the office of chief execu-
tive officer (CEO) and the office of board chair; (ii) creation of a position of
"lead director," an independent director who would be designated to stand in the
wings to lead a critical evaluation of the CEO or manage independent board con-
sideration of major "ownership" issues such as changes in control; (iii) payment
of directors in stock rather than cash and elimination of outside director pension
plans; or (iv) the structural elimination of poison pills or staggered boards.
E. Norman Veasey, The Defining Tension in Corporate Governance in America, 52 Bus. LAw.
393, 402 (1997) (citing institutional investors' demands as described by DennisJ. Block &
Jonathan M. Hoff, Mergers and Acquisitions: Corporate Governance and Institutional Activism,
N.Y. L.J., Jan. 18, 1996, at 5).
36. See, e.g., James Douglas, Political Theories of Nonprofit Organization, in THE NONPROFIT
SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 43, 47 (Walter W. Powell ed., 1987) ("The classic pluralist
argument is that a voluntary nonprofit sector permits a greater diversity of social provisions
than the state itself can achieve.")
37. Henry Hansmann charges that the ABA "simply took the Model Business Corpora-
tion Act and deleted from it all provisions that seemed inappropriate for nonprofits, such
as those dealing with the issuance of stock. The result was a rather empty enactment."
Hansmann, The Evolving Law, supra note 29, at 814; accord Howard L. Oleck, Mixtures of
Profit and Nonprofit Corporation Purposes and Operations, 16 N. Ky. L. REv. 225, 243-44 (1988)
(criticizing the ABA for referring the revision of the model act to its Section on Corpora-
tion, Banking, and Business Law, "because that section is the wrong one for planning law
for altruistic, voluntaristic, pro bono organizations-organizations whose purposes are sup-
posed to be selfless, spiritual, and in the public service").
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cial treatment of nonprofit directors like business directors; nor, at
least as to duty-of-care issues, is the trend to do so that recent.38 What
has undeniably changed, however, is the size and behavior of the char-
itable sector itself, and the need of thousands of new charities to reach
beyond traditional populations to staff their boards.3" Explosive
growth and expansion into commercial activities have transformed
the typical charity from a perpetual fund invested by trustees into a
modem enterprise subject to the management demands of a complex
operating business.4 °
The Reporter for both the 1980 California nonprofit statute and the ABA's 1987 revi-
sion found the following:
[Earlier] nonprofit laws are the poor stepchild of the state business statutes.
Legislators have paid little attention to the structure, activities, needs, and role of
nonprofit corporations. Scholars, too, have devoted relatively little time and ef-
fort to the study and analysis of nonprofit statutes. The body of statutory and case
law applicable to nonprofit corporations remains sparse and undeveloped.
Michael C. Hone, Aristotle and Lyndon Baines Johnson: Thirteen Ways of Looking at Blackbirds
and Nonprofit Corporations: The American Bar Association's Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation
Act, 39 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 751, 759 (1988-1989). In drafting both the California statute
and the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act, Professor Hone sent over a thousand copies
of an exposure draft "to nonprofit organizations, the Internal Revenue Service, academics,
accountants, and others for their comments. The input received from nonprofit organiza-
tions was crucial in shaping the law." Id. at 760 (footnote omitted).
38. One commentator notes:
There are only a handful of these cases [dealing with duty-of-care issues in-
dependent of director self-dealing], and the decisions in all but one espouse a
corporate standard, although they span almost fifty years and emanate from dif-
ferent jurisdictions. These few cases deal with issues such as losses on invest-
ments, the breadth of investment authority, and the propriety of compensation to
staff or advisors.
KURTZ, supra note 30, at 23. One court made a similar observation:
[I]ll-success or bad judgment not so reckless or extravagant as to amount to bad
faith or gross or wilful negligence on the part of directors in the discharge of
their duties do not warrant the appointment of a receiver for the corporation or
the rendition of a personal judgment against the directors.
Beard v. Achenbach Mem'l Hosp. Ass'n, 170 F.2d 859, 862 (10th Cir. 1948); accord Taylor v.
Baldwin, 247 S.W.2d 741, 750 (Mo. 1952) ("The court will not substitute its judgment and
discretion for that of the governors of the charity unless the governors (the Board) are
guilty of misconduct, or the charity is impossible of execution, or is about to fail, or its
purpose has been or is about to be perverted.").
39. See PETER DOBKIN HALL, INVENTING THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 138 (1992) ("[T]he in-
crease in the numbers of nonprofit organizations serving broader and more diverse con-
stituencies has transformed patterns of trustee recruitment. More women, ethnics, and
minorities... have joined the ranks of trustees.").
40. Hansmann was among those who observed the evolving commercialism of charita-
ble organizations:
By 1950, ... the nonprofit sector had begun to have a new look. It was
becoming populated with large numbers of "commercial" nonprofits-nonprofits
that were neither donatively supported on the one hand, nor clubs on the other,
but instead had the sale of personal services as their primary activity and derived
nearly all of their income from the prices charged for those services.
1408
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We cannot simply say, however, that fifty years ago "the law"
would have looked the way it does now had only charities functioned
then as they do today. At a practical level, it is not so easy to say what
"the law" has been 41-or even is now. While every state has statutory
provisions governing nonprofit corporations,42 not all express the
same fiduciary standards,43 and few cases involving nonprofit fiduciary
issues have reached the courts.4 4 It might even be that "the law" as
actually practiced by charity advisors and regulators approximates
ideal standards more closely than the language of the statutes re-
quires. Reform rather than punishment is generally the goal of the
charity regulator, whether the state attorney general or the Internal
Revenue Service.45 Both the government and the charity prefer settle-
Hansmann, The Evolving Law, supra note 29, at 813.
41. For example, Carl Zollman's American Law of Charities completely ignores the gov-
ernance of a corporate charity-even though he extols the corporate charity for avoiding
many of the difficulties of a charitable trust, which he discusses in the other six hundred
pages of his treatise. See CARL ZOLLMAN, AMEmCAN LAW OF CHARInEs 222-45 (1924) (dis-
cussing charitable corporations); id. at 329-32 (discussing corporate trustees). Hansmann
charges that the original Model Nonprofit Corporation Act "is muddled concerning permissi-
ble purposes for incorporation, vague and excessively permissive about distributions of net
assets to members on dissolution, and completely silent about the critical issue of directors'
and officers' fiduciary obligations." Hansmann, The Evolving Law, supra note 29, at 814.
42. Forty-six states plus the District of Columbia have a separate statute governing cor-
porations variously termed nonprofit, not-for-profit, nonstock, or voluntary. Delaware is
one of four states whose general corporation law also covers corporations without stock-
holders. The ABA's Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act has been adopted, in whole or in
part, in several states, while being rejected in other revisions, such as Illinois's. See 805 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 105/103.05 (West 1993) (allowing organization of nonprofits for any of
30 enumerated purposes, rather than adopting the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act's
categorization of three separate types of nonprofit corporations). California's statute pro-
vided the inspiration for the ABA's model. See supra note 37. Similar to the California
statute, the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act divides "nonprofits into Public Benefit,
Mutual Benefit, and religious nonprofits." Hansmann, The Evolving Law, supra note 29, at
816; see CAL. CoP. CODE §§ 5110-5111, 7110-7111, 9110-9111 (West 1990 & Supp. 1998).
New York has a unique nonprofit corporation statute. See N.Y. NOT-rFOR-PROFIT CoRP. LAW
§ 201 (McKinney 1992) (permitting not-for-profit corporations to form for four different
types of purposes).
43. Indeed, not all statutes contain explicit fiduciary rules.
44. SeeJames J. Fishman, The Development of Nonprofit Corporation Law and an Agenda for
Reform, 34 EMORY L.J. 617, 676-77 (1985) [hereinafter Fishman, Development of Nonprofit
Law] ("There are few cases dealing with a director's standards of proper conduct that
apply to charitable corporations.").
45. For example, at a recent conference, the top charity official from Ohio discussed
five enforcement remedies available to the attorney general. Craig Mayton, Assistant Attor-
ney General of Ohio, Comments at a Conference on "Governance of Nonprofit Organiza-
tions: Standards and Enforcement," National Center on Philanthropy and the Law, New
York University School of Law (Oct. 30-31, 1997) (author's notes). Mayton described the
injunctive remedy as the remedy of "first resort," characterized criminal sanctions and
monetary damages as onerous, commented that removal of a fiduciary "damages reputa-
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ment to the win-or-lose structure of litigation.46 Settlement often best
accomplishes a regulator's goals to ensure a well-managed charitable
sector and to preserve public confidence in the use of contributed
funds;4 7 for charity managers, settlement offers a chance to improve
their behavior while avoiding embarrassment and personal liability.
"Closing agreements" between the regulator and the charity to end an
enforcement action can be quite detailed, often spelling out specific
terms regulating future conduct.48 Lately, perhaps responding to crit-
icism that closing agreements create a secret body of law, some regula-
tion" and has a "chilling effect on getting new members to serve," and mentioned receiver-
ship as an "unusual" remedy. See also infta note 235.
46. Even where a court exercises equity jurisdiction, judicial resources do not permit
extended supervision. As a separate matter, the courts are available to charity fiduciaries
seeking instruction or approval "as to the existence or extent of their powers and the
proper manner of their exercise." EDITH L. FISCH, CHARITIES AND CHARITABLE FOUNDA-
TIONS § 473, at 382 (1974); see also 4A AUSTIN WAKEMAN ScoTr & WILLIAM FRANKLIN
FRATCHER, THE LAw OF TRUSTS § 394, at 382-84 (4th ed. 1989). However, a court will not
give instructions if the issue calls for an exercise of discretion. For example, one court
noted:
While the court will not interfere with a discretionary power vested in a trustee, in
the absence of a showing of fraud, bad faith or an abuse of discretion, trustees
may properly seek its advice as to the legality of action which they propose to take.
The trustee would not be entitled to ask the court to advise it in the selection of
the particular purposes to which the fund should be devoted, but, having selected
such a purpose, it would be entitled to seek advice as to whether that purpose was
a proper one to benefit by the distribution of the fund.
Westport Bank & Trust Co. v. Fable, 13 A.2d 862, 867 (Conn. 1940) (citation omitted).
47. See, e.g., Lisa M. Bell & Robert B. Bell, Supervision of Charitable Trusts in California, 32
HASTINGS L.J. 433, 458 (1980) (explaining that, in order to avoid alarming the donating
public, the California Attorney General does not publicize the large amount of money it
recovers for charities). But see, for example, Dana Wilkie, Merger Inspector Carries Formidable
Credentials, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Nov. 23, 1996, at Al, available in 1996 WL 12577736,
which states:
[California Deputy Attorney General James Schwartz's] high-profile cases have
included a $1 million settlement in the case of Stanford University bookstore di-
rectors accused of mismanaging and diverting store assets for personal profit; a
$2.7 million settlement in the case of Los Medanos Hospital District directors
accused of mismanaging hospital assets; and a $2.5 million settlement in the case
of Hastings Law School trustees accused of diverting student scholarship funds to
imprudent investments.
48. See, e.g., Carolyn Wright, IRS Has High Hopes for Intermediate Sanctions, Owens Says,
TAX NOTES TODAY, June 10, 1996, at 113-3, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, Tnt File
(according to IRS Exempt Organizations director Marcus Owens, "closing agreements...
commonly incorporate an organization's promises to draft and implement internal audit
procedures, a written conflict-of-interest policy, and an open-door policy for employees to
raise questions with executives"). See generally James J. Bloom & Thomas J. Miller, Closing
Agreements, in IRS EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS TECHNICAL DMSION, 1992 EXEMPT ORGANIZA-
TIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM 263 (1992)
(stating that closing agreements provide guidance to tax-exempt charities and help non-
profits to maintain future compliance with IRS regulations).
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tors have conditioned settlement on the charity's assenting to public
disclosure of the agreement. 49 Nevertheless, invisibility at the infor-
mal end of the regulation spectrum makes it very difficult to judge the
effectiveness of regulators in influencing charity behavior."
Moreover, regulators or courts might intone tough-sounding
legal standards while actually going easier on the charity fiduciary in
order not to discourage charity service. In one admittedly extreme
case, a state court absolved the founder and dominating foundation
manager of any breach of duty in running up a $300 million loss
through poor investments:
If Mr. Pepperdine had never organized the Foundation, but
had set himself up to bestow his fortune on deserving chari-
ties and had at the same time continued to "invest and rein-
vest" his own moneys and properties and finally by
miscalculations have lost it all, would any one be so crazy and
cruel as to assert a claim against him for his carelessness in
not holding intact the fortune which he intended to bestow
on others?51
49. See, e.g., Closing Agreement as to Final Determination Covering Specific Matters, 10 EXEMPT
ORG. TAx REV. 1035, 1036 (1994) (detailing an agreement between Hermann Hospital and
the Internal Revenue Service to change physician recruitment practices and to pay nearly
$1 million-the value of federal income tax exemption for 1991); Public Statement, Jimmy
Swaggart Ministries, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 5 ExEMvr ORG. TAX Rxv. 206, 206-07 (1992)
(detailing an agreement to desist from political activities-Jimmy Swaggart Ministries had
endorsed Pat Robertson's presidential bid-and to pay about $170,000 in back taxes and
interest); Letter from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Office of the Attorney Gen-
eral, to Dr. Arthur G.B. Metcalf, Chairman, Trustees of Boston University (Nov. 16, 1993),
reprinted in PHiLANTHRoPY MorNTHLY, Oct. 1993, at 7 (detailing an agreement between Bos-
ton University and the Attorney General that the University will make changes in its corpo-
rate governance); CBN Press Release in Agreement with IRS (Mar. 16, 1998), available in
LEXIS, Fedtax Library, Tnt File, as 98 TNT 55-78 (Mar. 23, 1998) (announcing a settle-
ment between the Christian Broadcasting Network and the IRS in which, among other
terms, CBN loses its tax exemption in 1986 and 1987 "due to the application of the rules
prohibiting intervention in political campaign activities," pays a "significant" amount to the
IRS, increases the number of outside directors on its board, and makes "other organiza-
tional and operational modifications to ensure ongoing compliance with the tax laws").
50. See Bell & Bell, supra note 47, at 451 n.116 ("[P]ublic files do not give information
on the many settled cases or the vast number of unreported court opinions."). In private
correspondence, California Deputy Attorney General James R. Schwartz wrote to me:
I believe that my colleagues, both in the California Attorney General's office
and in other Attorney General offices nationally, have had a similar experience
[with cases involving breaches of duty of care]. However, because these cases are
almost always resolved at the state trial court level, and, therefore, do not result in
published opinions, they do not hit the radar screens of most academics.
Letter from James R. Schwartz, California Deputy Attorney General, to Evelyn Brody (May
13, 1997) [hereinafter Letter to Brody].
51. George Pepperdine Found. v. Pepperdine, 271 P.2d 600, 604 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1954).
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While the state later reversed this standard, the "Pepperdine attitude
causes one of the larger difficulties in achieving effective supervision
over charities. ' 52 Michael Hone, the reporter of both the new Califor-
nia nonprofit law and the ABA's revision to its model act, observed
that the law allows volunteer directors, "in some cases in fact, to al-
most be asleep at the gate":
It is my impression, from talking with state Attorney Generals
[sic], that it is almost impossible to win cases involving only
inattentive management. Where the directors are pillars of
the community or spending hours of their time, they are not
good emotional defendants. Therefore, the [Revised Model
Nonprofit Corporation] Act has adopted a duty of care
which imposes liability only in particularly egregious cases. If
one could show years of inattention, then there would be lia-
bility. But if one had just a single lapse, a terrible judgment,
the business judgment rule would protect directors .... The
trust standard would hold the directors personally liable for
mere negligence.... It was the subcommittee's opinion that
if that were the standard adopted by the Act, very few sensi-
ble people would serve on the boards of nonprofit
organizations.53
Such a state of affairs prompted Harvey Goldschmid to observe that
the nonprofit law's single greatest problem is "the nonfunctioning
dead board."5 4
52. JamesJ. Fishman, Standards of Conduct for Directors of Nonprofit Corporations, 7 PACE L.
REv. 389, 413 (1987) [hereinafter Fishman, Standards of Conduct]. Similarly, Kurtz
comments:
The attitude [Pepperdine] reflects is more pervasive than one would expect from
the few cases that seem to proclaim it explicitly. It is another way in which the
applicable legal standards and the realities of nonprofit governance are at odds.
What courts most often do with these situations is to dissemble but obscure the
bases of decision making. Pepperdine and Miami Retreat [Foundation v. Ervin, 62 So.
2d 748 (Fla. 1952),] make clear what is often present but unarticulated, i.e., that
the law may tolerate excesses by a founder because, in some sense, the founder is
regarded. . . as having a proprietary interest. See also, Haines v. Elliot, 58 A. 718
(Conn. 1904).
KURTZ, supra note 30, at 157 n.21.
53. Hone, supra note 37, at 771-72.
54. Harvey J. Goldschmid, Dwight Professor of Law, Columbia University School of
Law, Comments at a Conference on "Nonprofit Conversions," Program on Philanthropy
and the Law, New York University School of Law (Oct. 18, 1996) (author's notes). See
generally Harvey J. Goldschmid, The Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit Directors and Officers: Para-
doxes, Problems, and Proposed Reforms, 23J. Cope. L. pt. IV.A (forthcoming 1998) (on file with
author) (recommending self-help by the nonprofit community: a more precise specifica-
tion of functions, guidelines, and enhanced educational efforts).
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Paradoxically, then, more exacting standards for the fiduciary's
duty of care can do more harm than good. With statutory and con-
tractual limitations on directors' and officers' insurance coverage and
indemnification from the charity, the fear of potentially high mone-
tary liability discourages good directors from serving, while the desire
to save directors from financial ruin leads courts to degrade the legal
standards by avoiding findings of liability. One salutary statutory re-
form might be to specify the worst monetary harm a fiduciary could
suffer-setting the risk at a level that would be low enough to con-
tinue both attracting directors and making attorneys general and
courts more willing to find breaches, yet high enough to induce fidu-
ciaries to take their tasks more seriously.
Similar concerns have led most states to alter their business cor-
poration statutes to grant directors a monetary cap or even a waiver
on their liability for breaches of their duty of care.55 (Such a shield
usually requires an amendment to the articles of incorporation, with
shareholder approval.56 ) A waiver does not change the standard of
care, but rather limits the corporation to equitable remedies, such as
injunction or removal of the director.57 The ABA's Revised Model Non-
profit Corporation Act includes a charter-amendment option, and a few
states adopted such a reform.5" Some might feel uneasy granting
charity directors a total monetary shield for duty-of-care breaches.
Even capping monetary relief to a director's compensation-as the
American Law Institute (ALI) suggested that a business corporation
55. See Committee on Corp. Laws, Changes in the Revised Model Business Corporation Act-
Amendment Pertaining to Liability of Directors, 45 Bus. LAW. 695, 696 (1990) [hereinafter Com-
mittee I] (stating that in a majority of states, charter option statutes authorize a corpora-
tion to adopt a provision that will eliminate or limit the personal liability of a director to
the corporation or the shareholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty);
Committee on Corp. Laws, Changes in the Revised Model Business Corporation Act-Amendment
Pertaining to Liability of Directors, 46 Bus. LAW. 319, 319 (1990) [hereinafter Committee II]
(stating that developments in the mid- and late-1980s, including the decision of the Dela-
ware Supreme Court in Smith v. Van Gor*om, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), and the resulting
reluctance of qualified individuals to serve as directors, "highlighted the need to permit
reasonable protection of directors from exposure to personal liability ... so that directors
would not be discouraged from fully and freely carrying out their duties").
56. See Committee I, supra note 55, at 696 (explaining that most of the statutes author-
ize a corporation to amend the articles of incorporation).
57. See id. (explaining that the waiver of liability applies only to monetary damages).
58. See REviSED MODEL NONPROrr CoRn'. Acr alternative § 2.02(b) (5) (1987) (Op-
tional Article Provision); id. alternative § 8.30(d) (General Standards for Directors); see also
infra Part III.A. Given that charities do not have shareholders, perhaps for memberless
corporate charities such a monetary shield should be self-executing, rather than on a char-
ity-by-charity "opt-in" basis. Similar legislation might be appropriate for trustees of charita-
ble trusts whose trust instruments do not already provide a shield.
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could do by charter amendment (with shareholder approval) 59-
would amount to a full waiver for the overwhehning majority of non-
profit directors who serve without compensation. Thus, the state
might prefer to impose a minimum as well as a maximum potential
financial risk.
Meanwhile, concerns of federalism overlie the regulation of non-
profit fiduciaries. The old turf accommodation-that states cover
substantive law and the federal government sets tax policy-no longer
holds. Regulatory authority over nonprofit fiduciaries, particularly
charity managers, has moved increasingly to the federal level through
the income tax laws.6"
Part I of this Article describes the basic legal obligations of trus-
tees of charitable trusts and directors of nonprofit corporations under
state law, as well as the consequences of attorney general enforcement
and limited private standing. Part II considers the federal tax laws
relating to charity fiduciary behavior, including the recent tax on "ex-
cess benefit" transactions between charities and their insiders. Finally,
Part III returns to the duty of care, which presents the greatest chal-
lenge to the fiduciary legal regime. Using as a guide the stories that
introduced this Article, four central questions within the duty of care
will be discussed: Should charity directors who abdicate their respon-
sibilities face monetary penalties? (Adelphi University); what checks, if
any, should be placed on directors' ability to adopt fundamental
changes to the charity's purposes or activities? (Timken Mercy hospi-
tal); should a duty to diversify investments trump donor directions?
(the Reader's Digest foundations); and has the law ceded supervision of
charities to the marketplace for donations? (Foundation for New Era
Philanthropy).
Over all, a laissez-faire structure for charity fiduciary law makes
sense-or at least constitutes the "least bad" outcome-if we accept
the framework in which charity functions as a system of private deci-
sions free from government dictate. Such a structure, however, recog-
nizes the limits of the law: Charity managers must behave at a higher
level than the law requires in order to retain the public's trust. The
price of forfeiting this trust could be a realignment of the political
59. AMERICAN LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS § 7.19, at 238 (1992) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES].
60. See, e.g., Hansmann, The Evolving Law, supra note 29, at 837 ("[U]ntil now, we have
essentially not had nonprofit corporation law.... We have turned to federal tax law to
establish the fiduciary duties of officers and directors. It has been federal tax law by de-
fault because the state corporation statutes have been empty, completely empty, on the
subject.").
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accommodations to charity, resulting, perhaps, in blanket imposition
of strict fiduciary rules, falling donations, and denial of tax benefits.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM REGULATING
CHARITY FIDUCIARIES
A. Choice of Form
The traditional view of the charity fiduciary is of someone who
must strictly adhere to donor-defined terms, and who must run to
court for approval for even the slightest deviation from donor direc-
tion.6 Such an image, however, fails to describe the modern charity
fiduciary.
From the earliest days of Anglo-American charity, a charity could
take either of two legal forms, one court-defined (common law) and
the other legislative (statutory).62 The trust can be created wholly in
the private sphere: A settlor makes an agreement with a trustee for
the management and disposition of a fund of money or property.63 if
the beneficiaries are indefinite and the trust has a charitable purpose,
the trust may exist in perpetuity.64 A corporation, by contrast, involves
the public sector: It requires the grant of a legislative charter in order
to obtain such characteristics as perpetual life.6 5 Modern corpora-
tions typically form under the state general or nonprofit corporation
statute.66
Despite their similarities, charitable trusts and charitable corpora-
tions are governed by distinct legal regimes. The pure trustee stan-
dards are stricter than those imposed on corporate directors,
although the standards have been conforming because of waiver by
61. See Fishman, Development of Nonprofit Law, supra note 44, at 645-50 (explaining the
great degree to which charity fiduciaries were controlled by donors at common law).
62. Aspects of modem trusts typically are regulated by statute. See, e.g., UNIF. SUPERVI-
SION OF TRUSTEES FOR CHARITABLE PURPOSES AcT, 7B U.L.A. 727 (1985).
63. SeeJESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 565-67
(5th ed. 1995) (discussing the creation of a trust).
64. See id. at 672 (stating that a charitable trust is exempt from the rule against
perpetuities).
65. BLACK'S LAw DICrIONARY 340 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "corporation" as "[a]n asso-
ciation of persons created by statute as a legal entity [that is] vested with the capacity of
continuous succession").
66. From time to time, the state legislature might grant a specific corporate charter.
The federal government can also grant charters; for example, Congress chartered the Boy
Scouts, 36 U.S.C. § 28 (1994), the Girl Scouts of America, 36 U.S.C. § 6, and the American
Red Cross, 36 U.S.C. § 1. Cf Christine Maistrellis, American National Red Cross v. S.G. &
A.E.: An Open Door to the Federal Courts for Federally Chartered Corporations, 45 EMORY L.J. 771,
771 (1996) (stating that Congress creates federally chartered corporations to perform serv-
ices the government would not provide otherwise).
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trust settlors, the enactment of modern statutes, and the increasing
harmonization of enforcement styles.6 7 For many years, numerous
commentators have urged that instead of following organizational
form, the law should follow function. 61 Otherwise, the well-advised
charity founder's choice of form (as trust or corporation) bestows on
or denies the public particular rights of state supervision and fiduciary
obligations. The Delaware Supreme Court, however, recently de-
clined to adopt a single legal standard for the two charitable forms.
To this court, the donor's ability to choose the legal environment for
his charity is an important aspect of the gift:
The Attorney General argues that a charitable trust and
a charitable corporation are created for the same purpose,
and that to apply different standards to the two entities
would elevate form over function. In this context, however,
form is not an unimportant consideration.... [T]he creator
of a charitable enterprise recognizes that different legal rules
govern the operation of charitable trusts and charitable cor-
porations and selects a form with those rules in mind. The
founder of a charitable trust binds its funds by the express
limitations and conditions of the trust document and im-
poses upon its trustees the strict and unyielding principles of
trust law. By contrast, the founder of a charitable corpora-
tion makes a gift "outright to the corporation to be used for
its corporate purposes," and invokes the far more flexible
and adaptable principles of corporate law. Both forms are
fully recognized by our law and each has its function. One of
the cardinal principles of trust law is that the intention of the
settlor is paramount. We believe that the decision of Fred M.
Kirby to endow a corporation rather than a trust in 1931 is
equally entitled to deference.6"
67. See MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, FOUNDATIONS AND GOVERNMENT 154-57 (1965)
(comparing the trust and the corporation as forms of organization).
68. See id. at 155 (noting a "need for developing a common set of fiduciary principles
for directors and trustees alike"); Fishman, Development of Nonprofit Law, supra note 44, at
657 (describing difficulties created because "the 'trust-corporate standard' dichotomy has
often centered on the label to be applied, rather than upon an analysis of the corporate
problem involved"); Henry Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L.
REv. 497, 623 (1981) [hereinafter Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law] (sug-
gesting "that nonprofit corporation law should be both unitary and rigorous"); Kenneth L.
Karst, The Efficiency of the Charitable Dollar: An Unfulfilled State Responsibility, 73 HARV. L. REV.
433, 436 (1960) ("[T]here is no good reason for making different rules for the managers
of two large foundations simply because one is a corporation and the other a trust.... The
important differences among charities relate not to their form but to their function.").
69. Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 466-67 (Del. 1991) (citations omitted) (quoting
Denckla v. Independence Found., 193 A.2d 538, 541 (Del. 1963)).
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In practice, it must be admitted, rarely does the founder of a
charity carefully consider the legal differences and make a choice
based on the advantages of organizational form. The overwhelming
American preference for the corporate form results from historical
accident 7 and a combination of institutional forces. 71 First, "coercive
isomorphism" (dictated conformity) arises from the similarity of state
laws and practices.72 Second, "mimetic processes" (imitation) induce
start-up enterprises to model themselves on those to which society has
already granted legitimacy. 73 Finally, and perhaps most important to
the new modern charity, "normative pressures," stemming from the
professional training of the charity advisor (particularly attorneys),
lead to conformity of organizational form. 4  In choosing between
legal forms today, advisors ordinarily recommend the nonprofit cor-
porate form, 75 although the trust form might be appropriate for a
charity limited to managing a fund of money and making designated
distributions, such as a grant-making foundation whose purpose the
donor narrowly defines.76
70. See FREMoNT-SMITH, supra note 67, at 37-40 (describing how, following the Revolu-
tion, some states repealed all English statutes-including the Elizabethan Statute of Chari-
table Uses-leading some courts to mistakenly believe that charitable trusts could not have
been created at common law). For an extended discussion of the American development
of charitable trusts, see ZoLLAmAN, supra note 41, at 20-70.
71. See Pauli. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomor-
phism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. Soc. REv. 147 (1983), reprinted
in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYsIs 63, 65 (Walter W. Powell &
PaulJ. DiMaggio eds., 1991) ("Once disparate organizations in the same line of business
are structured into an actual field (as we argue, by competition, the state, or the profes-
sions), powerful forces emerge that lead them to become more similar to one another.").
72. Id. at 67-69.
73. Id. at 69-70.
74. Id. at 70-74.
75. We are a nation not just of laws, but of lawyers. When I was a young associate,
permitted my first pro bono case, I took on the task of formalizing and obtaining tax-
exempt status for a fledgling community theater company. I'm fairly sure that the steps I
took were the same as those that would have been taken by a lawyer in any state of the
Union when asked to set up a new nonprofit enterprise. The complex set of documents I
drafted quite baffled my client, an actress with little business experience. My supervisor, a
senior associate who had brought in the matter, never discussed with me why this new
theater company should be a corporation rather than a trust, or even, assuming a corpora-
tion, why a nonprofit corporation. Cf Francie Ostrower, The Role of Advisors to the Wealthy, in
AMERICA'S WEALTHY AND THE FUTURE OF FoUNDATIONs 247, 249 (Teresa Odendahl ed.,
1987) ("Donors, attorneys, and personal advisors all believe that attorneys are the advisors
who are the most influential participants in the donor's choice of a charitable
instrument.").
76. See, e.g., Bell & Bell, supra note 47, at 437 (noting that 80% of the 29,000 charities
registered in California in 1980 were corporations, 14% were trusts, and 6% were unincor-
porated associations). Even most grant-making foundations are corporations. See, e.g., Du-
ties of Charitable Trust Trustees and Charitable Corporation Directors, 2 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR.J.
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B. The Function and Legal Obligations of Private and Charity Fiduciaries
The concept of fiduciary permeates the law. The word derives
from the Latin for trust.7 7 For any fiduciary relationship, the law im-
poses on the fiduciary two primary duties, the duty of loyalty7 8 and the
duty of care7 9-to obey the dictates of the principal while exercising
prudent judgment in good faith.
Recent academic analyses of firms ask, "What is the problem for
which the firm is a solution?" Figuring out this question helps reveal
whether the law is efficient and effective, and whether it needs reform.
1. The Private Trust.-The analysis that follows begins with the
private trust. This arrangement tries to solve the problem of human
mortality. A property owner cannot live long enough to control the
disposition of property beyond the next couple of generations. As-
sume that this owner wants to devise a mechanism to provide equally
for each descending generation. By placing the property in trust, the
owner can create a structure in which the fiduciary (the trustee) will
carry out the settlor's wishes in a way that treats succeeding genera-
545, 545 (1967) [hereinafter Duties of Trustees] (Report of the Committee on Charitable
Trusts) (indicating that approximately three-fourths of foundations in the United States
are corporations, including 10 of the 13 largest).
A donor who will be the sole funder of a charity might prefer to adopt the trust form.
It is easier for one person to control a trust (for example, the donor can be the sole
trustee). By contrast, the typical nonprofit corporation must have a minimum of three
directors-although the founder could set it up as a membership corporation with herself
as the sole member, the board of directors cannot be easily neutered. See Solomon v. Hall-
Brooke Found. Inc., 619 A.2d 863, 866 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993) (holding that a donor's
employment with an incorporated charitable foundation was at will and could be termi-
nated with or without just cause); Carolyn C. Clark & Glenn M. Troost, Forming a Founda-
tion: Trust vs. Corporation, PROB. & PROP., May-June 1989, at 32, 32-34 (describing the
flexibility and controllability of a trust as a form of a charitable foundation). Moreover, as
discussed in Part III.B infra, a corporate charity might more easily change its purposes than
a charitable trust. See also Brigid McMenamin, Donor Beware, FORBES, Feb. 13, 1995, at 172,
174 ("[lt's easier for future generations to tinker with articles of incorporation than with a
trust instrument, which needs court approval to change."). See generally MARTIN MORSE
WOOSTER, THE GREAT PHILANTHROPISTS AND THE PROBLEM OF "DONOR INTENT" (1994) (ex-
amining the problem of ensuring that the wishes of the creators of charitable foundations
will be followed after their deaths). Independent of a role as trustee or director, the donor
may impose her desires on a corporate charity through limitations in the gift instrument.
77. MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICrIONARY 433 (10th ed. 1996).
78. See REviSED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACr § 8.30 cmt. 4 (1987) ("The general duty
of loyalty of directors of nonprofit corporations is set forth in the mandate of section 8.30
that directors act in good faith in a manner they reasonably believe to be in the best inter-
ests of the corporation.").
79. See id. § 8.30 cmt. 2 ("Section 8.30(a) requires that a director in discharging his or
her duties act with the care of an ordinarily prudent person in a like position under similar
circumstances.").
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tions in the desired manner.8' (However, the limit of the law's pa-
tience for control by the dead hand-known as the rule against
perpetuities-is "lives in being plus 21 years.""1 ) Legal title to the
trust property normally resides in the trustee; 2 equitable title nor-
mally resides in the beneficiaries 3 (the "cestui que trustent," law French
for "those who trust" 4). The law requires the trustee to treat the ben-
eficiaries impartially, in the absence of trust terms specifying other-
wise.85 In our example, the trust instrument allocates the trust's
resources among all the beneficiaries in a way that gives "income" (as
defined) to the life interests while preserving the "principal" for the
remaindermen.8 6 Anyone with a property interest in the trust (a ben-
eficiary or a co-trustee) may sue a trustee for breach of fiduciary
duty.
8 7
Under the duty of loyalty, the trustee may not engage in any deal-
ings with the trust, no matter how fair or even favorable to the trust.88
By tradition, as Edward Halbach describes it, the only defense to
80. But see Joel C. Dobris, Why Trustee Investors Often Prefer Dividends to Capital Gain and
Debt Investments to Equity-A Daunting Principal and Income Problem, 32 REAL PROP. PROB. &
TR. J. 255, 271 (1997) ("Indeed, the whole idea of a trust is, speaking rather loosely, a
heuristic. Most clients have only a vague, rule-of-thumb idea of what they are doing when
they put assets into a trust."). Professor Dobris is a co-reporter in the revision of the Revised
Uniform Principal and Income Act and was a co-reporter of the Uniform Principal and Income
Act.
81. DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 63, at 833.
82. Id. at 563.
83. Id. at 563-64.
84. See BLACK'S LAw DICrIONARY, supra note 65, at 229 (defining "cestui que trust" as
"[hle who has a right to a beneficial interest in and out of an estate the legal title to which
is vested in another").
85. DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 63, at 568.
86. Id. Here and as noted below, this text benefited from comments received from
Edward C. Halbach, Jr., the reporter for the American Law Institute's RESTATEMENT
(THRD) OF TRUSTS (THE PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE) (1992). Professor Halbach stated that it
is increasingly common to distribute less than all of the income to the life interest, while
granting the power to invade principal. That is, the trustee usually has the discretion to
maintain the life tenant's standard of living. Telephone Interview with Edward Halbach,
Professor Emeritus, University of California at Berkeley School of Law (Aug. 26, 1994); see
also REvISED UNIF. PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT (Discussion Draft 1997).
87. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 67, at 197 ("[T] he existence of a beneficiary capable
of looking after his own interests is, in fact, a prerequisite to the validity of a private
trust."). To be precise, the beneficiaries need not become identifiable until the expiration
of the rule against perpetuities (for example, because of the possibility of unborn chil-
dren). DUKEMINIER &JOHANSON, supra note 63, at 599. However, usually somebody has to
take when a trust fails. Current practice has been struggling with the doctrine against
unascertainable beneficiaries, which has fallen into disrepute. Telephone Interview with
Edward Halbach, supra note 86.
88. Telephone Interview with Edward Halbach, supra note 86.
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trustee self-dealing is, "I didn't do it." 9 Such an absolute prohibition
is an admission of legal impotence: Years could pass by the time the
beneficiaries might even notice the breach, and the fact that trusts
separate beneficiaries across time exacerbates their inability to police
their interests.9 ° A conflict-of-interest transaction may nevertheless
take place under one of three circumstances. First, the settlor often
waives these prohibitions in the trust instrument, permitting trustees
to deal with the trust if the transaction is fair to the trust. Second, the
trustee may obtain court permission. Third, because trustee self-deal-
ing is not void, but rather voidable at the option of the beneficiaries, if
the self-dealing transaction resulted in gain to the trust, the benefi-
ciaries can let it stand. However, if a loss resulted, beneficiaries can
obligate the trustee to make up the difference (or to disgorge the
gain) ." In addition, states permit the trustee to be paid reasonable
compensation.92
The duty of care requires the trustee to behave as would a pru-
dent person dealing with her own property.9" The trust settlor has
wide latitude to vary allocations, investments, and other obligations by
setting forth specific instructions in the instrument, and settlors com-
monly do. Except in rare cases, the trustee must obey the settlor's
instructions.94
89. Id.
90. Id. Professor Halbach noted that multiple trustees watch over one another, but the
policing problem otherwise remains. Id.
91. Unless the trust instrument provides otherwise, in all practicality only a court may
authorize trustee self-dealing or remove a trustee (generally, only for cause or, possibly,
because of friction or hostility between the trustee and the beneficiaries that seriously im-
pedes trust performance). See 2 ScoTr & FRATCHER, supra note 46, § 107, at 102 ("A court
that has supervision over the administration of trusts has power to remove a trustee for
proper cause."). A given beneficiary who consents to, or knowingly acquiesces in, a breach
will be estopped from complaining about trustee self-dealing. However, while beneficiaries
may unanimously agree either to consent to a breach or to seek removal of a trustee, in
most private trusts there are unborn beneficiaries whose consent cannot be obtained. A
future project in the revision of the Restatement of Trusts deals with "vicarious consents"-
when consent to a breach could be obtained vicariously from a guardian or someone simi-
larly situated. Telephone Interview with Edward Halbach, supra note 86.
92. SeeJeffrey N. Gordon, The Puzzling Persistence of the Constrained Prudent Man Rule, 62
N.Y.U. L. Rxv. 52, 82 & n.123 (1987) (noting state statutes that set fees to be paid to
trustees).
93. DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 63, at 930.
94. In narrow circumstances, a court can interfere. For example, if the trust provisions
violate public policy, or circumstances change in ways not provided for by the settlor, and
the change would defeat the purpose of the trust, a court may provide relief. The equita-
ble doctrine of deviation permits the court to alter administrative provisions (for example,
the designation of a bank trustee that no longer exists). Traditionally, the court cannot
alter the substantive provisions, such as the beneficiaries who may receive distributions, but
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2. The Charitable Trust.-A charitable trust solves a very different
problem from a private trust. Indeed, much of charitable trust law
looks backwards compared with ordinary trust law.95 A private trust
fails if it will not have beneficiaries identifiable within the period of
the rule against perpetuities.y96 contrast, a charitable trust must not
have ascertainable beneficiaries.9 7 A private trust fails if its corpus will
not vest within the period of the rule against perpetuities." By con-
trast, a charitable trust is permitted to be, and usually is, perpetual.99
Courts generally refrain from interfering with the wishes of a private
settlor, because of the term limits on the life of a private trust. By
contrast, because the settlor of a charitable trust can dictate the use of
trust assets for centuries, the courts retain a cy pres power to reform
charitable trusts whose purposes have become impossible to carry
out.
100
The law of trusts makes little distinction between the legal obliga-
tions of those who manage charitable trusts and those who manage
private trusts. 1 Thus, a strict fiduciary standard appears to apply,
statutes are moving away from such restrictions. Telephone Interview with Edward
Halbach, supra note 86.
95. This is why charitable trusts failed in those states that erroneously believed that the
post-revolutionary repeal of the Statute of Charitable Uses also repealed charitable trusts.
See supra note 70.
96. 4A Sco-r & FRATCHER, supra note 46, § 364, at 108.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See id. § 365, at 109 n.1 ("[I]ndeed, most charitable trusts are of indefinite
duration.").
100. Cy pres relief becomes available when the settlor's purposes fail. See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra note 65, at 387 (defining the cy pres doctrine as "a rule for the construc-
tion of instruments in equity, by which the intention of the party is carried out as near as
may be, when it would be impossible or illegal to give it literal effect"). While only a court
may apply the cy pres doctrine, charity trustees sometimes act on their own in applying
trust assets to a purpose different from the one directed by the donor. If the trustee is
called to account, and the court agrees that the trust has failed and approves the new
application, no liability results. FISCH, supra note 46, § 586, at 461-62. Professor Fisch's
treatise bemoans the millions of dollars languishing in neglected charitable trusts, particu-
larly small ones or those enjoying a substantial surplus beyond what can be spent pursuant
to the donor's directions. Id. § 585, at 460. English charity law imposes an affirmative duty
on charity trustees to seek cy pres relief when the circumstances warrant, and the Fisch
treatise urges that American courts should interpret the general fiduciary duty of care to
include such an obligation. Id. § 521, at 403-04.
101. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS (THE PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE) § 379 (1992)
("The duties of the trustee of a charitable trust are similar to the duties of the trustee of a
private trust."); 4A ScoTt & FRATCHER, supra note 46, § 379 ("The duties of the trustee of a
charitable trust are similar to those of trustees of a private trust."); GEORGE GLEASON Bo-
GERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 391 (rev. 2d ed.
1991) ("The powers, duties, and liabilities of trustees for charity are, with only a few excep-
tions, the same as in the case of trustees of private trusts.").
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because, as just described, the trustee's duty of loyalty prohibits self-
dealing transactions with the charitable trust. Under the duty of care,
the trustee must exercise such attention as would a prudent person in
managing his own affairs. 11 2 However, while settlors of testamentary
charitable trusts often want their trustees to adhere to strict fiduciary
standards, the living settlor of a charitable trust who also wants to act
as trustee typically relieves the trustees of legal duties to the maximum
extent permitted. This generally results in a lenient standard like that
imposed on corporate directors. 10 3
Again, the trustee must obey the specifications of the trust instru-
ment. As long as the trust qualifies as charitable, courts will hold the
trustee to these terms no matter how confident the parties are that a
better use could be made of the funds.1"4 Charitable trusts notorious
for their founder's idiosyncracies abound-consider, for example, the
Barnes Foundation,10 5 the Isabella Stewart Gardner Museum,10 6 and
the Buck Trust. 0 7 Only should the donor's dictates become impossi-
ble to carry out will a court consider a cy pres petition, and then the
court will endeavor to carry out the donor's wishes by departing as
minimally as possible from the original instructions.'0"
102. The Restatement (Third) of Trusts describes the duty of care as requiring a trustee to
act "as a prudent investor would, in light of the purposes, terms, distribution requirements
and other circumstances of the trust." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS (THE PRUDENT
INVESTOR RULE) § 227. This language is used in order to "lessen the danger of unwar-
ranted, excessive conservatism." Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Trust Investment Law in the Third
Restatement, 77 IOWA L. REv. 1151, 1155 n.19 (1992).
103. See infra notes 114-121 and accompanying text (discussing the corporate fiduciary
standards).
104. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 67, at 433 ("The courts look first to the terms of a
trust instrument... supplying them from trust law only when the instrument is silent.").
105. See Mary Grace Blasko et al., Standing to Sue in the Charitable Sector, 28 U.S.F. L. REv.
37, 73-74 & n.285 (1993) (discussing the Barnes Foundation litigation).
106. See, e.g., DOUGLASS SHAND-Tucci, THE ART OF SCANDAL: THE LiFE AND TIMES OF
ISABELLA STEWART GARDNER (1997); Holland Cotter, A Legacy Thieves Could Not Steal; Despite
Devastating Losses, the Gardner Museum Is Rebounding, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1997, at ClI
(describing the terms of Gardner's "extraordinary will": Should Gardner's installation of
artwork be altered in any way, the entire collection is to be "shipped to Paris and auctioned
off, with the profits going to Harvard University"). The theft of 13 valuable paintings-
perhaps the largest art heist in history-carries reminders in the form of small placards
displayed where those works used to hang, reading "Stolen, March 18, 1990." Id. The
pieces were not insured, "'since even if an insurance policy paid off, the museum could not
use the money to replace the items lost.'" John Abell, Stolen Masterpieces at Boston Museum
Not Insured, REUTER LiBRARv REPORT, Mar. 20, 1990, available in LEXIS, News Library (quot-
ing museum spokesman Corey Cronin).
107. See generally John G. Simon, American Philanthropy and the Buck Trust, 21 U.S.F. L.
REv. 641 (1987) (discussing the Buck Trust litigation and the public policy issues impli-
cated thereby).
108. See also infra notes 140-141 and accompanying text.
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While a settlor may not waive fiduciary obligations entirely,"°9 a
founder or major donor may impose obligations on the charity that
raise serious concerns of dual loyalty and commingling of private and
public purpose. For example, the founder might require the charity
to retain a donation that consists of stock in the founder's company,
even though an ordinary prudent investor would prefer to diversify. 110
Should the law privilege the donor to such a degree? This issue is
discussed further in Part III.B, below.
Given that charities lack identifiable beneficiaries, typically only
state attorneys general may sue to enforce a charitable trust and the
fiduciaries' duties.
3. Business Corporations.-Why do corporations form? A busi-
ness corporation reduces the transaction costs involved in operating a
complex,joint capitalist enterprise in a framework of centralized man-
agement, limited liability for owners, perpetual life for the enterprise,
and freely transferable interests."' 1 However, separating ownership
(the shareholders) from control (the directors) produces a "principal-
109. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 67, at 434 (discussing a judicial attitude that some
standards of conduct are so essential that they cannot be removed by agreement); see also
Duties of Trustees, supra note 76, at 555 ("[P]ublic policy prevents any relaxation which
would relieve a trustee from responsibility for wilful and deliberate breaches of fiduciary
duty, for gross negligence or actions taken in bad faith or with fraud, or for acts from
which he has profited personally."). As Professor Zollman observed, "A provision in a will
that the trustee shall not be held accountable for the non-performance or ill-performance
of the trust is... ineffective, and will have to give way to the statute which says that he shall
account." ZOLLMAN, supra note 41, at 424 (footnote omitted). He continues: "'No testator
can obtain for his bequests that support and permanence which the law gives to public
charities only, and at the same time deprive the beneficiaries and the public of the safe-
guards which the law provides for their due and lawful administration.'" Id. (quotingJack-
son v. Phillips, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 539, 571 (1867)).
110. A similar problem exists in the family trust situation. Should the trustee be keep-
ing the family business intact, or maximizing the security and returns of the beneficiaries?
See John H. Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the Future of Trust Investing, 81
IowA L. REv. 641, 665 (1996), which states:
I am not saying that you can never have an underdiversified trust fund. It will
remain common to place a family firm or a family farm in trust .... There's
nothing wrong with using a trust as part of the succession arrangements for a
family enterprise.... When, however, the trust assets are cash or cash-equivalent,
in the sense that diversification can be achieved at little cost, I believe that the
courts will come to view the advantages of diversification as so overwhelming that
the settlor's interference with effective diversification will be found to be inconsis-
tent with the requirement that a private trust must be for the benefit of the
beneficiary.
111. See generally OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM
(1985) (describing the transaction costs analysis of the corporation).
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agent problem."'1 12 Accordingly, the directors' duties of loyalty and
care represent an attempt to align the interests of the agents with the
interests of the principals. However, as a legal matter, the directors
owe these duties to the corporation rather than to shareholders (or any
other constituent group)."1 '
The duty of loyalty for corporate fiduciaries has evolved past abso-
lute bans on self-dealing.114 Rather, states look for a process in which
the transaction with the interested director was approved by disinter-
ested parties (directors or shareholders or both) after full disclosure
of all material facts by the interested party.115 While courts might still
examine the transaction for fairness to the corporation, they apply a
"much lighter level of scrutiny." '16
In reviewing directors' duty of care, courts have developed a doc-
trine called the "business judgment rule." '17 Less a rule than an ac-
cumulation of case law statements, the business judgment rule
insulates directors from liability for mistakes in judgment exercised in
good faith and without divided loyalty. 1 8 As a result, a director
112. For an extensive discussion of these issues, see generally Brody, Agents Without Prin-
cipals, supra note 33.
113. SeeJAMEs D. Cox ET AL., CORPORATIONS § 10.1, at 10.2-10.7, § 10.11, at 10.38-10.40
(1995) (discussing directors' fiduciary duty).
114. Initially courts imposed trustee-type duties on directors of business corporations,
but such punctiliousness could not survive the realities of the business world. See Fishman,
Standards of Conduct, supra note 52, at 434-35 (noting that a combination of a need for the
service of "men of experience and ability" on corporate boards as well as the advantages of
transactions with corporations' own "directors and with other corporations" led to a relaxa-
tion of the strict rule). See generally Harold Marsh, Jr., Are Directors Trustees? Conflict of Inter-
est and Corporate Morality, 22 Bus. LAw. 35 (1966) (describing the evolution from trustee
standard to the fairness standard).
115. See MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT §§ 8.60-8.63 (1984); see also infta note 229 (discussing
burden of proof in a duty-of-loyalty case); infra note 234 (discussing remedies in a duty-of-
loyalty case).
116. ALI PRINCIPuLES, supra note 59, § 5.01 reporter's note 3, at 207. "[L]ess intense
scrutiny" applies to executive compensation because the corporation by definition cannot
forgo the transaction. Id. § 5.03 cmt. c, at 246-47. Nevertheless, regulators of business
corporations have recently required more rigorous procedures for approving compensa-
tion paid by publicly traded companies. See I.R.C. § 162(m) (West 1997) (placing limits on
deduction of compensation over $1 million paid by companies that do not follow certain
procedures); Executive Compensation Disclosure, Securities Act Release 33-6962, Ex-
change Act Release No. 31327 [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,056
(Nov. 12, 1992) (announcing the adoption of final rules on executive compensation disclo-
sure). As to tax-exempt charities, see new I.R.C. § 4958, discussed infra Part II.
117. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 59, § 4.01(c), at 138-39.
118. Id. § 4.01(c) cmt., at 173. Section 4.01(a), which sets forth the duty of care,
provides:
A director or officer has a duty to the corporation to perform the director's
or officer's functions in good faith, in a manner that he or she reasonably believes
to be in the best interests of the corporation, and with the care that an ordinarily
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breaches the duty of care only by committing "gross negligence"
rather than ordinary negligence.1 19
The law requires the corporation to provide information to the
shareholders to improve their ability to monitor the directors, 20 and
grants shareholders the ability to sue (on behalf of the corporation)
for harm caused by directors' breach of fiduciary duty.1 21
4. Charitable Corporations.-Like charitable trusts, charitable cor-
porations seek to solve the problem of serving an indefinite public
into (usually) perpetuity. However, perpetuity is not unique to the
nonprofit corporate form; business corporations also have perpetual
life. The primary legal distinction between the business corporation
and the nonprofit is the absence of owners. Sometimes called "non-
prudent person would reasonably be expected to exercise in a like position and
under similar circumstances.
Id. § 4.01(a), at 138. Section 4.01(c) states the business judgment rule:
A director or officer who makes a business judgment in good faith fulfills the duty
under this Section if the director or officer:
(1) is not interested .. .in the subject of the business judgment;
(2) is informed with respect to the subject of the business judgment to the
extent the director or officer reasonably believes to be appropriate under the
circumstances; and
(3) rationally believes that the business judgment is in the best interests of
the corporation.
Id. § 4.01(c), at 139.
The ABA's Revised Model Business Corporation Act (now called the Model Business Corpora-
tion Act (1984)) and its Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act both state that the business
judgment rule need not be resorted to if the director satisfies the statutory duty of care. See
MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 8.30(d) cmt. 4 (1984) ("The possible application of the business
judgment rule need only be considered if compliance with the standard of conduct set
forth in ... section 8.30 is not established."); REviSED MODEL NONPROFI" CoRP. AcT § 8.30
cmt. 3 (1987) ("If a director has met the standards of section 8.30, there is no need to
apply the business judgment rule."). This formulation seems to me very unhelpful. The
whole purpose of the business judgment rule is to preclude detailed inquiry. More useful
is the approach taken in the ALI's Principles of Corporate Governance, which refers to the
business judgment rule as a "safe harbor." See ALI PRINCIPLEs, supra note 59, § 4.01 (c)
cmt., at 173 ("Although courts have not expressed it this way, the business judgment rule
has offered a safe harbor for directors or officers who make honest, informed business
decisions that they rationally believe are in the best interests of their corporations. Section
4.01(c) articulates this safe harbor concept.").
119. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985) (affirming gross neg-
ligence as the standard for director liability under the business judgment rule); see also infta
Part III.A.
120. See MODEL Bus. CoRnP. Acr §§ 16.02 (Inspection of Records by Shareholders), 16.20
(Financial Statements for Shareholders) (1984).
121. See id. § 7.40 (Procedure in Derivative Proceedings).
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stock" corporations for this reason, 122 nonprofit corporations may not
have shareholders or otherwise distribute earnings. 123 However, non-
profit corporations may, but are not required to, have members with
rights to elect the board of directors and to exercise other extraordi-
nary powers set forth in the statute or the articles of incorporation.' 24
For example, members might be granted the right to vote on the cor-
poration's decision to sell substantially all of its assets, merge, or dis-
solve. This type of membership is more common in the "mutual"
nonprofit, such as a labor organization, social club, or business
league. Most charities have no members, or have only members in the
ceremonial sense. A nonprofit corporation without members, by neg-
ative definition, has a self-perpetuating board of directors. 25
The duties of directors of nonprofit corporations, particularly in
recent years, have come to resemble those of directors of business cor-
porations, because of the change in function of the typical charitable
corporation.1 26 As Bayless Manning observed of the basic difference
122. See 1 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PPr-
VATE CORPORATIONS § 68, at 917 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1990) (distinguishing stock and non-
stock corporations).
123. See id. § 68.05, at 918-20 (discussing limitations on nonprofit or "nonstock"
corporations).
124. See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 2.02 (stating that the articles of incor-
poration for a nonprofit corporation must state whether it will have members and may
state the powers that its members will have).
125. To improve charity governance, California limits charity managers to 49% of the
board positions. CAL. CORP. CODE § 5227 (West 1990 & Supp. 1998). One wonders, how-
ever, whether this simply leads to dummy outside directors. See Fishman, Standards of Con-
duct, supra note 52, at 448 n.252 ("This provision encourages the naming of dummy
directors."). The ABA's Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act also offers such a provision,
as optional section 8.13 (Financially Disinterested Majority-Public Benefit Corporations).
The official comment states:
This section is optional as many members of the Subcommittee .. .felt that its
provisions would be ineffective in preventing intentional abuses, while presenting
a burdensome or inconvenient requirement .... Legitimate public benefit corpo-
rations might have difficulty in finding active and competent directors who had
no financial interest in the corporation.
REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.13 cmt. For a proposal on expanding charity
membership-and its legal significance-see Avner Ben-Ner & Theresa Van Hoomissen,
The Governance of Nonprofit Organizations: Law and Public Policy, 4 NONPROFIT MGMT. & LEAD-
ERSHIP 393, 408-12 (1994).
126. See Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l Training Sch. for Deaconesses & Missionaries,
381 F. Supp. 1003, 1013 (D.D.C. 1974) (mem.). Judge Gesell stated:
[T] he modern trend is to apply corporate rather than trust principles in deter-
mining the liability of the directors of charitable corporations, because their func-
tions are virtually indistinguishable from those of their "pure" corporate
counterparts.
... A trustee is uniformly held to a high standard of care and will be held
liable for simple negligence, while a director must often have committed "gross
negligence" or otherwise be guilty of more than mere mistakes of judgment.
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between a trustee and a director: "[T]he concept of the prudent in-
vestor was created precisely to differentiate a trustee from the wider
universe of business risk-taking, the very universe in which the board
of directors is expected to live and operate.' 27  The ABA's Revised
Model Nonprofit Corporation Act explicitly rejects the approach that cor-
porate charities are trusts and that directors are trustees. 128
A conflict-of-interest transaction between the organization and a
director can invoke both the duty of loyalty and the duty of care: gen-
erally, the loyalty of the conflicted director and the care exercised by
the other directors in approving the transaction. State nonprofit stat-
utes typically deal with director conflicts of interest. For example, sec-
tion 8.31 of the ABA's Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act blesses an
interested transaction that either was fair when entered into or was
approved in advance, after full disclosure of the material facts and of
the director's interest, by the board acting in good faith on the rea-
sonable belief that the transaction is fair to the charity.' 29 Alterna-
... Since the board members of most large charitable corporations fall
within the corporate rather than the trust model, being charged with the opera-
tion of ongoing businesses [as opposed to merely the management of the trust
funds], it has been said that they should only be held to the less stringent corpo-
rate standard of care.
Id. (citations omitted); accord Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 462 (Del. 1991) (stating that a
member of a charitable corporation owes a fiduciary duty to act with "fairness and loyalty,
devoid of considerations of self-interest"); Johnson v. Johnson, 515 A.2d 255, 264 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1986) (stating that the standard of care for investments by a director of
a charitable corporation is one of ordinary business care and prudence rather than the
stricter standard of a trust fiduciary). However, the Restatement (Second) of Trusts comments:
"In the case of a charitable corporation duties of a somewhat similar character [to the
trustees of a charitable trust] rest upon the members of the controlling board .... " RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 379 cmt. b (1959).
127. Bayless Manning, The Business Judgment Rule and the Director's Duty of Attention: A
Time for Reality, 39 Bus. LAw. 1477, 1493 (1984).
128. See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.30(e) ("A director shall not be
deemed to be a trustee with respect to the corporation or with respect to any property held
or administered by the corporation, including without limit, property that may be subject
to restrictions imposed by the donor or transferor of such property.").
129. See id. § 8.31. Some states always require the transaction to be fair to the charity;
other states use the fairness test as an alternative to disinterested approval. See, e.g., Gilbert
v. McLeod Infirmary, 64 S.E.2d 524, 529 (S.C. 1951) (applying the fairness test and voiding
a transaction despite the absence of actual fraud or fraudulent intent on the part of the
director); see also Fishman, Standards of Conduct, supra note 52, at 443 (discussing the statu-
tory provisions of New York, California, and Ohio). Even the Revised Model Nonprofit Corpo-
ration Act follows the common trend to bar loans to directors and officers. See REviSED
MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.32 (Loans to or Guaranties for Directors and Officers).
On the general question of compensation, the Model Act provides: "Unless the articles or
bylaws provide otherwise, a board of directors may fix the compensation of directors." Id.
§ 8.12. (The official comment emphasizes that the directors must still comply with their
duties of loyalty and care. Id. § 8.12 cmt.) As a practical matter, most directors of nonprof-
its serve without compensation (other than expenses); executive compensation is the
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tively, the attorney general or a court may approve the transaction,
either before or after it occurs.130 Finally, the articles of incorpora-
tion, bylaws, or board resolution may impose additional requirements
on conflict-of-interest transactions.13
As discussed in Part I.C, below, the right to enforce the fiduciary
obligations of charitable directors lies primarily with the state attor-
neys general. A few states permit the charity's articles of incorpora-
tion to shield directors who breach their duty of care (but not their
duty of loyalty) from having to pay monetary damages. 132 As discussed
in Part III.B, some scholars believe that nonprofit directors have a
third fiduciary duty to obey the specified purposes of the corporation,
and that they may not amend these purposes without court approval.
5. Summary: Comparing Charity Trustee and Corporate Standards.-
The schematic below presents a very simplified illustration of charity
fiduciary law. (Note, also, that some states impose the trust standard
on directors of charitable corporations. 133)
DUTY OF LOYALTY DUTY OF CARE
TRUSTEE Absolute: No self-dealing Ordinary: Person dealing with
(settlor may waive) own property (settlor may
relax)
DIRECTOR Fairness Test: Disclose interest, Gross Negligence: Business
abstain, and transaction is fair judgment rule is safe harbor.
to corporation. I
As the parenthetical language in this chart suggests, it would be
an oversimplification to call the trust fiduciary standards "strict" and
the corporate standards "liberal." Nevertheless, these characteriza-
tions are useful in debating what standard should apply to charity
greater concern. As described in Part II, standards for nonprofit executive compensation
might emerge under the federal tax rules, and tax laws already impose strict self-dealing
prohibitions (except for reasonable compensation) on managers of a "private foundation."
130. See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. AcT § 8.31(b) (2) (Director Conflict of
Interest).
131. For a sample of conflicts of interest policy, written by the Internal Revenue Service,
see Lawrence M. Brauer & Charles F. Kaiser, Tax-Exempt Health Care Organizations Commu-
nity Board and Conflicts of Interest Policy, in EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS: TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION
PROGRAM TEXTBOOK FY 1997, at 17, 18, 25 (1996), update released May 22, 1997, TAX
NOTES TODAY, Oct. 14, 1997, at 198-80, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, Tnt File.
132. See Part III.A (discussing the business judgment rule and its effect on directors'
liability).
133. See, e.g., 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5547(a) (West 1995) (stating the general rule
that corporate charities take property "in trust" for the purposes set forth in the articles,
and directors "as trustees" are held to the "same degree of responsibility and accountability
as if [the charity were] not incorporated").
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trustees and directors. Thus, while most American charities are cor-
porations and most charitable trust instruments grant trustee discre-
tion,13 4 we may fairly ask what those standards should be. When, for
example, commentators urge the adoption of trust standards, they
yearn for a structure of strict fiduciary duties for all charity managers,
be they legally trustees or directors. 13' To their dismay, however, the
trend, while indeed towards conformity, is in the direction of the cor-
porate standard. As discussed below, courts prefer to defer to the
business judgment of charity managers, legislatures relax the invest-
ment duties of institutional fund managers, and Congress bows to the
determination of independent board members of public charities in
setting compensation and other benefits.
C. Monitoring and Enforcement
Contrasting the charitable forms with their proprietary analogues
presents the dilemma of charity fiduciary law in its brightest light: In
the case of an entity having no owners and established for the benefit
of indefinite beneficiaries, who is the principal on whom the law can
rely to monitor the agents and enforce the charitable purposes? The
way the law answers this question makes enforcement of charity fiduci-
ary duties difficult.
Beginning with self-dealing, if regulators and courts want an easy
life, the state can adopt prohibitions on any conduct between a charity
and its fiduciaries that is hard for an outsider to monitor and judge
for fairness. This explains the strict trust standard.'1 6 No solution this
simple, however, comes without cost. Per se prohibitions sweep too
broadly, and void too many transactions that would benefit the charity
and thus benefit the public. As a compromise, self-dealing transac-
134. For example, Marion Fremont-Smith observes: "It is the rare trust instrument
which does not include some, if not all, of the provisions whereby these differences be-
tween trustees and directors are removed." FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 67, at 155.
135. See, e.g., Deborah A. DeMott, Self-Dealing Transactions in Nonprofit Corporations, 59
BROOK. L. REv. 131, 145-47 (1993) (criticizing the application of corporate fiduciary stan-
dards to the nonprofit sector).
136. See, for example, In re Taylor Orphan Asylum, 36 Wis. 534, 552 (1875), discussing
the ban on trustees' buying the charity's property:
[This is the rule] not because they might not in many instances make fair and
honest disposition of it to themselves, but because the probability is so great that
they would frequently do otherwise, without danger of detection, that the law
considers it better policy to prohibit such purchases entirely, than to assume them
to be valid except where they can be proved to be fraudulent.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). As discussed in Part II, the federal tax laws impose
blanket prohibitions on self-dealing by private foundation managers, regardless of whether
the foundation takes the trust or corporate form.
1998] 1429
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VoL. 57:1400
tions with a corporate charity will be reviewed for substantive fairness
only in the absence of a private process requiring decisionmaking by
disinterested fiduciaries (under the tax laws, for example, all private
foundations are subject to the strict standard). 37
Some commentators criticize such deference to charity manag-
ers.13 ' After all, the nonprofit structure cannot be equated with the
business corporation in which shareholders having a direct financial
interest ultimately decide the fate of the board.' Initially, one might
think that the law should privilege the trust settlor or donors with
oversight powers. However, American law does not work this way. A
donor cannot reclaim funds if she is displeased with their use;' 4 ° more
generally, the donor cannot bring suit to enforce the purposes of the
charity.' 4 ' Nor, except in rare cases, do beneficiaries have standing to
137. See infra Part II (discussing restrictions on self-dealing).
138. Cf DeMott, supra note 135, at 131 ("[I]t is neither justifiable nor wise to import
criteria that legitimize self-dealing from the for-profit setting to the nonprofit context.").
139. See Hansmann, The Evolving Law, supra note 29, at 820 ("[I] t is not appropriate to
hold the managers of... a nonprofit only to the fiduciary standards appropriate for a for-
profit.").
140. If the charity fails to adhere to a restriction on a donation, and the donor retains a
reversion to a private person or fails to express a general charitable intent, the property
will revert (even if the breach occurs beyond the dead-hand period). See, e.g., Evans v.
Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 447 (1970) (holding that property donated for a municipal park for
whites reverted to the family only because the will did not express a general charitable
intent, and thus a cy pres modification was not available); cf Solomon v. Hall-Brooke
Found., Inc., 619 A.2d 863, 866 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993) (holding that a donor's gift to a
foundation, a gift conditioned upon a lifetime employment contract, was unenforceable as
a matter of public policy, and thus the donor's employment was at will).
141. When a donor conditions the use of a gift, the charity must adhere to that restric-
tion, but generally only the attorney general may bring an enforcement action. See Carl J.
Herzog Found., Inc. v. University of Bridgeport, 699 A.2d 995, 1002 (Conn. 1997) (holding
that an objecting donor has no standing under the Connecticut Uniform Management of
Institutional Funds Act); see also infra Part III.C. English charity law still embraces a
founder's right of "visitation" over gifts made to charitable corporations. FREMONT-SMITH,
supra note 67, at 206. This practice has largely fallen into disuse in the United States. Id. at
206-07. That the English right is hereditary makes it less appealing here. See BOGERT &
BOGERT, supra note 101, § 416, at 62, which states:
In a country such as the United States, where primogeniture is obsolete, the vest-
ing of a power of visitation in the heirs of the donor is not desirable.... [I]n
many cases they would be either wholly uninterested in exercising the right of
visitation, or would be openly hostile to the institution which had deprived them
of a part or all of the fortune of their relative.
Accord Wier v. Howard Hughes Med. Inst., 407 A.2d 1051, 1057 (Del. Ch. 1979) (holding
the common law right of visitation no longer applicable). But cf N.Y. EST. POWERS &
TRUSTS LAW § 8-1.3(a) (McKinney 1992) (allowing anyone "founding, endowing and main-
taining" a public library, museum, or educational institution in trust to exercise complete
control over administration of the trust during his or her lifetime, and, if granted, to pass
on these rights to the surviving spouse, without any obligation to account). At a recent
conference, one attorney suggested a contractual remedy, whereby the instrument grant-
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sue charity trustees or directors, either directly or derivatively on be-
half of the charity, because "the human beings who are favorably af-
fected by the execution of the trust are merely the media through
whom the social advantages flow to the public." '42 Instead, the state
attorney general, acting as parens patriae, can enforce society's interests
in the proper operation of the charity.1 4 3 The attorneys general enjoy
a wide variety of powers, including "enjoining wrongful conduct, re-
scinding or cancelling a transfer of property, appointment of a re-
ceiver, replacement of a fiduciary, compelling an accounting, redress
of a breach or performance of fiduciary duties. 1 4 4
In practice, however, attorneys general rarely pursue their rights
with the same zeal that private parties exhibit. What if the attorney
general will not act, cannot act, or does not present the "right" argu-
ments (whether for political or other reasons)? Critics of limited
standing rules urge greater powers in the hands of some outside
party.145 To defend such a position, however, they must believe that
ing the gift would provide for a "gift over to another charity" in the event of default, so that
an independent charity would have a private right of action (as well as an interest in moni-
toring the first charity's use of the gift). Victoria B. Bjorkland, Partner, Simpson, Thatcher
& Bartlett, Comments at a Conference on "Governance of Nonprofit Organizations: Stan-
dards and Enforcement," National Center on Philanthropy and the Law, New York Univer-
sity School of Law (Oct. 30-31, 1997) (author's notes).
142. George Gleason Bogert, Proposed Legislation Regarding State Supervision of Charities, 52
MICH. L. REv. 633, 633 (1954). See generally Blasko et al., supra note 105, at 37 (examining
"private parties' standing to initiate litigation against charitable organizations for misman-
agement, fraud or corruption"). But see infra notes 291-294 and accompanying text for a
discussion of whether donors have standing under the Uniform Management of Institutional
Funds Act.
143. See Blasko et al., supra note 105, at 43-47 (discussing the authority of attorneys gen-
eral to bring suit to enforce the charitable.purposes of an organization).
144. FlscH, supra note 46, § 711, at 549-50 (footnotes omitted). The judicial power to
remove a trustee, and the causes that justify removal, are the same for charitable and pri-
vate trusts. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 101, § 398, at 343.
145. Compare Marion R. Fremont-Smith, Enforceability and Sanctions, paper presented
at a Conference on "Governance of Nonprofit Organizations: Standards and Enforce-
ment," National Center on Philanthropy and the Law, New York University School of Law
(Oct. 1997) (manuscript at 4, on file with author) ("It is this author's view that the overrid-
ing factor in almost every case in which standing has been granted to individuals has been
lack of effective enforcement by the attorney general or another government official.")
with Rob Atkinson, Unsettled Standing: Who (Else) Should Enforce the Duties of Charitable Fiduci-
aries, 23J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 1998) (manuscript at 94-95) (questioning whether attor-
ney general supervision really is too low). Moreover, Atkinson would prefer that charities
be treated as "radically independent, self-sustaining" communities, leading to a "sectarian
model" of altruism in which "charitable fiduciaries would enjoy maximum independence
from all external controls, both private and public." Id. at 109. Under such a view,
[T]he state would have no say in the use of resources in the hands of charitable
fiduciaries, beyond ensuring that they do not transgress the outer limits of care
and loyalty. This model, in effect, would abolish the duty of obedience entirely
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the gains in preventing charity abuses outweigh the additional cost in
administration, interference in decisionmaking, and the possibility of
getting the wrong result.
To minimize the risk of vexatious and multiple lawsuits but to
take advantage of the oversight provided by those with a special inter-
est in the charity, a few recent statutes set forth an expanded class of
private persons with standing rights. The 1980 California nonprofit
statute permits any of the following to "bring an action to enjoin, cor-
rect, obtain damages for or to otherwise remedy a breach of a charita-
ble trust": (1) the corporation, derivatively; (2) an officer; (3) a
director; (4) a "person with a reversionary, contractual, or property
interest in the assets subject to such charitable trust" [but note, not
donors generally]; and (5) the Attorney General, or any person
granted relator status by the Attorney General.1 46 New York's 1970
statutory revision grants standing in suits for breach of fiduciary duty
to the attorney general, the corporation, a director, an officer, mem-
bers holding five percent of voting power, and, if the certificate of
incorporation or the bylaws so provide, to any contributor of at least
$1000.147 The 1987 Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act permits de-
rivative suits by fifty members or, if the nonprofit corporation has
fewer than fifty members, members holding five percent of voting
power. (In such a case, notice must be given to the attorney general,
who has the right to join in the action.)' 4 ' Even without statutory
authorization, courts will, on rare occasion, grant standing to those
with a "special interest.' ' 1 4 9 One commentary also found that "[i]f a
and leave the attorney general alone with standing to enforce the remaining du-
ties of care and loyalty.
Id.
146. CAL. CORP. CODE § 5142(a) (West 1990). The attorney general must be given no-
tice of any action brought by the other persons specified, and the attorney general may
intervene. "In a suit by a relator, the relator generally takes an active part in the proceed-
ing and is responsible for court costs, but the attorney general retains control of the action
and can withdraw, dismiss or compromise it at any time." Blasko et al., supra note 105, at
49 (footnote omitted); accord Fishman, Development of Nonprofit Law, supra note 44, at 674
(urging that relators, if successful, should be granted reimbursement for costs and attor-
neys' fees).
147. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 720(b) (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1997). The
statute also grants standing to a receiver, a trustee in bankruptcy, or a judgment creditor.
See id.
148. REvISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. AcT § 6.30(a), (f) (1987) (Derivative Suits).
149. See, e.g., Jones v. Grant, 344 So. 2d 1210, 1212 (Ala. 1977) (holding that "benefi-
ciaries with a sufficient special interest in the enforcement of a charitable trust can insti-
tute a suit as to that trust," and granting standing to the faculty, staff, and student body to
sue where grants and loans made to upgrade the college had allegedly been misused);
Hooker v. Edes Home, 579 A.2d 608, 614 (D.C. 1990) (holding that "a particular class of
potential beneficiaries has a special interest in enforcing a trust if the class is sharply de-
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court determines that the attorney general is substantially ineffective,
the probability increases that a private party will be allowed to repre-
sent, in litigation, the public's beneficial interest in a charity."1 ' On
the other hand, a recent Connecticut case suggests that those who
hope for a liberalizing trend in interpreting standing rights will have a
long wait.
1 51
Granting standing to any director of the charity raises a circularity
problem.152 To allow suit by a disappointed director of a charitable
corporation confounds the general principle that the corporation is
to be governed by the majority of the board. 153 Henry Henn and Jef-
fined and its members are limited in number," and, in addition, that plaintiffs can show an
immediate threat of injury); Alco Gravure, Inc. v. Knapp Found., 479 N.E.2d 752, 755 (N.Y.
1985) (holding that where a company foundation amended its articles of incorporation to
permit distributing income and principal to another charity, individuals from the class of
intended beneficiaries-the employees of a particular corporation-had standing to sue
for equitable relief). For an extreme example of standing granted to a large, indefinite
class, see Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes National Training School for Deaconesses & Missionaries, 367
F. Supp. 536, 540-41 (D.D.C. 1973) (mem.), which certified 10,000 patients of a hospital as
a class to sue derivatively for an injunction against director mismanagement and self-deal-
ing, but did not permit direct suit for treble damages under the antitrust laws.
150. Blasko et al., supra note 105, at 69.
151. See Steeneck v. University of Bridgeport, 668 A.2d 688 (Conn. 1995). Steeneck dealt
with a University "life trustee" who lacked voting privileges, who could not serve as an
officer or member of the executive committee or chair corporate committees, and who
could not be counted toward a quorum. Id. at 690. The court held that the trustee had no
standing, either as a "director," id. at 695, or as someone with a "special interest," to chal-
lenge as ultra vires the University's contract to affiliate with the Professors World Peace
Academy, founded by the Reverend Sun Myung Moon. Id. at 696-97. The Steeneck court
declined to decide whether voting rights alone were a necessary prerequisite to director
status, but instead concluded that the bylaws contemplated that "the life trustee position is
largely an honorary one, to which genuine and substantial management functions do not
attach." Id. at 694. A strong dissent argued: "It is ... clear that, in granting standing to a
mere 'member' of a nonstock corporation who has no role in the management of the
affairs of the corporation[,] the legislature could not have intended to deny a nonvoting
trustee statutory standing . . . ." Id. at 698 (Berdon, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
Moreover, the dissent viewed the position of life trustee as analogous to that of a co-trustee,
who, under the common law, is "'in the best position to learn about breaches of trust and
to bring the relevant facts to a court's attention.'" Id. at 699 (quoting Holt v. College of
Osteopathic Physicians & Surgeons, 394 P.2d 932, 936 (Cal. 1964)).
152. Supporters of such a right include Karst, supra note 68, at 443-44, and Bogert, supra
note 142, at 633-36. In the reverse situation, the corporation, acting through a majority of
the board, may clearly bring suit against a wrongdoing director for breach of fiduciary
duty. See FREMOrNT-SMITH, supra note 67, at 151 (noting that "[i]n the case of a charitable
corporation, the right to bring suit to enforce the duties of directors is available to the
corporation").
153. See, e.g., Holt, 394 P.2d at 939-41 (McComb, J., dissenting) (explaining that "[t]he
affairs of either a private corporation or a charitable corporation are managed by a major-
ity of the board of directors or board of trustees of the corporation"); Nugent ex rel. Lin-
gard v. Harris, 184 A.2d 783, 785-86 (R.I. 1962) (affirming the trial judge's finding that a
minority of directors may not secure removal of the majority in the absence of mismanage-
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frey Boyd thus observe: "Analogous New York case law probably
would bar the derivative action if a disinterested quorum or commit-
tee of directors exercises its business judgment and determines that
the maintenance of the action is against the best interests of the cor-
poration";"' accordingly, by contrast, "[d]emand might be unneces-
sary if plaintiff shows, for example, that the demand would be futile
because the complaint implicates a majority of the board."155 A Cali-
fornia court permitting a charity's directors to sue noted: "We do not
reach the question whether minority directors of a private [business]
corporation can bring an action in behalf of the corporation. The
differences between private and charitable corporations make the
consideration of such an analogy valueless."' 56
What happens to the errant fiduciary once someone with stand-
ing complains? As discussed in Part III.A, even in the rare case when a
breach is established, under state law, a finding of liability almost
never results in a punishment more severe than admonishment or, at
worst, removal of the fiduciary. As discussed immediately below, re-
cent federal tax law could provide a different answer.
II. FEDERAL REGULATION OF CHARITY FIDUCIARIES THROUGH
TAX LAWs
Overlaid on the state law variations in the law of charities is the
uniform layer of federal tax law. In order for a charity to qualify for
federal income tax exemption under section 501 (c) (3) of the Internal
ment as opposed to a difference of opinion). A similar problem can arise in a charitable
trust, whose trustees (unlike the trustees of a private trust) may act by majority rather than
unanimous decision. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 383 (1959) (explaining that
if there are several trustees of a charitable trust, their powers may be exercised by a major-
ity of the trustees unless otherwise directed by the terms of the trust); FREMONT-SMITH,
supra note 67, at 107 ("In a private trust powers can be exercised only with the concurrence
of all the trustees; whereas in a charitable trust, the affirmation of a majority is sufficient
unless there is a provision . . . requiring unanimity.").
154. Henry G. Henn & Jeffrey H. Boyd, Statutory Trends in the Law of Nonprofit Organiza-
tions: California, Here We Come!, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 1103, 1123-24 (1981).
155. Id. at 1123 n.159; accord REvISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 6.30 cmt. 2, at 119
(1987) (noting that a demand on the board prior to bringing suit "would be useless, for
example, if the suit was against all the directors for entering into a conflict of interest
transaction").
156. Holt, 394 P.2d at 936 n.4 (citation omitted). Even granting standing to a co-trustee,
however, does not guarantee that the co-trustee will bring suit. Charles Berry and Gerald
Buchwald tell the story of how John Hancock, elected treasurer of the Harvard Corpora-
tion in the 1770s, moved the treasury to Philadelphia and refused to settle the amount or
resign as treasurer. Charles R. Berry & Gerald J. Buchwald, Enforcement of College Trustees'
Fiduciary Duties: Students and the Problem of Standing, 9 U.S.F. L. REv. 1, 13 n.50 (1974).
Hancock later became governor of Massachusetts and thus president of the Harvard Board
of Overseers. Id. His estate made restitution after his death, still without any litigation. Id.
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Revenue Code, it must be organized and operated exclusively for a
religious, educational, or charitable purpose. 157 In addition, the
Code prohibits the "inurement" of charity profits to "any private
shareholder or individual." '158 Federal income tax law applies the
same organizational and operational constraints on charities regard-
less of organizational form-that is, whether organized as trusts or
corporations. 
159
Additional restrictions apply to that subset of section 501 (c) (3)
organizations known as "private foundations,"160 generally defined as
charities (other than churches, hospitals, or educational institutions)
funded by a small group of donors. 61 In 1969, amendments to the
Internal Revenue Code effectively adopted the strict trust standard of
loyalty by imposing an absolute ban on most self-dealing transactions
between a private foundation insider and the foundation.1 62 Before
1950, the tax laws were silent on the extent to which self-dealing trans-
actions by charity managers amounted to prohibited private inure-
ment. In 1950, spurred by complaints about abuses in the private
foundation subsector, 163 Congress passed a statute imposing an arm's-
157. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (West 1997).
158. Id.
159. See id. (including in its definition of exempt organizations "[c]orporations" and
"any community chest, fund, or foundation" that meets the forementioned requirements).
160. See I.R.C. ch. 42 ("Private Foundations and Certain Other Tax-Exempt
Organizations").
161. See I.R.C. § 509 (defining the term "private foundation").
162. Henry Hansmann disagrees with Congress's decision to use the Internal Revenue
Code to impose strict fiduciary standards on private foundation managers, and less strict
standards on managers of publicly supported charities. Hansmann, The Evolving Law, supra
note 29, at 837-38. To Hansmann, this is exactly backwards: As a principal-agent matter,
donors to foundations can look out for their own interests, while donors to public charities
need the extra protection of the ban on self-dealing. Id. As Hansmann explains:
I think the tax code's private foundation rules are a bad model upon which to
base corporate-law fiduciary duties for officers of private foundations .... The
stricter standard is unnecessary because the only person that a private foundation
can defraud is the federal government .... Most of us are not donating to private
foundations unless we control them .... We are very interested in the fiduciary
duties imposed upon other kinds of nonprofits. In short, the federal tax code
places the strictest fiduciary standards upon the class of organizations for which
such standards are least appropriate from the point of view of corporation law. I
think it is regrettable that we have defaulted to the federal tax law to establish
fiduciary standards. But there may be no alternative.
Id. at 838. However, the reason Congress imposed self-dealing prohibitions on substantial
contributors to and managers of private foundations was not to protect the donors, but
rather to protect the taxpayers: Congress was concerned precisely with "defraud[ing] the
federal government." Id.
163. See Consuelo Lauda Kertz, Executive Compensation Dilemmas in Tax-Exempt Organiza-
tions: Reasonableness, Comparability, and Disclosure, 71 TUL. L. Rtv. 819, 822 (1997) (explain-
ing how the new legislation resulted from reports of misappropriations). Technically,
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length standard on loans, payments of compensation, preferential
availability of goods or services, and other transactions with creators,
substantial contributors, and their families and controlled busi-
nesses. 164 The Internal Revenue Service, however, found it nearly im-
possible to enforce an arm's-length standard. Moreover, the
penalty-i.e., loss of tax exemption-was so great that the Service only
reluctantly found violations.' 65 In response, in 1969 Congress re-
placed the arm's-length standard with an absolute prohibition, viola-
tions of which attract penalty taxes to the benefiting disqualified
person and to a participating foundation manager. 166 Unless cor-
rected, serious prohibited transactions can also cause loss of tax ex-
emption to the private foundation.
For nearly thirty years, transactions between non-private founda-
tions-that is, the "public charities"-and their insiders continued to
be governed only by the facts-and-circumstances private-inurement
test. 167 A finding of private inurement would theoretically cause loss
of the public charity's tax exemption.' 68 In practice, this death sen-
tence was avoided if the Service and the charity could work out a clos-
ing agreement in which the insiders agreed to modify their conduct
and make the charity whole.1 69
A few years ago, congressional tax law writers became captivated
by the sorry facts of management buyouts of nonprofit health mainte-
nance organizations at reportedly phenomenal bargain prices to the
insiders.1 ° The federal tax rules were helpless to punish this type of
these charities were not called private foundations until the Tax Reform Act of 1969. See
I.R.C. § 509(a) (West 1997).
164. I.R.C. § 503 (1954) (subsections dealing with the arm's-length standard were re-
pealed in 1969).
165. See Kertz, supra note 163, at 827-28 (noting that the IRS has been reluctant to use
the harsh remedy of loss of exemption except in egregious cases).
166. Code section 4941 contains exceptions for, among other things, the payment of
compensation "for personal services which are reasonable and necessary to carrying out
the exempt purpose of the private foundation." I.R.C. § 4941 (d). Nevertheless, the per se
bar on self-dealing transactions occasionally caused severe dislocations. For example, sec-
tion 4941 "forced the Rockefeller Foundation to spend two million dollars to move out of
Rockefeller Center in order to avoid a conflict of interest, even though it was paying regu-
lar commercial rent." Hone, supra note 37 (discussant remarks), at 770 (comments of
Professor John Simon).
167. JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN ScHwARz, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 496 (1995).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See, e.g., Theresa McMahon, FairValue? The Conversion of Nonprofit HMOs, 30 U.S.F.
L. REv. 355, 388 (1996) (discussing the interest taken by United States Representative Pe-
ter Stark of California when news of the proposed management buyout of Health Net, a
nonprofit public benefit social welfare organization, became public); Lee A. Sheppard,
HMO Conversions and Self-Dealing, 61 TAX NoTEs 15, 15 (1993) (same). Another notorious
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wrongdoing. A charity selling all its assets and distributing the sale
proceeds to other charities in liquidation doesn't care about losing its
tax exemption. 171 But why did this become a ftderal tax problem?
Should it be reason enough that, in some of these cases, controversy
raged locally over whether the state regulatory agency had the exper-
tise, the time, or, perhaps, the political will to ensure the fairness of
the transaction to the nonprofit?
172
Congressional interest in this and other types of "excess benefit"
transactions intensified. Reformers sought a legal structure that
would penalize the wrongdoers rather than the injured charity and its
beneficiaries, without imposing an absolute ban on self-dealing.
173
Thus, both congressional and administration proposals urged a vari-
ety of "intermediate sanctions"-penalty taxes on the excess benefits
obtained by misbehaving insiders rather than the death sentence of
revoking the organization's tax exemption. 174 A set of intermediate
sanctions was signed into law on July 30, 1996.175
case, involving the sale of Anclote Psychiatric Hospital in Florida, also inspired Congress-
man Stark to propose inserting self-dealing taxes into the Clinton administration's health
care reform bill. Michael W. Peregrine & Bernadette M. Broccolo, Stark Introduces Exempt
Organizations "Intermediate Sanctions" Legislation, 9 EXEMFr ORG. TAX REv. 131, 132 (1994).
Stark's proposal extended the inurement prohibition to HMOs and other organizations
exempt under Internal Revenue Code section 501 (c) (4). See Peregrine & Broccolo, supra,
at 132. The Internal Revenue Service retroactively revoked Anclote's exemption in order
to tax the sale; the Tax Court upheld the Service in finding the below-market terms of the
sale resulted in private inurement. See Anclote Psychiatric Ctr., Inc. v. Commissioner, 76
T.C.M. (CCH) 175 (1998).
171. See Sheppard, supra note 170, at 17 (noting that if an organization no longer exists,
the fact that it is no longer exempt is unimportant); cf id. at 16-17 (describing Letter
Ruling 9130002, a "rare" case in which the Internal Revenue Service retroactively revoked a
hospital's exemption to "enable[ ] the IRS to tax the sale proceeds"); see supra note 170
(describing Anclote Psychiatric Center). Moreover, in many of the nonprofit hospital con-
versions the charity retains the sale proceeds and operates as a grant-making foundation,
in which case continued tax-exempt status would be important. See extended discussion in
Part III.B, infra.
172. See, e.g., Harris Meyer, Selling ... Or Selling Out, TRUSTEE, Sept. 1996, at 12, 14 ("In
the 1980s, a number of not-for-profit California HMOs were purchased in leveraged
buyouts by insiders, then sold for far larger sums .... State regulators were widely criti-
cized for being asleep at the wheel.").
173. See Kertz, supra note 163, at 828 (explaining that the loss of exemption by a univer-
sity would affect the students, faculty, staff, and general community, without necessarily
punishing the wrongdoers).
174. The Internal Revenue Service has also set forth guidelines specifically addressed to
health care organizations. See supra note 131.
175. Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. 104-168, 110 Stat. 1452 (1996), § 1311(a) (codi-
fied at I.R.C. § 4958 (West 1997)) (adding to the Internal Revenue Code new section 4958
("Taxes on Excess Benefit Transactions")). See generally Kertz, supra note 163 (analyzing
recently enacted intermediate-sanctions legislation that deals with excessive compensation
abuses). The new law also extends the "private inurement" prohibition to section
501 (c) (4) organizations. See I.R.C. §§ 501 (c) (4) (B), 4958 (e) (1).
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Under the new rules, if a "disqualified person"-anyone in a posi-
tion to exercise substantial influence over the affairs of the charity (or
a related person) Y6 -receives a financial benefit from the charity
greater than the value of goods or services she provided, then the ben-
efited insider must pay a tax equal to twenty-five percent of this ex-
cess.' 7 7 (A second-tier, confiscatory tax applies if the charity is not
made whole.1 7 1) In addition, a tax applies to any charity manager
who "knowingly" approved the transaction. 179 Under the legislative
history, charity fiduciaries may rely on a rebuttable presumption of
reasonableness if the following conditions are met: (1) the transac-
tion was approved by the trustees or directors (or a committee
thereof), who were individuals unrelated to and not controlled by the
disqualified person; (2) this independent body obtained and relied
on appropriate data for functionally comparable positions; and (3)
the body adequately documented the basis for its determination.8 0
In all other cases, the burden of proof will be on the fiduciaries,
although the Internal Revenue Service has hinted that it will not pur-
sue "minor" transgressionslsl and that it is considering safe harbors
for charities (such as churches) that lack independent boards.18 2
Indeed, these new rules are only the latest in a series of federal
tax laws that impose tighter restrictions on charity behavior than do
state rules. While state law generally permits a nonprofit organization
to have broad purposes-such as "any lawful purpose"'8-a charity
that hopes to obtain federal income-tax exemption under section
501(c) (3) must have only religious, educational, or charitable pur-
poses. Federal tax rules regarding unrelated business income (start-
ing in 1950),184 private foundation status (1946, 1950, and particularly
1969),185 and political and lobbying activities (1969 and 1987)186 have
profoundly influenced operations of the charitable sector. The infor-
176. I.R.C. § 4958(f)(1)(A)-(B).
177. I.R.C. § 4958(a)(1), (c)(1)(A).
178. I.R.C. § 4958(b).
179. I.R.C. § 4958(a) (2).
180. H.R. REP. No. 104-506, at 56-57 (1996). See also the American Law Institute's dis-
cussion of "duty of fair dealing" in infra note 229.
181. See supra note 165.
182. Fred Stokeld, IRS Considering Alternatives to Rebuttable Presumption Rule, 74 TAX
NOTES 1505, 1506 (1997).
183. See Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, supra note 68, at 509-38 (dis-
cussing "the varying approaches taken in the state statutes toward the purposes for which
nonprofit corporations may be formed").
184. See I.R.C. §§ 511-515.
185. See I.R.C. §§ 507-509(a).
186. See I.R.C. §§ 501 (c) (3), 501 (h), 4911.
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mation returns that charities must file with the IRS, and make avail-
able to the public, contain the most comprehensive and current data
on the sector.1 8 7 Meanwhile, lax or overburdened state attorneys gen-
eral have come to rely more and more on the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice to police charities.
1 8 8
As a result, we have been moving to a system of federalizing over-
sight of charities. De facto, and against its core competency (and
likely preference), the Internal Revenue Service comes to operate, at
least in part, as a uniform, super-regulatory board.' 8 9 One can debate
the merits of increased federal powers and their effect on state en-
forcement.1 "' However, even the best laws lose their salutary benefits
187. Generally, all charities with annual gross receipts of over $25,000, except churches,
must file a Form 990 (or, if small, a Form 990-EZ). Private foundations must file a Form
990-PF. I.R.C. § 6033(a). Unfortunately, the IRS does not have an easily accessible central-
ized source for returns. Legislation enacted in 1996 also requires Form 990 filers to dis-
close their most recent form on the spot (for an in-person request) or within 30 days (for a
mall-in request). I.R.C. § 6104(e).
188. This is not to say that the states have complete confidence in the adequacy of the
IRS Form 990. See, e.g., Robert Franklin, Charity Information Easier to Come by, but Is It Relia-
ble?, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Oct. 7, 1996, at 3B, available in LEXIS, News Library, Strib
File (quoting Sheila Fishman, the director of the Minnesota's Attorney General's charity
division, as saying she has "very little trust in" the Form 990).
189. See, for example, Marion R. Fremont-Smith, Trends in Accountability and Regulation
of Nonprofits, in THE FUTURE OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 75, 86 (Virginia A. Hodgkinson et
al. eds., 1989), which states:
[T]he Internal Revenue Service is not the most appropriate agency to regulate
the independent sector. It lacks the more refined tools for compelling compli-
ance available to state equity courts. It is not well placed to police disclosure
provisions. Even if granted equity-type powers, its staff is neither by training nor
by inclination suited to enforcement that is not designed to raise revenue.
190. In an analogous context, Justice Black lamented the prosecuting of local crimes
through federal tax laws; specifically, he argued that the power shift to Washington
harmed both the central government and the states. See Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S.
130, 141-43 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting).
Under Internal Revenue Code section 6104(c), the Internal Revenue Service must
notify appropriate state officials of a final determination to deny or revoke tax exemption
of a charity under section 501 (c) (3). Accord James B. Lyon, The Supervision of Charities in the
United States by the State Attorneys General (and Other State Agencies) and the Internal Revenue
Service, N.Y.U. 24TH CONF. ON TAX PLANNING FOR 501(c) (3) ORGANIZATIONS, § 5.04[2], at
5-27 (1996). It might improve the administration of state monitoring and enforcement if
Congress permitted the Service to share information about an ongoing investigation with
the appropriate state. See id. § 5.04[1], at 5-25 to 5-26 (discussing the relationship between
the state attorneys general and the Internal Revenue Service in general). Lyon describes
the frustration resulting from the Service's inability to reciprocate the flow of information
that attorneys general currently provide to the Service. See id. § 5.04[3], at 5-28 & n.71
("'We provide information to the IRS and we don't know what the IRS does with it because
they are prohibited by law from telling us what they are doing with it.'" (quoting testimony
by the Connecticut Assistant Attorney General)). The Oversight Subcommittee of the
House Ways and Means Committee recently recommended that "'[the] IRS study and
make recommendations to the Committee on Ways and Means on whether certain State
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if they are not backed up with authority, and the exempt-organization
function at the Service suffers from its own inadequate resources. 191
III. DUTY OF CARE: CORE QUESTIONS AND CASE STUDIES
Legal disputes involving nonprofit fiduciaries generally deal with
breaches of the duty of loyalty rather than of the duty of care. Self-
dealing and other conflicts of interest go to the heart of the fiduciary
relationship. In the charitable sector, such violations of the public
trust attract the most press coverage and public disdain, and thus win
the greatest share of attorney general attention.1 9 2 Yet, important as is
fiduciary malfeasance, the remainder of this Article will focus on fidu-
ciary misfeasance, precisely because the law is so bad at addressing
officers, such as the attorney general and other officials charged with overseeing public
charities, should be provided additional access to Federal tax information."' Id. § 5.04[3],
at 5-29 (quoting HousE SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT OF THE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 103D
CONG., REPORT ON REFORMS TO IMPROVE THE TAx RULES GOVERNING PUBLIC CHARITIES 23
(Comm. Print 1994)).
191. See, e.g., Wright, supra note 48 (citing Exempt Organizations Director Marcus
Owens to the effect that the 800 IRS employees who work on exempt organizations (and
municipal bonds) audit 10,000 organizations "in a good year," but that fewer than 100 of
these are comprehensive reviews).
192. See, e.g., Jim Witty, Attorney General Turns up the Heat, HONOLULU STAR-BULL., Sept.
11, 1997, at Al (reporting on a preliminary attorney general investigation of the trustees of
the $10-billion Bishop Estate charitable trust, particularly instances of self-dealing and co-
investing in projects in which trustees also personally invested); Op. N.M. Att'y Gen., No.
90-17, 1990 N.M. AG LEXIS 15, at *12-13 (Sept. 20, 1990) (concluding that the state con-
flict-of-interest statute bars the state from entering into a contract with a nonprofit having a
state legislator on the board); M.A. Farber, Abrams to Investigate Covenant House Loans, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 2, 1990, at BI, available in LEXIS, News Library, Nyt File (citing a former head
of the Attorney General's Charities Bureau who emphasized that it is a violation of state law
for any officer or director of a nonprofit to receive a loan from the institution); William C.
Lhotka, Designer Gowns Helped Oust Sisters from Foundation, ST. Louis PosT-DISPATCH, Sept.
22, 1996, at 5D, available in LEXIS, News Library, Mwest File (noting that the Missouri
Attorney General "called the [David B. Lichtenstein] foundation a 'financial playground'
for [the removed directors]"); Selwyn Raab, Judge Ousts Operators at Mental Center, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 21, 1986, at B3, available in LEXIS, News Library, Nyt File (noting a situation in
which a nonprofit paid $2.5 million in excessive rents to corporation owned by the family
of the nonprofit's founder and medical director); Kathleen Teltsch, Abrams Says Head of
Foundation Lived Well on Charity's Millions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1988, § 1, pt. 3, at 75, avail-
able in LEXIS, News Library, Nyt File ("'Since I've been Attorney General, I do not recall
seeing another case of such extreme personal greed .. .- (quoting the New York Attorney
General)); Kathleen Teltsch, State Says Levitt Diverted $5 Million from Family Foundation, N.Y.
TIMES, June 11, 1983, § 1, at 27, available in LEXIS, News Library, Nyt File (reporting on
the charges brought by the New York State Attorney General against William J. Levitt for
diverting foundation funds for "personal use and benefit"). See generally DeMott, supra
note 135 (addressing whether directors of nonprofits should be as free to self-deal as their
counterparts are in for-profit business corporations, and arguing that norms in the for-
profit context should not be imported into the nonprofit context).
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it. 9 ' The discussion is divided into four topics, based on the cases
introduced in this Article: (A) the near abdication of director over-
sight (Adelphi University); (B) fundamental changes in the charity's
purposes or activities (Timken Mercy hospital); (C) investment policy
(the Reader's Digest foundations); and (D) the cozy world of charity
fundraising (Foundation for New Era Philanthropy).
The law largely ignores the "business" side of charity: decisions as
to what activities the charity should engage in go unreviewed and un-
disturbed by public authorities, be they attorneys general or judges. 94
All matters of judgment fall under the fiduciary's duty of care, gov-
erned by general principles of prudence and good faith. 95 Even
here, again for practical reasons, we find more specific guidance and
review for investment activities than for spending policies. After all,
one can measure the success of an investment portfolio by referring to
objective indices, but who can second-guess a decision to build a new
physics lab instead of raise salaries for the business school faculty?
In practice, of course, it is not always so easy to separate the twin
obligations of loyalty and care. Peter Swords and Harriet Bograd have
found a consensus among the more experienced state charity officials:
"Inadequate board governance also creates the conditions that make
embezzlement, misappropriation of funds and self-dealing possible.
The case of the domineering executive director and the weak board
seems to be quite typical across the country."19 6
Moreover, courts seem more willing to listen to duty-of-care com-
plaints if the transaction is tainted by duty-of-loyalty implications. For
193. For a rare example of the attorney general stepping in to remedy gross mismanage-
ment, see Randy Kennedy, New Board Puts Garden Back on Feet, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1993,
§ 13, at 9, available in LEXIS, News Library, Nyt File (describing the New York Attorney
General's investigation of the directors and officers of the Queens Botanical Garden Soci-
ety for waste and mismanagement, the removal or resignation of 20 directors, and the
operation of the Society by the New York City Department of Cultural Affairs until the
Society's members elected new directors); see also supra note 47 (describing the California
Attorney General's actions against charity fiduciaries who breached their duty of care).
194. See REvisED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. Acr § 8.01 (b) (1987) ("Except as provided in
this Act .... all corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and the
affairs of the corporation managed under the direction of, its board.").
195. See Henry Ridgely Horsey, The Duty of Care Component of the Delaware Business Judg-
ment Rule, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 971, 977-78 (1994) (discussing the "business judgment" rule
as according deference to directors in their duty to govern in good faith).
196. Peter Swords & Harriet Bograd, Accountability in the Nonprofit Sector: What Problems
Are Addressed by State Regulators? (visited Mar. 19, 1998) <ftp://nonprofits.org/pub/cyb-
acc/npcc/AG PROB.WP5>. The state charity officials also expressed familiarity with the
"'self-employment syndrome,'" in which a charity "was created primarily for the benefit of
its formerly unemployed executive, and the board, staff, vendors, and contractors include
many friends and relatives of the executive." Id.
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example, in the "Sibley Hospital case,"' 1 7 the directors completely
failed to supervise the investment of funds, leaving millions of dollars
on deposit in non-interest-bearing bank accounts. 98 The court,
though, appeared at least as influenced by concerns of loyalty.' 99 One
wonders whether Judge Gesell would have found any duty-of-care
breach-or, more important, even granted standing to the plaintiff
patients-had the funds been deposited at banks where the hospitals'
directors were not also directors. z00 Indeed,Judge Gesell's application
of the business-corporation fiduciary rules to charitable corporations
had even greater impact on the duty-of-loyalty side: The directors did
not face the absolute ban on self-dealing found in trust law, but only
the disclosure-fairness test of the corporate law.2 1 Nor did breach
lead to liability.20 2 In the end, no director was removed or fined;
rather, each was required only to read the court's opinion!20 3
The first and last of our case studies-Adelphi University and the
Foundation for New Era Philanthropy-deal with director judgment
unconstrained by donor direction. The middle two case studies raise
issues of donor control and the degree to which society should give
continuing authority to the donor's wishes. The drop in value of the
Wallace foundations can be traced directly to their holdings of stock
in their founders' company, Reader's Digest Associates. 2 4  In the
Timken Hospital case study, donors gave unrestricted funds to a chari-
table corporation formed for a specified purpose, raising a more sub-
tle, unself-interested type of divided loyalty-what Daniel Kurtz and
197. Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l Training Sch. for Deaconesses & Missionaries, 381
F. Supp. 1003 (D.D.C. 1974) (mem.) (Sibley Hospital).
198. See id. at 1010 & tbl.II (illustrating the directors' maintenance of funds in accounts
earning little or no interest).
199. See id. at 1016 (discussing instances in which defendant trustees engaged in self-
dealing); see also Scheuer Family Found., Inc. v. 61 Assocs., 582 N.Y.S.2d 662, 664 (App.
Div. 1992) ("[I]f plaintiff has made a prima facie showing of a lack of such disinterested
independence or such dual relation, the complaint may not be dismissed for failure to
state a cause of action solely upon application of the business judgment rule.").
200. But see Lynch v. Redfield Found., 88 Cal. Rptr. 86, 92 (Ct. App. 1970). In Lynch, the
court surcharged squabbling directors for permitting funds to accumulate in a non-inter-
est-bearing account for five years. Id. The Attorney General charged:
"[A]ll three directors in concentrating on their feud left the Foundation in a state
of suspended animation for several years ignoring their obligations to carry on its
charitable purposes and to manage its assets with the degree of care and diligence
which a prudent man would exercise in the management of his own affairs."
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting a statement of the Attorney General).
201. Sibley Hospital, 381 F. Supp. at 1015.
202. See id. at 1017.
203. See id. at 1021.
204. Cf. Barshay, supra note 17.
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other commentators call the duty of obedience.2"5 When may the
charity sell the donated property or alter the purposes to which that
donation is put? Does organizational form matter, and should it?
That is, should cy pres relief from a court be required for charitable
trusts while charitable corporate boards are granted plenary authority
to amend "outdated" restrictions and charitable purposes?
A. Adelphi University: Directors Fail to Exercise Judgment
1. The Standard of Care.-Only a handful of cases-in the propri-
etary sector as well as the nonprofit-deal with the fiduciary's duty of
care unadorned by concerns of the duty of loyalty. In 1891, the
United States Supreme Court first recognized a duty of care in indus-
trial-corporation directors to act as would "ordinarily prudent and dili-
gent men";2 6 in this five-four decision the business world learned
what a difficult standard this is to flunk.2 °7 The Delaware high court
did not even recognize a duty to act in an informed and prudent man-
ner until 1963.208
Plaintiffs' lack of success in duty-of-care claims has been blamed
on a misapplied business judgment rule.20 9 Commented Henry
Horsey, a former justice of the Delaware Supreme Court:
Those who surveyed the duty of care case law in this
country before the mid- [nineteen-] eighties found an infer-
tile field and were in nearly unanimous agreement as to their
findings: the business judgment rule had been applied in
such a manner as to constitute an almost per se bar to share-
205. See KuRTZ, supra note 30, at 84-90.
206. Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 152 (1891).
207. See id. at 165-66 (holding that the defendants were not liable for not preventing loss
by putting the bank into liquidation within 90 days after they became directors). Nine-
teenth-century courts initially applied fiduciary duties only to directors of corporations that
were banks, invoking a quasi-trustee theory. See Hun v. Cary, 82 N.Y. 65, 70 (1880) (stating
the question under consideration as the measure of fidelity, care, and diligence the trus-
tees of the bank owed to the bank and its depositors).
208. See Horsey, supra note 195, at 985-87 (discussing Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufac-
turing Co., 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963), in which a Delaware court first recognized the exist-
ence of a director's fiduciary duty to act in an informed and prudent manner). Justice
Horsey authored the controversial opinions for the court in both Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488
A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), and Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993), modified,
636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994). See infra notes 216-217, 228-230 and accompanying text.
209. See Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Business Judgment Rule: Meaningless Verbiage or Misguided
Notion?, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 287, 298-300, 304-12 (1994) (arguing that a gross negligence
standard does not appear to have affected the outcome in any case where the defendant
lost, and questioning why directors should enjoy more protection against a charge of negli-
gence than other professionals).
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holder claims of directors' breach of their fiduciary duty of
care. 210
Indeed, in 1942, the highest court of New York declared: "[E] rrors of
judgment by directors do not alone suffice to demonstrate lack of fi-
delity[,] .... even though the errors may be so gross that they may
demonstrate the unfitness of the directors to manage the corporate
affairs. 21 1
The business judgment rule (if not the name) dates back to a
1742 English case, Charitable Corp. v. Sutton,212 in which the Lord
Chancellor declared: "For it is by no means just in a judge, after bad
consequences have arisen from such executions of [directors'] power,
to say that they foresaw at the time what must necessarily happen; and
therefore were guilty of a breach of trust. ' 213 Declared one modern
trial judge, in rejecting a rule that directors are chargeable with ordi-
nary negligence: "Courts have more than enough to do in adjudicat-
ing legal rights and devising remedies for wrongs. The directors'
room rather than the courtroom is the appropriate forum for thrash-
ing out purely business questions .... ,2"' No wonder, then, that the
corporate bar was so stunned by the Delaware Supreme Court's 1985
decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom,215 holding directors personally liable
for gross negligence in arranging the sale of their company. 216 This
highly criticized decision helped inspire state statutes, discussed be-
low, that permit shareholders to limit or eliminate the monetary liabil-
ity of directors for most breaches of the duty of care.21 7
210. Horsey, supra note 195, at 977-78 (citing, among other articles, George W. Dent,Jr.,
The Revolution in Corporate Governance, the Monitoring Board, and the Director's Duty of Care, 61
B.U. L. REv. 623 (1981), and S. Samuel Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOF-
STRA L. REV. 93 (1979)).
211. Everett v. Phillips, 43 N.E.2d 18, 19-20 (N.Y. 1942).
212. 26 Eng. Rep. 642 (Ch. 1742).
213. Id. at 644. Horsey, supra note 195, at 975, describes Charitable Corp. as the "father"
of the "business judgment rule."
214. Kamin v. American Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 810-11 (Sup. Ct.), affid, 387
N.Y.S.2d 993 (App. Div. 1976). The author of the trial decision, Judge Edward J. Green-
field, also commented, "To allege that a director 'negligently permitted the [action]' . ..
without alleging fraud, dishonesty or nonfeasance, is to state merely that a decision was
taken with which one disagrees." Id. at 811.
215. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
216. See id. at 884 (holding board members personally liable for gross negligence in
failing to disclose all material facts before securing stockholders' approval of merger). The
defendants subsequently settled for $23.5 million, of which $10 million (the policy limit)
was covered by the company's directors' and officers' liability policy. Bayless Manning,
Reflections and Practical Tips on Life in the Boardroom After Van Gorkom, 41 Bus. LAw. 1, 1
editor's note (1985).
217. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b) (7) (Supp. 1996) (providing that a certifi-
cate of incorporation may include a provision limiting monetary liability of directors for
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2. The Business Judgment Rule.--The business judgment rule, by
definition, requires the exercise of judgment; thus, it is not available
in cases of nonfeasance.21 The American Law Institute found that
the "business judgment rule provides special protection to informed
business decisions as distinguished, for example, from continued inat-
tention to directorial obligations. ' 1 9 Critics contend that a distinc-
tion between misfeasance and nonfeasance fails to reflect life in the
boardroom. Complains Bayless Manning: "[A]stonishingly, ... given
the realities of the way boards operate, the business judgment rule
would not operate at all in respect of fully ninety percent of what di-
rectors are actually engaged in."22 Nonprofit directors devote even
less time and attention to their positions. Such affirmative board du-
ties as selecting the chief officer, preparing the budget, and reviewing
most breaches of the duty of care). Compare ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 59, § 7.19 (Limita-
tion on Damages for Certain Violations of the Duty of Care).
[I]t is contemplated that the outside directors who were held liable in Smith v.
Van Gorkom would have been entitled to the protection of a limitation on dam-
ages adopted pursuant to this Section. (No assumption is here made that these
directors would have been liable to any extent if § 4.01 [Duty of Care] had been
applicable.).
Id. § 7.19 cmt. f, at 248 (citation omitted); accord infra Part III.A.3 (discussing monetary
caps or waivers).
218. In Charitable Corp., the Lord Chancellor held the directors liable for the loss result-
ing from their gross failure to attend to the business, resulting in breaches of trust by
others. 26 Eng. Rep. at 644-45.
219. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 59, introductory note to part IV, at 135 (Duty of Care
and the Business Judgment Rule). The ALI acknowledges the difficulty in distinguishing
between "a conscious decision or inexcusable inattentiveness." Id. § 4.01(c) cmt., at 175
(discussing the safe harbor provided by the business judgment rule). Section 8.30(d) of
the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act states that a director is not liable "for any action
taken or not taken as a director" if the director complies with the duty-of-care standards.
REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.30, at 212 (1987) (General Standards for Direc-
tors). Again, though, this covers only conscious board decisions of whether to act or not.
See id. § 8.30 cmt. 9, at 219 ("'Section 8.30(d) ... also applies to the determination by the
board of directors of which matters to address and which not to address. Section 8.30(d)
does not apply only when the director has failed to consider taking action which under the
circumstances he is obliged to consider taking.'" (quoting MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT
§ 8.30(d) cmt. 4, at 225 (1984))).
220. Manning, supra note 127, at 1494. Manning begins his analysis by taking "as axio-
matic that a director should not be held liable for having failed in his duty of attention
unless his conduct departs significantly from normal expectations of proper conduct." Id.
at 1480. To Manning, the central problem of life as a director is that "the universe of all
actions not taken is always far greater than the roster of actions taken." Id. Because
agenda setting is the most important thing a board does, the distinction between commis-
sion and omission of specific acts is meaningless and unhelpful. See id. at 1485-86. Man-
ning concludes hopefully: "The courts will somehow find a way to alter the interpretation
of the business judgment rule in such a way as to make it produce commonsense results in
the case of reasonably diligent citizens who have been in good faith generally attentive to
their duties as directors over a period of time." Id. at 1495.
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operations are likely to be carried out haphazardly or by only a few of
the board members. Moreover, it is no legal defense that a director
was an uncompensated volunteer.
221
221. See Charitable Corp., 26 Eng. Rep. at 645 ("By accepting a trust of this sort, a person
is obligated to execute it with fidelity and reasonable diligence; and it is no excuse to say
that they had no benefit from it, but that it was merely honorary .... ); Lynch v. Redfield
Found., 88 Cal. Rptr. 86, 91 (Ct. App. 1970) ("By pointing out that they served without
compensation, defendant directors imply that such fact might subject them to a lesser
fiduciary obligation than a compensated trustee. No authority has been cited and we have
found none. We see no basis for such conclusion."). The Revised Model Nonprofit Corpora-
tion Act, however, states cryptically:
Two distinguishing factors of nonprofit corporations are that their directors may
be serving without compensation and are attempting to promote the public good.
Courts may take these factors into consideration in determining whether direc-
tors are liable with respect to performance of their duties. This does not mean
that directors can ignore their responsibilities because they are volunteers or have
no economic interest in the corporation or its operations.
REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. AcT § 8.30 cmt., at 215.
Many states have adopted mandatory or permissible statutory protections for volun-
teer directors of charities as a response to the liability crisis of the mid-1980s. See generally
REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT, ch. 8, subch. E (Indemnification), §§ 8.50-8.58.
These statutes do not, however, extend to trustees of charitable trusts. See BOGERT & Bo-
GERT, supra note 101, § 394, at 279; see also KURTZ, supra note 30, at 37 ("[P]rudence dic-
tates that directors' and officers' (D & 0) liability insurance be procured; it protects both
the organization's obligation to indemnify ... and it independently protects directors in
many cases when the corporation cannot provide indemnification under the prevailing
law."). See generally id. ch. 6 ("Protection: Indemnification and Insurance"). After review-
ing the data, Kurtz expresses skepticism of "an actual liability crisis" for nonprofit directors
and officers (although there has been an increase in tort claims against them). See id. at
95, 99. But see John v. John, 450 N.W.2d 795, 798 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989). In John, the trial
court found that the director was entitled to neither an advance for defense costs nor
indemnification where he "had committed gross misconduct and breached his fiduciary
duties as a director and trustee" of his foundation. Id. The trial court also found that he
"had engaged in a pervasive pattern of abuse of office including securities fraud, tax fraud,
perjury, self-dealing, conflicts of interest, corporate fraud, lying to the board of directors,
breach of fiduciary duties, deception and disobedience of the board of directors, waste,
and mismanagement." Id.; see also infta Part II.A.3 (discussing monetary shields for direc-
tors who breach their fiduciary duty of care).
Alfred Conard is credited for first proposing a monetary cap:
In order to be effective but not catastrophic, the measure of liability must stand in
a proper relation to what a director gains from his position.... Perhaps it should
be twice this amount, or perhaps one-half, but it should vary depending upon the
director's compensation....
... At the same time, the statute would forbid indemnification of such liabili-
ties, as well as prohibit insurance coverage against them.
Alfred F. Conard, A Behavioral Analysis of Directors'Liability for Negligence, 1972 DuKE L.J. 895,
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3. Remedies.--Traditionally, breach of a fiduciary duty has been
a tort.2 22 Thus, plaintiffs charging a breach of duty of care in the busi-
ness corporation context must show both a harm caused to the organi-
zation and the measure of that harm.223 Consider the 1924 case of a
director who failed to pay attention while the business corporation
slid into bankruptcy. 224 Judge Learned Hand declared, "Having ac-
cepted a post of confidence, [the director] was charged with an active
duty to learn ... "225 Nevertheless, the plaintiff had the burden of
demonstrating under the ordinary rules of tort that "the performance
of the defendant's duties would have avoided loss, and what loss it
would have avoided. ' 226 If this means that no remedy might be avail-
able, Hand saw no alternative:
[W] hen a business fails from general mismanagement, busi-
ness incapacity, or bad judgment, how is it possible to say
that a single director could have made the company success-
ful, or how much in dollars he could have saved? ...
... [Were the burden instead on the defendant,] if a
director were once shown slack in his duties, he would stand
charged prima facie with the difference between the corpo-
rate treasury as it was, and as it would be, judged by a hypo-
thetical standard of success. How could such a standard be
determined? . . .Men's fortunes may not be subjected to
such uncertain and speculative conjectures .... No men of
sense would take the office, if the law imposed upon them a
guaranty of the general success of their companies as a pen-
alty for any negligence.
227
Recently, however, the Delaware Supreme Court rejected Hand's
analysis: "The tort principles of Barnes have no place in a business
judgment rule standard of review analysis." 228 The court further held:
222. See Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (stating that a director's
breach of fiduciary duty "rests upon a tort").
223. See id. at 620 (explaining that the director's "disbursement may have been a wrong
to the company, but no damage followed it, and without damage there can be no
recovery").
224. Id. at 614-15.
225. Id. at 616.
226. Id. However, a particular director cannot escape liability by claiming that his or her
conduct was less significant than the conduct of the others. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note
59, § 7.19, at 238 (providing that if the board as a whole has violated its duty of care, either
by commission or omission, the directors bear joint and several liability).
227. Barnes, 298 F. at 616-17.
228. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 370 (Del. 1993), modified, 636 A.2d
956 (Del. 1994). Asked one commentator: "[I]f a breach of fiduciary duty is not a tort
action, what is it? A contract action?" Charles Hansen, The Technicolor Case: A Lost Oppor-
tunity, 19 DEL. J. CoRp. L. 617, 637 n.152 (1994). Even in a contract case, the plaintiff has
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"A breach of either the duty of loyalty or the duty of care rebuts the
presumption that the directors have acted in the best interests of the
shareholders, and requires the directors to prove that the transaction
was entirely fair." 2 9 The court declared that "[b]urden shifting does
the burden of establishing the elements of the claim, including causation and injury. The
court's approach in Technicolor appears to conflict with an earlier holding that "the party
attacking a board decision as uninformed must rebut the presumption that its business
judgment was an informed one." Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985).
229. Technicolor, 634 A.2d at 371. It is not easy to parse the issues of causation, damage,
and burden of proof under the traditional tort approach. To start with, the ALI's Principles
of Corporate Governance emphasize that just because a director might have committed a
breach of the duty of care, "no implication is intended that liability will be imposed. That
question depends on whether the acts or omissions were the legal cause of any damage to
the corporation." ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 59, introductory note to pt. IV, at 136; see also
id. § 7.18, at 222-23 (Recovery Resulting from a Breach of Duty: General Rules).
The ALI's restatement of the duty of care concludes: "A person challenging the con-
duct of a director ... has the burden of proving a breach of the duty of care .... and, in a
damage action, the burden of proving that the breach was the legal cause of damage suf-
fered by the corporation." Id. § 4.01(d), at 139. If, however, the challenging party can
prove that the director was not acting in good faith or with disinterest with respect to a
business judgment, then the director's conduct will be judged without recourse to the
protection of the business judgment rule. If the challenger can prove that the director did
not (or did not rationally) believe that the decision was in the best interests of the corpora-
tion, then the director has breached the duty of care. Next, the challenger must prove that
the breach of duty-of-care standards was the legal cause of loss to the corporation. See id.
§ 4.01 (d) cmt. d, at 142; see also id. § 7.18 (providing general rules regarding recovery for
breach of duty).
A different burden of proof applies in cases involving the duty of loyalty, which the
ALl calls the "duty of fair dealing." See id., introductory note to pt. V, at 199. In general, if
the interested director makes a disclosure in advance and obtains approval from disinter-
ested directors (or shareholders), then the business judgment rule applies, and the burden
of proof is on the challenger. The ALI suggests that even when disinterested directors
have approved a transaction, the transaction should be scrutinized more closely than
under the business judgment rule, because these transactions "need not be entered into
(in the sense that alternative transactions can usually be effected with third parties)." Id.
§ 5.02(a) (2) cmt., at 218; cf Gearhart Indus., Inc. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 741 F.2d 707, 720
(5th Cir. 1984) (explaining that under Texas business corporation law, the burden of
proof is on the interested director, but a transaction unfair to the corporation is still up-
held if ratified by a majority of disinterested directors or the shareholders). If the inter-
ested director does not make a disclosure or obtain approval, the more stringent standard
of fairness applies, and the burden of proof falls on the interested director. ALI PRINCI-
PLES, supra note 59, introductory note to pt. V, at 202-03; see also id. § 5.02 (Transactions
with the Corporation); id. § 5.02 & cmt. a, at 211 (discussing requirements of section 5.02
in comparison with existing law).
The ALI principles for advance approval of conflict-of-interest transactions apply in
some cases to ratification after the fact by disinterested directors (or shareholders). The
ABA's Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act, however, provides that if the interested direc-
tor of a public benefit corporation did not disclose and obtain board approval in advance,
then only the court or the attorney general may ratify the transaction (they may also ap-
prove it in advance). Of course, the interested director can always defend by proving that
the transaction was fair. REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.31 cmt. 2 (Ways to
Comply with Section 8.31), at 224-25 (1987).
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not create per se liability on the part of the directors; rather, it is a
procedure by which Delaware courts of equity determine under what
standard of review director liability is to be judged."23 Similarly, Illi-
nois rejects the Restatement (Second) of Torts' view of breach of fiduciary
duty as a tort, applying instead "the substantive laws of agency, con-
tract and equity."2 1
The type of remedy affects how concerned we should be about
the level of care. Judge Gesell in the Sibley Hospital case observed
that the "function of equity is not to punish but merely to take such
action as the Court in its discretion deems necessary to prevent the
recurrence of improper conduct." 23 2 If directors face monetary dam-
ages, then society might be loath to impose high fiduciary obligations
on charity managers. 233 By contrast, if wrong-doing directors face
only removal or other injunction (as embarrassing as this may be),
then perhaps society should not be so fearful. Of course, in framing
such a solution we should remember that courts (and attorneys gen-
eral) have enough to do without trying to run charities.23 4 Moreover,
charity board service generally is a voluntary and often time-consum-
ing undertaking, and removing one director does not ensure that a
better one will step forward to take his place.235 No wonder former
230. Technicolor, 634 A.2d at 371.
231. Kinzer v. City of Chicago, 539 N.E.2d 1216, 1220 (Il. 1989).
232. Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l Training Sch. for Deaconesses & Missionaries, 381
F. Supp. 1003, 1018 (D.D.C. 1974) (mem.).
233. Compare ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 59, § 7.19 reporter's note 5, at 258-59, which
states that limitations on liability for breach of duty of care will "tend to inhibit re-charac-
terization of duty of fair dealing cases as duty of care cases so as to enable the defendant to
pass on the loss to the insurer.... Such a fictitious characterization undercuts the deter-
rent threat by which the duty of loyalty should be enforced . . . ." But see Macaluso v.
Jenkins, 420 N.E.2d 251, 257 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (holding that a director exercising such
control over a corporation justifies piercing the nonprofit corporate veil).
234. The Model Business Corporation Act does not specify remedies for breach of the duty
of loyalty or the duty of care. The ABA suggests:
A court should enter an order that provides an equitable and fair remedy to
the corporation taking into account any benefits the corporation received. A
court should determine whether the breach of section 8.31 [duty of loyalty] was
technical or substantive, whether there was an attempt to deal openly and fairly
with the corporation and to act in good faith in furthering the corporation's best
interests. In particularly egregious cases involving fraudulent or malicious con-
duct, a court may grant exemplary damages.
MODEL Bus. CoRP,. ACT § 8.31 cmt. 6, at 227 (1984).
235. See, for example, David G. Samuels, Obligations of Fiduciaries of Charitable Founda-
tions, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 5, 1997, at 1, 4:
[A]s a technical matter, the Attorney General [of New York] can ordinarily initi-
ate court action seeking the removal of board members who authorize, or acqui-
esce in, the payment of excessive compensation to officers or insiders or other
actions which result in the waste of corporate assets. The Attorney General also
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New York State charity director Daniel Kurtz concluded: "In light of
the consistently generous holdings concerning directors' conduct, the
rare case in which breaching directors appear to suffer genuine sanc-
tions seems truly aberrational . "... 236
Not that recovery against negligent directors is much more likely
on the stock corporation side. Indeed, realizing that the risk of large
judgments dissuades good directors from service and encourages
them to be overly cautious in making decisions, legislatures across the
country have moved to permit business corporations to indemnify di-
rectors and-usually only upon shareholder approval-even to adopt
a shield against monetary damages for directors who act in good faith
and not out of self-interest.237 A monetary shield does not alter the
can seek to surcharge individual board members who have arguably squandered
or wasted corporate assets, requesting a court to order one or more board mem-
bers to pay restitution to the charitable organization and thereby make it whole.
However, as a practical matter, an attorney general will be less able to obtain
drastic relief against board members who are not shown to have been active par-
ticipants in, or beneficiaries of, illegal payments of charitable assets.
The courts do not tend to view passive or negligent conduct with as jaun-
diced an eye as active misconduct, and board members (who are often volunteers
serving without compensation, and often individuals of modest means) are not
likely to be required to repay funds which they never personally received, particu-
larly if they act promptly to seek relief from the active wrongdoer.
Accord Bell & Bell, supra note 47, at 451 (" [The California Attorney General] rarely seeks to
remove trustees from office. Courts require a strong likelihood of future misconduct by
the trustees, and often trustees against whom actions are brought will resign their office."
(footnote omitted)).
Note that the federal Volunteer Protection Act of 1997, which generally relieves volun-
teers of nonprofit or governmental organizations from liability, does not extend to "any
civil action brought by any nonprofit organization or any governmental entity against any
volunteer of such organization or entity." Volunteer Protection Act of 1997, Pub. L. No.
105-19, 111 Stat. 218 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14503(b)). It is not clear whether this
exception applies to attorney general enforcement action or derivative suits against wrong-
doing voluntary directors and trustees. See Fremont-Smith, supra note 145, at 11 ("How-
ever, it is not certain whether this exception will apply to enforcement actions by the
attorney general or individuals to whom the courts have granted standing to bring suit.").
236. KURTZ, supra note 30, at 156 n.20.
237. See generally E. Norman Veasey et al., Delaware Supports Directors with a Three-Legged
Stool of Limited Liability, Indemnification, and Insurance, 42 Bus. LAW. 399 (1987) (discussing
how the July 1986 amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law expanded pro-
tection for directors). In 1986, Delaware added to its Corporation Code new section
102(b) (7), which, as discussed below, is also available to nonprofit corporations. This stat-
ute permits the certificate of incorporation to contain:
(7) A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to
the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary
duty as a director, provided that such provision shall not eliminate or limit the
liability of a director: (i) For any breach of the director's duty of loyalty to the
corporation or its stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or
which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law; (iii) under
§ 174 of this title [dealing with distributions]; or (iv) for any transaction from
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standard of care, but rather limits the corporation to nonmonetary
remedies, such as injunction or removal of the offending director.238
which the director derived an improper personal benefit .... All references in
this paragraph to a director shall also be deemed to refer (x) to a member of the
governing body of a corporation which is not authorized to issue capital stock.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b) (7) (Supp. 1996).
In a survey conducted shortly after enactment, 75% of responding Delaware business
corporations declared an intent to seek stockholder approval for the amendments author-
ized by section 102(b) (7). R. Franklin Balotti & MarkJ. Gentile, Elimination or Limitation of
Director Liability for Delaware Corporations, 12 DEL. J. CoP. L. 5, 5 n.1 (1987); see also Zirn v.
VLI Corp., 681 A.2d 1050, 1053 (Del. 1996) ("We ... hold that the directors are exempt
from liability for monetary damages for good-faith disclosure violations by virtue of the
company's certificate of incorporation adopting the exemption authorized.. . ."); Arnold
v. Society for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 678 A.2d 533, 541 (Del. 1996) (Arnold 17) ("Arnold Ican be
read only as a holding that the directors are free from personal financial liability whether
monetary damages arise out of legal or equitable theories."); Arnold v. Society for Sav.
Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1286 (Del. 1994) (Arnold 1) ("We hold that Section
102(b) (7), as adopted by Bancorp, shields the individual defendants from liability, and
that the shield was not waived."), affrd, 678 A.2d 533 (Del. 1996); In re Dataproducts Corp.
Shareholders Litig., [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,227, at 91,183
(Del. Ch. Aug. 22, 1991) (noting that because of the corporation's certificate of incorpora-
tion, "the directors cannot be held liable for monetary damages except for (inter alia) acts
amounting to a breach of their duty of loyalty, or involving intentional misconduct, a
knowing violation of law, or an improper personal benefit").
In 1990, after 35 state legislatures had already acted, the ABA adopted an amendment
to the MODEL Bus. CoRp. Acr (1984). New section 2.02(b) (4) permits the following:
[A charter provision] eliminating or limiting the liability of a director to the cor-
poration or its shareholders for money damages for any action taken, or any fail-
ure to take any action, as a director, except liability for (A) the amount of a
financial benefit received by a director to which he is not entitled; (B) an inten-
tional infliction of harm on the corporation or the shareholders; (C) a violation
of section 8.33 [unlawful distributions]; or (D) an intentional violation of crimi-
nal law.
Committee I, supra note 55, at 700 (emphasis omitted).
The ABA adopted the opt-in charter-amendment approach favored (with various ex-
ceptions) by most of the states to the sel-executing approach adopted by five states: "So
long as any such liability-limitation provision does not extend to liability to third parties,"
the ABA comments, "shareholders should be permitted-except when important societal
values are at stake-to decide how to allocate the economic risk of the directors' conduct
between the corporation and the directors." Id.; see also 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN.
§ 2.02 cmt. i, at 109 (Director Liability) (3d ed. 1984 & Supp. 1992). One state (Virginia)
combines an opt-in with a self-executing rule, capping a director's liability at the lesser of(a)
the amount specified in the charter or bylaws, or (b) the greater of $100,000 or the cash
compensation received by the director in the preceding 12 months; and two states (Indi-
ana and Ohio) statutorily reduced the standard of the duty of care. Id. § 8.50 statutory
comparison, at 1093-1094.3; Committee I, supra note 55, at 698.
238. See, e.g., ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 59, § 7.19, at 255 ("Nonfinancial penalties, such
as injunctions or disqualifications from office, which are not addressed by § 7.19, have only
limited applications in the duty of care area, in part because due care suits typically arise
well after the event."); Deborah A. DeMott, Limiting Directors' Liability, 66 WASH. U. L.Q.
295, 299 (1988) ("Other types of remedies-such as injunctions- . . . are outside the
scope of authorized provisions."). Monetary caps avoid the circularity of having the corpo-
ration indemnify a director who was found liable for damages, and they reduce the costs of
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Limiting the potential cost for duty-of-care breaches to the compensa-
tion received might make courts more inclined to uphold standards of
care, 23 9 and can be reconciled with a restitutionary measure of
damages. 24
0
The legal question remains whether shareholders of corporations
in those few states without enabling statutes might nevertheless adopt
such charter amendments. 241 The ALI's Principles of Corporate Govern-
ance suggest that, in the absence of a statute, the ability to limit a direc-
tor's monetary exposure for breaches of the duty of care to the
corporation is a matter of shareholder right.2 42  However, the ALI
would not sanction a cap of less than one year's compensation of a
director (or officer) breaching the duty of care. Moreover, the ALI
would not protect behavior involving illicit self-dealing, conscious dis-
regard of duty, or violation of the law, nor would it protect "a sus-
tained and unexcused pattern of inattention that amounted to an
abdication of the defendant's duty to the corporation."243
insurance. The unavailability of a monetary recovery, for better or worse, also makes a
shareholder derivative suit less desirable to the shareholders' plaintiffs bar (whose contin-
gent fees are generally a percentage of the award). See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 59,
§ 7.19 & cmt. c (Policy considerations), at 241-42.
239. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 59, § 7.19, at 255 ("Commentators have also argued
that the disproportion between the potentially enormous damages for a due care violation
and the often limited culpability of the defendant disposes courts to decline to find liability
in cases where the defendant's behavior should not be protected.").
240. See AMERICAN LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND REC-
OMMENDATIONS § 7.16 cmt. h, pt. 2, at 206-07 (Discussion Draft No. 1, 1985) (noting that a
restitution measure "could justify return of compensation received by an officer or director
who breached his duty of care on the theory that he had implicitly promised to use due
care but had not so performed and thus was required to make restitution of his allocable
salary and related benefits over the relevant period"). This draft admits that such a theory
would not be accepted by a court faced with a case of medical malpractice!
241. The ALI Reporter's comment acknowledges the absence of American case law, but
analogizes the shareholders' waiver to the ability of "a trustee to relieve itself by contract
from liability for negligence, but not for liability from breaches that were in bad faith,
intentional, or recklessly indifferent to the interests of a beneficiary." ALI PRINCIPLES,
supra note 59, § 7.19 cmt. a (Comparison with Existing Law), at 240.
242. See id. § 7.19 (Limitation on Damages for Certain Violations of the Duty of Care).
Commentary to drafts of this section reveal a split in opinion among the reporters for
various portions of the project. See, e.g., AMERICAN LAw INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.17 reporter's notes 2 & 3, at 268-71
(Tentative Draft No. 8, 1988) (contrasting opinions of the Chief Reporter and the Re-
porter for Part IV, with those of the Reporter for Part VII). The final language deletes an
earlier clause that also would have permitted a charter provision that entirely "precludes
damages against a director acting in such capacity for such a failure." See AMERICAN LAw
INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.17, at
116 (Tentative Draft No. 9, 1989).
243. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 59, § 7.19(3), at 238. The ALI gives the following exam-
ple of the abdication provision, suggesting that abdication will rarely be found:
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Does a contractarian view of corporations also permit sharehold-
ers to waive a director's monetary liability for breaches of the duty of
loyalty?244 The policy judgment underlying the ALI's monetary cap
provision "is that, with respect to the goal of assuring the quality of
business decisionmaking," less reliance should be placed on litigation
and greater reliance should be placed on "alternative mechanisms,
such as an independent board, the market for corporate control, peer
pressure, and public disclosure. '24 5 Accordingly, the ALl Reporter ar-
gues against a suggestion that shareholders could waive the duty of
loyalty, observing that "market and social forces seem more likely to
be able to deal with the official who is merely lazy than with one who is
dishonest or self-interested.
246
The contractarian view of corporate charter amendments is hard
to apply to the "principal-less" model of a memberless nonprofit cor-
poration (unless we view prospective donors as basing their decision
to contribute on the existence of such an amendment to the articles).
However, society might wish to enact such a monetary cap for non-
profit directors under the theory that better management will result.
Because of the absence of shareholders, though, it seems unnecessary
to require nonprofit corporations without members to adopt such a
charter amendment. Nevertheless, alternative paragraph (d) to sec-
tion 8.30 of the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act tracks Dela-
ware's opt-in approach, and so whether the shield applies depends,
first, on the state's enabling legislation, and second, on each charity's
Director Jones has been recurrently ill for over a year and during this period has
missed all meetings of the board of directors of Industrial Co. Industrial Co.
experienced a severe business crisis during this period, and the board took an
action that violated § 4.01 [duty of care] in an area in which it usually relied on
Jones's expertise. Jones would have successfully opposed the action if present. If
Jones incurs liability on these facts (for example, on the theory that a director in
such circumstances should have resigned), a certificate provision limiting liability
in compliance with § 7.19 should be effective. Although a sustained and unex-
cused absence might otherwise have amounted to an "abdication,"Jones's nonat-
tendance under these circumstances would not amount to an abdication.
Id. § 7.19 cmt. f, illus. 7, at 250.
244. See, e.g., id. § 7.19 cmt. d, at 243 ("Here, case law provides a clear answer that a
charter amendment will not be given effect by a court when it infringes on [the] duty [of
loyalty]."). Comment d to section 7.19 states further:
If corporate managers were to ask shareholders to approve a charter provision
that limits or exculpates them from liability for duty of loyalty violations, a funda-
mental problem of asymmetric information would arise because investors would
face substantial uncertainty and could not accurately price the cost to them of this
discretionary power.
Id. § 7.19 cmt. d, at 244.
245. Id. § 7.19 cmt. c, at 242 (Policy Considerations).
246. Id. § 7.19 reporter's note 5, at 258.
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articles of incorporation.247 A few state statutes permit charter
amendments by their nonprofit corporations, 248 although Arkansas's
247. REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.30(d) (1987) (alternative provision). Al-
ternative section 2.02(b)(5) to the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act would permit the
articles to include the following:
(5) provisions eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to
the corporation or members of the corporation for monetary damages for breach
of any such director's duties to the corporation and its members, provided that
such a provision may not eliminate or limit the liability of a director:
(i) for any breach of the director's duty of loyalty to the corporation or
its members;
(ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional
misconduct or a knowing violation of law;
(iii) for any transaction from which a director derived an improper per-
sonal economic benefit; or
(iv) under sections 8.31-8.33 [dealing with distributions].
No such provisions shall eliminate or limit the liability of a director for any
act or omission occurring prior to the date when such provision becomes
effective.
Id. § 2.02(b) (5) (alternative provision). Correspondingly, alternative section 8.30(d) adds
a second sentence, to read in its entirety as follows:
(d) A director is not liable to the corporation, any member, or other person
for any action taken or not taken as a director, if the director acted in compliance
with this section. The liability of a director for monetary damages to the corpora-
tion and its members may be eliminated or limited in the corporation's articles to
the extent provided in section 2.02(b) (5).
Id. § 8.30(d) (alternative provision). The commentary states: "This alternative section is
derived from section 102(b)7 [sic] of the Delaware General Corporation law. It does not
change the duty of care. Rather subdivision (d) allows a corporation to limit directors'
liability for monetary damages for breaching their duty of care." Id. § 8.30(d) cmt. (alter-
native provision).
248. SeeALAKA STAT. § 10.20.151 (d) (Michie 1996) (providing for amendments chang-
ing the number of directors and eliminating or limiting the personal liability of the direc-
tors); Aruz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-2342.A.8 (West 1996) (providing that articles of
incorporation shall state a provision eliminating or limiting personal liability of director
excepting certain circumstances); COLO. REv. STAT. § 7-22-101(r) (West 1996) (same);
DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 102(b) (7) (Supp. 1996) (allowing for provisions to limit personal
liability of directors of both stock and nonstock corporations); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
17-6002(b) (8) (1996) (allowing limitations on personal liability in both stock and nonstock
corporations); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 180, § 3 (West 1987 & Supp. 1997) (providing
that articles of incorporation may include provisions eliminating or limiting personal liabil-
ity of director); MICH. COMP. LAws § 450.2209 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997) (applying to a
"volunteer director" and excepting an "act or omission that is grossly negligent," severely
diminishing the value of the monetary waiver); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 420-A:4-a (Supp.
1997) (creating provisions for directors of nonprofit health service corporations); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 48-52-102(b) (3) (1995) (setting forth requirements for stating provisions that
regulate the powers and rights of a corporation). The California Nonprofit Corporation
Law protects uncompensated directors of charities from personal liability for the following:
any negligent act or omission occurring (1) within the scope of that person's
duties as a director acting as a board member . . .; (2) in good faith; (3) in a
manner that the person believes to be in the best interest of the corporation; and
(4) is in the exercise of his or her policymaking judgment.
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revision of its nonprofit law rejected the proposal.249 We have yet to
see any state impose a mandatory minimum monetary floor (as Vir-
ginia does for business corporations, in the absence of a charter
amendment250). In all cases, moreover, directors remain at risk for
breaches of their duty of loyalty. In addition, nonmonetary remedies,
such as removal, remain.
2 5 1
4. Adelphi University.-The New York State Board of Regents Re-
port in the Adelphi University case never reached the business judg-
ment rule: "For the rule to pertain, trustees [of an educational
corporation] must affirmatively exercise discretion and make a delib-
erate judgment. "252 Thus, "the rule does not shield from scrutiny irra-
tional decisions that are based on inadequate information or
CAL. CORP. CODE § 5047.5 (West 1990). This statute does not apply, among other situa-
tions, to self-dealing, gross negligence, or in any action brought by the attorney general.
Moreover, the statute applies only if the charity maintains general liability insurance. Id.
249. SeeJames Edward Harris, The Nonprofit Corporation Act of 1993: Considering the Elec-
tion to Apply the New Law to Old Corporations, 16 U. Asuc LrrrLE ROCK L.J. 1, 19 (1994)
(discussing the rejection of a liability shield for directors under the new Arkansas non-
profit corporation act). While the Arkansas legislature enacted the monetary shield in its
business corporation act, the bar committee developing the nonprofit statute "believed
that it would be bad policy to permit the exculpation of directors from fulfilling the basic
corporate duty of care. For that reason, the Committee decided not to include an exculpa-
tion clause in the legislative proposal." Id.
250. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-692.1 (Michie 1993) (Limitation on liability of officers
and directors; exception).
251. See Craig W. Hammond, Note, Limiting Directors'Duty of Care Liability: An Analysis of
Delaware's Charter Amendment Approach, 20 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 543, 561-62 (1987) ("Those
states that wish to follow the charter amendment approach but do not want to remove all
potential sanctions on directors might couple the sunset provision proposal with non-
monetary sanctions."). Regulators and courts could put some teeth into removal by also
barring the breaching director from serving as a director, officer, or consultant for any
nonprofit organization for some period of time. One commentator observes:
The advantages of the "suspension" provision . . .are that it is not so easy to get
around (notice the "or consultant" proviso); it is not so severe that, like potential
multi-million-dollar personal liability, it would strike courts as unthinkable to im-
pose; but at the same time it would still have some effective "bite" to it-the sus-
pendees would be removed from the most prestigious and cushy positions
ordinarily available to men of their rank, and would, I suspect, be objects of some
shame among their peers.
Id. at 562 n.73 (proposing temporary suspension from serving as an officer in any corpora-
tion for directors found liable for breaching their duty of care (citing CHRISTOPHER D.
STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR 148, 149
(1975) (proposing three-year suspension of directors found to have committed gross negli-
gence from stock corporations doing business in interstate commerce))).
252. Panel, supra note 4, at 16. The Report elaborates: "Although the trustees have not
cited any case law in which a New York court has specifically applied the business judgment
rule to trustees of education corporations, presumptively the rule would apply to an educa-
tional corporation just as to any other not-for-profit corporation." Id.
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consideration."25 The Report found that the board failed to make an
informed decision about the university president's compensation:
"This is evidenced by the board's failure to review or approve the
terms of Diamandopoulos' compensation, gather comparable salary
data, engage in any meaningful evaluation of Diamandopoulos' per-
formance or educate itself about the specific terms of Diamando-
poulos' package." '254 The Regents declared: "When directors act
blindly, recklessly and heedlessly, as these trustees have in setting Dia-
mandopoulos' compensation, they cannot escape responsibility for
their conduct."255 The Report concluded: "The totality of the record
before us demonstrates that, in setting Diamandopoulos' compensa-
tion, the trustees failed to exercise the degree of care and skill that
ordinarily prudent persons would have exercised in like circum-
stances. They must therefore be removed from office." '25 6
One can't help but get a sense from reading the Regents' report
of how restricted the regulator's role is. In concluding that Dia-
mandopoulos's compensation was excessive, the Report reviews his
achievements (or lack thereof) in detail. We find such statements as
the following: "[T]he first academic plan was not in place until
1990-five years into Diamandopoulos' tenure";257 "Despite this plan,
enrollment started to fall"; 58 "While we do not take issue with the
board's decision to create an Honors College, we note that it did not
prove a panacea for Adelphi's ailments";259 "During this time, Dia-
mandopoulos often expressed concern about the enrollment decline,
but seemed helpless against it";260 "[To the faculty he] admitted a
'downward slide' in admissions standards for several years [and]
stated that 5,535 FTE's [full-time equivalent students] for 1995 'repre-
sents a number below which we cannot fall without as yet unimagined'
consequences, [while the 1995 numbers] fell to 4,603" ;261 "While Dia-
mandopoulos and the trustees often lamented this situation, they
never implemented any strategy to address it, [and] [y] ear after year,
annual fundraising targets were missed";262 "In fact, during Dia-
253. Id. at 33.
254. Id. at 17.
255. Id. at 33. Given this finding, it would not have mattered whether the Adelphi trus-
tees were held to an ordinary negligence standard or a gross negligence standard.
256. Id. at 16-17.
257. Id. at 27.
258. Id. at 28.
259. Id. at 29.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 30.
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mandopoulos' presidency, Adelphi's Barron's ratings have sunk from
'very competitive' in 1986 to 'competitive' in 1991 to 'less competitive'
in 1994";263 and "After eight years in office ... [he] had presided over
a complete breakdown in relations between faculty and administra-
tion."26 4 In 1993-1994, of presidents of doctoral institutions, his pay
was second only to that of Boston University's John Silber (who also
sat on Adelphi's board).265
What might the Attorney General of New York add to the Re-
gents' sanction of removal?2 66 New York not-for-profit law does not
authorize charter amendments limiting a director's liability for mone-
tary damages. Upon the request of the Regents, the Attorney General
filed suit against the former trustees267 for, among other forms of re-
lief, an accounting of "all University assets lost or wasted for the bene-
fit of the President" and assets "misdirected" to the self-dealing
trustees, as well as "directing defendant trustees be surcharged for any
loss or waste of University assets which are a result of their miscon-
duct, with appropriate interest."268 As a separate matter, the Internal
263. Id. at 31-32.
264. Id. at 32.
265. Id.; cf JOHN S. GLASER, THE UNITED WAY SCANDAL: AN INSIDER'S AccouNT OF WHAT
WENT WRONG AND WHY 114 (1994) (noting that William Aramony, the disgraced former
United Way president whose generous compensation shocked the public, once advised,
"'A cardinal rule ... is that you never put anyone on your Board who makes less than you
do.'").
266. See N.Y. EoUc. LAW § 216-a(4) (d) (9) (McKinney 1988) (providing that the Regents
may request the Attorney General to bring suit against the trustees of a New York
university).
267. Plaintiffs Complaint at 9, Vacco v. Diamandopoulos, No. 97401253 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Mar. 24, 1997) (noting the Attorney General's authority to commence action against a
corporation at the request of the Regents).
268. Id at 43-44. At a news conference, New York Attorney General Dennis Vacco quan-
tified the amount sought in restitution for the University at $6 million. Jack Sirica, Adelphi
Fallout: Vacco Sues Ex-Board Trustees for Misappropriation, NEWSDAY, Mar. 25, 1997, at A5,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Majpap File. In earlyJune 1997, the defendants moved to
dismiss some of the causes of action, and to force Adelphi to advance funds for legal fees.
Jack Sirica, Adelphi in Fight Over Law Fees, NEWSDAY, June 7, 1997, at A8, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Majpap File. According to a news story, "both the attorney general and the
university's current board members remain sharply opposed to the former trustees' argu-
ment that, if anything, the Regents [sic] decision that resulted in their ouster found them
guilty only of 'negligence.'" Id.; accord Jack Sirica, Ousted Trustees Renew Fight: Petitioner
Challenges Regents on Adelphi, NEWSDAY, June 6, 1997, at A28, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Majpap File (reporting on a petition filed by former trustees to overturn the Re-
gents' findings that resulted in their removal, and stating that "the outcome of the petition
would appear to have the greatest bearing on several lawsuits the former trustees are now
fighting"). It appears that even if the university's directors' and officers' liability policy
covers deliberate misconduct (which would be unusual), the trustees' legal fees might al-
ready have reached the policy's $3.1 million limit. Accordingly, the trustees would need to
justify entitlement to indemnification from the university. See Emily Bass, Legal Fight Does
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Revenue Service might be able to seek to impose "excess benefit"
sanctions on both Diamandopoulos and the directors who approved
his excess compensation.269
5. Summary.-To summarize this subpart, we examined the as-
pect of a fiduciary's duty of care that relates to the business judgment
rule. We saw that this rule-which is more of a safe harbor-cannot
be invoked unless the director actually exercised judgment. Accord-
ingly, it fails to assist directors who do not make themselves aware of
the issue involved. Even without the operation of the business judg-
ment rule, however, the reluctance of attorneys general and courts to
sanction directors personally often leads to a finding of lack of liabil-
ity. Rather than degrade the standard of care, a (low) maximum mon-
etary sanction should be imposed on nonprofit directors; injunctive
remedies, such as removal, would remain. More certain and less se-
vere potential penalties would make board service more attractive,
while alerting fiduciaries that charities are entitled to a real level of
care.
B. Timken Mercy Medical Center: Fundamental Change in Purpose
1. General Principles of Director Authority.-In the early years of
corporate governance, a corporation could engage only in those activ-
ities specified in its charter or otherwise permitted by statute.270 In
the modern era, corporations have broad powers, and so the doctrine
of ultra vires has atrophied.271 Similarly, because a proprietary corpo-
ration's primary purpose is to make a profit, the courts will not review
the directors' decisions to make even drastic changes in business activ-
Adelphi an Injustice, NEWSDAY, May 9, 1997, at A41, available in LEXIS, News Library, Majpap
File.
269. See supra note 6. An organization manager who knowingly and willfully partici-
pated in an excess-benefit transaction (but did not personally benefit) faces a maximum
exposure of $10,000 for each such transaction. See I.R.C. § 4958(d)(2) (West 1997).
270. See 7A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER & STEPHEN M. FLANAGAN, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF
THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 3399, at 6 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1997) (describing the
doctrine of ultra vires as an act beyond the powers of a corporation as fixed by its charter).
271. Id. § 3405, at 17; see, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 3.04(b) (1984) (providing that
only a shareholder, the corporation acting against an incumbent or former director, of-
ficer, employee or agent, or the attorney general may challenge the validity of corporate
action on the ground that the corporation lacked the power to act). One scholar notes:
Indeed, it is difficult to formulate a justification for retention of the ultra vires
concept in a business context where, after all, there is only a single objective into
which a multitude of activities may be translated, i.e., corporate profit and share-
holder gain. At the same time, it is impossible to assimilate the multifarious activi-
ties pursued by charities to a single objective.
KuJRTZ, supra note 30, at 149 n.107 (citation omitted).
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ities-in theory, if the shareholders disapprove, they can always re-
move and replace the board.2 7 2
As a basic principle of corporate governance, directors have the
authority to amend the articles of incorporation and bylaws.27 3 How-
ever, in the case of fundamental changes such as merger or dissolu-
tion, corporation law usually requires shareholder approval.
Specifically, the common law required shareholder approval for a sale
of substantially all of the corporation's assets, and corporate statutes
continue this rule.2 7 4 In addition, the board of directors owes the
shareholders a duty to consider bona fide offers for corporate
assets.
275
Nonprofit law often substitutes the approval of members for the
approval of shareholders.2 76 This leaves the obvious question whether
any check applies to such a fundamental decision by the board of a
272. See, e.g., ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 59, § 3.02, at 86-87 ("Except as otherwise pro-
vided by statute . . . a board of directors also has the power to: . . . [ilnitiate and adopt
corporate plans.... [m]anage the business of the corporation[,] ... [and] [a]ct as to all
other corporate matters not requiring shareholder approval.").
273. See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 10.02 (1984) ("Unless the articles of incorpora-
tion provide otherwise, a corporation's board of directors may adopt one or more amend-
ments to the corporation's articles of incorporation without shareholder action . . ").
Delaware, however, requires shareholder approval of a certificate of incorporation amend-
ment, and grants the shareholders exclusive power to amend the bylaws unless, generally,
that power is reserved to the board in the charter. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109 (1991).
274. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 12.02(a) (1984):
A corporation may sell, lease, exchange, or otherwise dispose of all, or substan-
tially all, of its property .... otherwise than in the usual and regular course of
business, on the terms and conditions and for the consideration determined by
the corporation's board of directors, if the board of directors proposes and its
shareholders approve the proposed transaction.
275. But even here the board has a great amount of discretion. Cf ALI PRINCIPLES,
supra note 59, § 6.01, at 389 ("The board of directors in the exercise of its business judg-
ment, may approve, reject, or decline to consider a proposal to the corporation to engage
in a transaction in control," but approval by the shareholders is required if the corporation
is a party (citation omitted)). Moreover, section 6.02 provides: "The board of directors
may take an action that has the forseeable effect of blocking an unsolicited tender offer, if
the action is a reasonable response to the offer." Id. § 6.02(a), at 405 (citation omitted).
This section permits the board to consider "whether the offer, if successful, would threaten
the corporation's essential economic prospects." Id. § 6.02(b) (1), at 405. In addition, the
board may "have regard for interests or groups (other than shareholders) with respect to
which the corporation has a legitimate concern if to do so would not significantly disfavor
the long-term interests of shareholders." Id. § 6.02(b) (2), at 405. If a shareholder can
prove that the board's action was an unreasonable response to the offer, the action "may
be enjoined or set aside, but directors who authorize such an action are not subject to
liability for damages if their conduct meets the standard of the business judgment rule."
Id. § 6.02(d), at 405.
276. Such a pattern emerges clearly in the law of Delaware, which has no separate non-
profit corporation statute. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271(a) (1991), which provides, in
pertinent part:
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charity that lacks members. State statutes commonly permit attorneys
general to become involved in extraordinary events in the life of a
charity, such as when it wishes to merge, sell substantially all of its
assets, or dissolve, as well as to appeal to a court to alter the restricted
use of assets under the cy pres doctrine.277 As discussed below, a
trend has begun to develop in which states adopt specific legislation
tailored to the sale of nonprofit hospital assets (particularly to for-
profit entities).27 8
Drafters of the ABA's revision of the Model Nonprofit Corporation
Act worried about whether a corporate charity can alter its purposes
without applying to court for cy pres relief.2 79 "'Those who give to a
Every corporation may at any meeting of its board of directors or governing body
sell, lease or exchange all or substantially all of its property and assets.... upon
such terms and conditions and for such consideration, .. . as its board of directors
or governing body deems expedient and for the best interests of the corporation,
when and as authorized by a resolution adopted by the holders of a majority of
the outstanding stock of the corporation entitled to vote thereon or, if the corpo-
ration is a nonstock corporation, by a majority of the members having the right to
vote for the election of the members of the governing body, at a meeting duly
called upon at least 20 days' notice.
277. Different states have different models. See Daniel W. Coyne & Kathleen Russell Kas,
The Not-for-Profit Hospital as a Charitable Trust: To Whom Does Its Value Belong?, 24 J. HEALTH
& Hosp. L. 48, 52 (1991) (describing Illinois's "trust the trustees to do their duty" method
without any immediate review or supervision, the New York "judicial approval" method,
which requires court approval prior to the effectiveness of trustee action, and the ABA
Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act's intermediate course of requiring notice to the at-
torney general but not prior approval). For news coverage, see, for example, Lisa W.
Foderaro, Harvard Will Sell a Forest, a Legacy from an Alumnus, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1989, at
BI, available in LEXIS, News Library, Nyt File (reporting the approval of trustee action by a
court after review by the attorney general); Vivien Kellerman, Antiquities Group Delays Land
Sale, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1990, § 12, at 4, available in LEXIS, News Library, Nyt File (ex-
plaining that one needs attorney general and court approval to sell bequeathed property);
Andrew H. Malcolm, 2 Right-to-Die Groups Merging for Unified Voice, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12,
1990, at B4, available in LEXIS, News Library, Nyt File (describing how the proposed
merger of the two largest right-to-die nonprofit groups would need the approval of the
New York State Attorney General); Douglas C. McGill, Historical Society Is Planning Cuts to
Meet Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1988, at C15 (describing the New-York Historical Society's
discussions with the attorney general about receiving court permission to sell 40
paintings).
278. See infra Part III.B.3.
279. For a particular gift, "the corporation, as distinguished from its directors, may hold
or be deemed to hold property in trust or subject to restrictions." REviSED MODEL NON-
PROFIT CORP. AcT § 8.30 cmt. 1 (1987). However, applying a literal trust approach to an
outright gift to the nonprofit corporation would then make the corporation both the
trustee and the beneficiary. Some courts circumvented this long-standing conundrum by
treating the charitable class served by the corporation as the beneficiaries of the trust.
Duties of Trustees, supra note 76, at 547. A trust approach makes monetary judgments for
breach meaningless-the corporation would have to sue itself on behalf of its indefinite
beneficiaries, and hence recover from itself. Id. However, equitable remedies would still
be available. Id. Moreover, where the nonprofit organization itself serves as trustee of
1460
1998] THE LIMITS OF CHARITY FIDUCIARY LAW 1461
home for abandoned animals do not anticipate a future board amend-
ing the charity's purpose to become research vivisectionists. "'28
Some states apply "quasi-cy pres principles" to a charitable corpora-
tion's amendment of its purposes; such a court proceeding accords
deference to the board's determination instead of permitting the
judge to substitute her own judgment.281 The new-purposes problem
could obviously be avoided by including in the initial articles of incor-
poration a statement that the charity is formed "for any charitable
purpose. '28 2 Indeed, the ABA cautions against an overly restrictive
purposes clause in the articles of incorporation: "By irrevocably dedi-
cating assets when such dedication is not required, the incorporators
may inadvertently impress the assets of a corporation with unintended
restrictions and obligations. '28 3 On the other hand, of course, chari-
ties fear that prospective donors might not be so willing to donate on
such an open-ended basis.
2. The Effect of Donor Restrictions on Efficient Use of Charitable As-
sets.-Not only do donors have market power, but the law also looks
restricted donated property, the charity must make a cy pres application to the court to
modify the use. Id. at 548. Presumably, directors who alter the use of restricted property
without following the proper procedures have committed a breach of fiduciary duty, albeit
one measured under the corporate standard.
280. Lizabeth A. Moody, The Who, What, and How of the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation
Act, 16 N. Ky. L. REv. 251, 264 & n.69 (1988) (quoting Letter from Kevin A. Suffern to
Project Reporter Michael C. Hone (Oct. 2, 1986)). Suffern, as Assistant Attorney General
of Massachusetts, also used this colorful language in litigation. See Attorney Gen. v.
Hahnemann Hosp., 494 N.E.2d 1011, 1021 n.18 (Mass. 1986).
281. See In re Multiple Sclerosis Serv. Org. of N.Y., Inc., 496 N.E.2d 861, 861-62 (N.Y.
1986) (describing "[t]he standard governing distribution of the assets of a charitable cor-
poration being dissolved under the Not-For-Profit Corporation Law... [as] less restrictive
and accord[ing] greater authority to the corporation's board of directors.., than was the
cy pres standard at common law"); Alco Gravure, Inc. v. Knapp Found., 479 N.E.2d 752, 753
(N.Y. 1985) (holding that "quasi-cy pres principles" apply to a purposes clause amendment
in articles of incorporation); cf Queen of Angels Hosp. v. Younger, 136 Cal. Rptr. 36, 40-41
(Ct. App. 1977) (applying a strict cy pres standard by requiring sale proceeds to be used to
carry out a charity's original purpose, which was the operation of a hospital); Town of
Brookline v. Barnes, 97 N.E.2d 651, 655 (Mass. 1951) (noting that "the application of
funds cy pres is ajudicial function" and that the court may choose among many methods in
arriving at an appropriate scheme).
282. See REviSED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. Acr § 2.02(b) (1) ("The articles of incorpora-
tion may set forth .. .the purpose or purposes for which the corporation is organized,
which may be, either alone or in combination with other purposes, the transaction of any
lawful activity. .. ").
283. Id. § 2.02 cmt. 3(a); cf Op. Miss. Att'y Gen., 1995 Miss. AG LEXIS 843, at *3 (Dec.
6, 1995) (explaining that where articles of incorporation broadly define a charity's tax-
exempt purpose, it may sell its assets to a for-profit health care corporation and "redirect
its focus to provide funding for research grants, patient education, support for organ dona-
tion and transplants and other charitable activities").
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primarily to their wishes in determining what a charity may do.28 4
However, it makes less sense to overprivilege donors in light of the
actual functioning of the typical modern charity.285 Few nonprofits
actually rely on donations for the bulk of their support: In 1992, for
the nonprofit sector as a whole, less than twenty percent of gross re-
ceipts came from donations.28 6 In many cases, then, no donor or
group of donors effectively influences nonprofit policy.2" 7 At the
other extreme, in nonprofits where donations dominate, privileging
donors with accountability rights loops back into another market fail-
ure, the "separation of supply from demand"-if by "demand" we
mean the beneficiary's demand rather than the donor's. 28 8  A non-
profit organization dependent on a concentrated or organized donor
base might be forced to make poor choices, behaving more patemalis-
tically and conservatively. Because donors often do not consume the
services they donate, donor control can lead to inefficient overpro-
duction of what particular donors want to support and underproduc-
tion of services unpopular in donors' eyes. 289
284. See Evelyn Brody, Charitable Endowments and the Democratization of Dynasty, 39 ARiz. L.
REV. 873, 877 (1997) [hereinafter Brody, Charitable Endowments] (discussing the deference
the law pays to donors).
285. See generally Brody, Agents Without Principals, supra note 33, at 519-22 (describing the
hazards of deferring to donors).
286. In 1992, private contributions from individuals, foundations, and corporations
came to $111 billion, accounting for 18% of total receipts of the nonprofit sector, down
from 26% in 1982. See VIRGINIA ANN HODGKINSON ET AL., NONPROFIT ALMANAC 1996-1997:
DIMENSIONS OF THE INDEPENDENT SECTOR 5, 86 tbl. 2.1 (1996) ("Private contributions grew
at a rate higher than that of government only between the years of 1982 and 1987. .. ").
These researchers additionally estimated that the value of volunteer services in 1994 was
$116 billion, which represented a gradual decline in hours volunteered after 1992. Id. at
28. Averages mask enormous variations by subsector. However, "[t] he education/research
subsector was the only subsector in which private contributions increased as a proportion
of total funds, from 9 percent in 1977 to 13 percent in 1992." Id. at 11. Internal Revenue
Service data for 1992 indicate that for tax-exempt hospitals, only 2.3% of total revenues
came from contributions, gifts, and grants. See Cecelia Hilgert, Charities and Other Tax-
Exempt Organizations, 1992, 16 STAT. INCOME BULL. 112, 113 fig.B (1996) (reporting that
contributions, gifts, and grants amounted to only $5.6 billion out of a total revenue for
hospitals of $242.8 billion). The percentage of contributions, gifts, and grants for
"[h]ospital research organization [s]" was 25%, or $760 million out of $3.09 billion. Id.
287. See Brody, Institutional Dissonance, supra note 25, at 467 ("A nonprofit must accom-
modate the institutional expectations of its industry, its donors, its volunteers, its members,
its beneficiaries, its clientele, its corporate sponsors, its government granting agencies and
the taxpaying public.").
288. See LESTER M. SALAMON, PARTNERS IN PUBLIC SERVICE: GOVERNMENT-NONPROFIT RE-
LATIONS IN THE MODERN WELFARE STATE 4748 (1995) (discussing the problem of philan-
thropic paternalism and noting that it places the power to make a determination of
community needs in the hands of the individuals with the greatest resources).
289. See id.
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Moreover, until fairly recently, the law did not accommodate a
donor who later regretted or was willing to alter restrictions made at
the time of the gift.2 90 Now, the Uniform Management of Institutional
Funds Act (discussed in Part III.C, below) provides a mechanism for
releasing donor restrictions.29 ' With the donor's written consent, the
charity's "governing board may release, in whole or in part, a restric-
tion imposed by the applicable gift instrument on the use or invest-
ment of an institutional fund." '292 If, however, written consent cannot
be obtained because of the donor's "death, disability, unavailability, or
impossibility of identification, [then] the governing board may apply
... to the [appropriate] court for release of a restriction."2 3 By nega-
tive implication, the charity apparently may not apply for a judicial
reformation over a living donor's objections. Furthermore, the char-
ity and the donor may not collude to injure the public interest, and
the charity must notify the attorney general, who may intervene. The
court may release any restriction, in whole or in part, that it finds to
be "obsolete, inappropriate, or impracticable, 2 94 a much more flexi-
ble test than the cy pres requirement of impossibility.
To illustrate the difference in these standards, consider the most
celebrated cy pres case in American philanthropy, the Buck Trust.29 5
In 1975, Beryl Buck bequeathed $10 million worth of stock in an oil
company to a trust for the benefit of Main County, California, one of
the richest counties in the country.296 Ten years later, when the stock
had ballooned in value to $400 million, the trustee possessing distribu-
tion powers sought court approval to spend some of the income to
benefit the greater San Francisco Bay area.297 The attorney general
290. See, e.g., UNIF. MANAGEMENT OF INs'r. FUNDS Acr prefatory note, para. 1 (1972), 7A
U.L.A. 706 (1985) [hereinafter UMIFA] (explaining the desire among nonprofit institu-
tions for "more effective use of endowment and other investment funds").
291. See id. The Act defines an "institution" as an incorporated or unincorporated or-
ganization formed and operated exclusively for educational, religious, charitable, or other
eleemosynary purposes. Id. § 1(1), 7A U.L.A. 712.
292. Id. § 7(a), 7A U.L.A. 723. If a donor refuses to consent to change a restriction and
the charity alters the use anyway, does the donor have standing under UMIFA to sue? A
Connecticut appeals court ruled yes, but the Connecticut Supreme Court reversed. See
Carl J. Herzog Found., Inc. v. University of Bridgeport, 677 A.2d 1378, 1385 (Conn. App.
Ct. 1996), rev'd, 699 A.2d 995 (Conn. 1997).
293. UMIFA § 7(b), 7A U.L.A. 723 (1985) (second alteration in original).
294. Id.
295. See Ronald Hayes Malone et al., The Buck Trust Trial: A Litigator's Perspective, 21
U.S.F. L. REv. 585, 586 (1987) (describing the Buck Trust case as "the largest cy pres case
in history").
296. See Brody, Charitable Endowments, supra note 284, at 880 (describing the history of
the Buck Trust litigation).
297. Id.
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opposed on the ground that the original restriction was not impossi-
ble to carry out.298 The court agreed, and denied cy pres relief; the
trustee was replaced.2
99
A second, less obvious question relating to a change in funda-
mental purpose applies to all charities, membership or nonmember-
ship. As will be discussed in Part III.C below, a fiduciary has an
obligation to make the charity's investments "productive." Does this
obligation extend to its operating assets as well? Henry Manne sug-
gests, in the business context, that only the "market for corporate con-
trol" induces managerial efficiency.3°° Under this theory, we would
expect to find conservatism, in the sense of lack-of-change (if not
complacency), to the extent that the nonprofit form shields charity
managers from the threat of takeover. °1 Recently, for example,
Henry Hansmann lamented how capital gets locked into the non-
profit hospital industry beyond its efficient use.3 ° 2 He proposed re-
quiring nonprofit hospitals to respond to every serious bid to buy
their assets, giving bidders standing to sue to enforce that duty.30 3
298. Id. at 880-81.
299. Id. at 881; see also Simon, supra note 107 at 643 (arguing that the cy pres doctrine-
which attempts to "avoid a frustration of donor intention arising out of changed circum-
stances" and to "avoid charitable waste"-could have accommodated the desired changes).
The plaintiff opposed using any Trust funds for the petitioner trustee's attorneys fees, and
sought to surcharge the petitioner for them. See Malone et al., supra note 295, at 634.
There can be no doubt that the petitioner's resignation was conditioned on eliminating
this possibility. Id. UMIFA cryptically states: "This section does not limit the application of
the doctrine of cy pres." UMIFA § 7(d), 7A U.L.A. 723 (1985). The interaction between
these two standards is unclear.
300. To Professor Manne, "[o]nly the take-over scheme provides some assurance of
competitive efficiency among corporate managers and thereby affords strong protection to
the interests of vast numbers of small, non-controlling shareholders." Henry G. Manne,
Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 113 (1965).
301. A consultant to nonprofit hospitals recently wrote:
Most industry participants could cite several examples of institutions that have
been ill served in the long run by a board's determination to resist market pres-
sures. When the reluctant board finally seeks a partner, the hospital's financial
value, strategic options, and negotiating clout have often diminished.... Despite
this, I am unaware of a challenge to any community hospital board's fiduciary
role because of delayed action.
Steven R. Hollis, Strategic and Economic Factors in the Hospital Conversion Process, HEALTH Air.,
Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 131, 133.
302. Henry Hansmann, The Changing Roles of Public, Private, and Nonprofit Enterprise in
Education, Health Care, and Other Human Services, in INDIVIDUAL AND SocIAL RESPONSIBILITY
245, 255-56 (Victor R. Fuchs, ed. 1996).
303. Id. at 256. One senior administrator of the Good Samaritan Health System at the
time of its sale to Columbia/HCA described how the nonprofit form held back the
hospital:
There also was a "shadow motivation," unspoken but always present: The board
and the administration were increasingly convinced that Good Samaritan's ex-
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3. Nonprofit Hospital Conversions and Alteration of Purposes.-Far
from embracing such an approach, the legal structure in which donor
wishes are privileged severely constricts the recently proliferating, and
highly emotional, transactions in which nonprofit hospitals seek to
convert to for-profit form. The board of a nonprofit hospital faces
two independent questions in deciding whether to convert: what the
Massachusetts Deputy Attorney General calls the "front-end cy pres
issue" and the "back-end cy pres issue. "304
The first question is whether the board, without attorney general
or court approval, has the authority to decide to sell the assets (as well
as to decide the terms of the deal and the identity of the buyer, fiduci-
ary obligations being higher if the sale is to insiders). Second, if the
sale takes place, who decides what to do with the resulting sale pro-
ceeds? Even though donations account for only a small portion of the
resources of a modem nonprofit corporate hospital, should cy pres-
type judicial approval nevertheless be required if the nonprofit board
wants to devote the sale proceeds to non-hospital health care pur-
poses-or, indeed, to any charitable purpose?3 °5  While several
state regulators have filed suit to prevent such transactions, 0 6 the dis
isting local, nonprofit structure would continue to make it difficult for them to
undertake bold actions necessary for future survival. In the past year, for exam-
ple, they had been unable to reach agreement on several key proposals, including
the consolidation of cardiac surgery services, in large part because of the broad
constituencies involved and the slow public decision-making process.
Molly Joel Coye, The Sale of Good Samaritan: A View from the Trenches, HEALTH An'., Mar.-Apr.
1997, at 102, 103.
304. Richard Allen, Massachusetts Deputy Attorney General, Comments at a Conference
on "Nonprofit Conversions," Program on Philanthropy and the Law, New York University
School of Law (Oct. 18, 1996) (author's notes). See generally Coyne & Kas, supra note 277,
at 50-51 (recounting state court cases that illustrate the hurdles that some nonprofit hospi-
tals must overcome when they try to sell their assets).
305. The question of who decides was hotly debated by the participants in the N.Y.U.
conference, see supra notes 54 and 304, who included the top charity regulators of Califor-
nia, New York, and Massachusetts. One participant, practitioner Victoria Bjorkland, asked
whether a charity that had received 5000 perpetual donations would be required to un-
dergo 5000 cy pres proceedings. Victoria Bjorkland, Partner, Simpson, Thatcher & Bart-
lett, Comments at a Conference on "Nonprofit Conversions," Program on Philanthropy
and the Law, New York University School of Law (Oct. 18, 1996) (author's notes). For a
discussion of these issues in the university context, see Harriet M. King, The Voluntary Clos-
ing of a Private College: A Decision for the Board of Trustees?, 32 S.C. L. REv. 547 (1981).
306. See, e.g., Verified Complaint for Injunctive Relief 15, Kelley v. Michigan Affiliated
Healthcare Sys., Inc., 96 TNT 187-16 (Mich. Civ. Ct. June 17, 1996), available in LEXIS,
Fedtax Library, Tnt File ("This deal will abrogate a heritage of nonprofit, community-based
health care grounded in principles of charity and benevolence, in exchange for a delivery
system driven by shareholder greed and motivated by profit and return on investment.");
Rex Dalton, Sharp, State End Columbia Dispute; HealthCare System Adds 3 to Its Board, SAN
DIEo UNION-TRIB., Mar. 27, 1998, at BI (reporting that California Attorney General's Of-
fice-which had termed "imprudent and improper" the nonprofit Sharp Healthcare's at-
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cussion below assumes that these transactions are law-
ful.
30 7
If a donation to the nonprofit hospital was impressed with an ac-
tual trust, and if the trust forbids the sale, then the charity must obtain
court approval to sell the assets. Regardless of the source of authority
for selling, the charity must continue to use the sale proceeds for the
purposes specified or to obtain court approval to alter the use. 0 8
By contrast, the existence of unrestricted donations to a corporate
charity does not bar the board from making decisions dealing with
tempt (later abandoned) to sell a half interest with management control to Columbia/
HCA-has closed its investigation after Sharp agreed to add three new board members);
Jay Greene, Minn. Becomes 1st State to Fight Not-for-Profit Hospital Merger, MoD. HEALTHCARE,
June 29, 1992, at 8, 8 (describing how the State of Minnesota filed suit against the merger
of two Minneapolis-based healthcare systems); Monica Langley, Sell the Local Hospital? The
Very Idea Splits a Usually Placid Town, WALL Sr. J., Mar. 18, 1997, at Al (describing how the
public outrage among many Boca Raton, Florida citizens delayed indefinitely the sale of a
local nonprofit hospital).
307. As a separate matter, if the nonprofit hospital transfers its assets to a partnership
with for-profit investors, the Internal Revenue Service could challenge the continuing tax
exemption of the nonprofit hospital. See Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-12 I.R.B. 6 (holding that
whether the nonprofit hospital will be operating exclusively for a charitable purpose de-
pends, among other factors, on whether it controls the partnership).
308. These issues arose in the cy pres proceeding involving the Massachusetts hospital
MetroWest Health, Inc., whose affiliate formed a partnership with a subsidiary of the pro-
prietary Columbia/HCA. In addition, the parties asked for court approval of a provision in
the transfer agreement reciting:
Because the Partnership is not a public charity and therefore cannot hold prop-
erty subject to charitable trust, it is the intention of the parties that the Covenant
shall be binding on the Partnership as a contractual obligation only and cannot
and shall not impose any charitable trust on any property of the Partnership.
Contribution and Sale Agreement § 12.18.4, reprinted in Plaintiff's Complaint 77, Me-
troWest Health, Inc. v. Harshbarger, No. SJ 96-177 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., Suffolk County,
Apr. 5, 1996). (Note that because of Columbia/HCA's recent financial difficulties, it has
put MetroWest up for bid; MetroWest Health, the nonprofit partner, has a right of first
refusal. Alex Pham, Firm Offers MetroWest up to $80m; Bidding War Ablaze as For-Profits, Non-
profits Vie, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 19, 1998, at D1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Bglobe
File.) Incidentally, not everyone agrees that the buying proprietary hospital should com-
mit to a specified level of charity care. The economist Burton A. Weisbrod observes:
[P]ublic policy should strive to maximize the bid price by minimizing or eliminat-
ing the obligation of the for-profit firm to provide charitable health services.
Sound heartless? On the contrary, the resulting increased price would permit the
foundation receiving the sale proceeds to finance charitable obligations. If, by
contrast, the bids include obligations to provide community health education,
care for the uninsured, research and other unprofitable but socially desirable
services, the resulting contractual agreement will be difficult to enforce.
Burton A. Weisbrod & Elizabeth Selvin, Hospitals & Profits; Fortunes, and Services, Are at Stake
as Institutions Are Converted, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Feb. 11, 1998, at B7, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Sdut File (concluding that the resulting foundation should be required to
provide these types of socially desirable services).
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charity assets, including sale.3 °9 However, some courts hold corporate
charities to the purposes stated in their articles of incorporation at the
time the donations were made. If the charity desires to alter its pur-
poses, at least in some states, the amendment may not apply retroac-
tively. Thus, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts held that a hospital
could not use sale proceeds attributable to pre-amendment donations
for the new charitable purpose:
[Otherwise, b]y simply amending its charter purposes, a
charitable corporation would itself be able to exercise the
power to devote funds to new charitable purposes whenever
the trustees decided to do so, without any requirement that
the new purposes be similar and not contradictory.... Such
an interpretation also might eviscerate the Attorney Gen-
eral's power and responsibility to "enforce the due applica-
tion of [charitable] funds . .. and prevent breaches of trust
in the administration thereof."310
309. See Duties of Trustees, supra note 76, at 548-54 (discussing, under the general heading
"Duty to Comply with Donor's Directions," the following topics: (1) "Amendment of Char-
ter," (2) "Merger or Consolidation," (3) "Dissolution," and (4) "Restricted Purpose"). For
example, a federal appeals court (construing the law of North Carolina) refused to limit
the use of donated funds to the specific solicited purpose:
Campaign publicity [for the annual March of Dimes campaign] . .. furnishes no
basis for an inference that the donors, by their response, manifested an intention
to so restrict their gifts that plans of operation and administrative practices might
not be altered to increase the effectiveness of The National Foundation's service
of its objectives. At least, so long as victims of poliomyelitis in Catawba County
received adequate and proper care and assistance, as they did ....
National Found. v. First Nat'l Bank, 288 F.2d 831, 836 (4th Cir. 1961).
310. Attorney Gen. v. Hahnemann Hosp., 494 N.E.2d 1011, 1021 (Mass. 1986) (altera-
tion and second ellipsis in original). Upon a sale of its assets, Hahnemann Hospital
amended its bylaws to add the following new purpose to its original purpose of operating a
homeopathic hospital (and, secondarily, a convalescent home): "(3) Participating in any
activity that promotes the health of the general public, including making distributions to
organizations that qualify as exempt organizations under Section 501 (c) (3) of the Internal
Revenue Code." Id. at 1016 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court held that the
hospital trustees did not violate their fiduciary duty to the hospital by so amending their
bylaws. Id. at 1018. The court next considered the effects of the Converse trust agreement
(governing a large donation) and of the existence of unrestricted donations. The court
found that the hospital's intent to become a grant-making institution amounted to an
"abandonment of Hahnemann's principal activity for the past four decades, the sole pur-
pose for which it was first organized in 1892 and for which it accepted gifts," and that this
abandonment violated the Converse trust. Id. at 1018. The court did not, accordingly,
reach the Attorney General's argument that "the board also would violate its fiduciary duty
to donors of unrestricted gifts by abandoning the purpose for which it was organized and
had held itself out to the public." Id. at 1019 n.15. The court, in addition, rejected the
Attorney General's argument "that trust law must be read into [the statute permitting the
board to amend its articles] to limit amendments to those that further the 'dominant char-
itable purpose.'" Id. at 1020. However, the court found that the Converse trust instrument
prevented the articles from being amended in a way inconsistent with the trust. "Conse-
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If a charitable hospital sells its operating assets and now holds
only the sale proceeds, the California Attorney General's office ap-
plies a strict cy pres approach, on the belief that the fiduciaries must
continue to devote the proceeds to primary and hospital care.31' Per-
haps a court proceeding does best protect all affected interests. How-
ever, applying the cy pres standard-holding the charity to its original
incarnation unless it becomes "impossible" to carry it out-makes no
sense. To the extent economic forces have been dictating the shift of
nonprofit hospital operating assets to the proprietary sector in the
quently," the court concluded, "otherwise unrestricted donations made to Hahnemann
before the September 18, 1985, amendment are subject to the same restrictions as Con-
verse trust contributions." Id. In addition, "Hahnemann and the board will violate their
fiduciary duties to those donors if they apply to the third, new purpose any proceeds of the
sale attributable to donations from the Converse trust and from unrestricted donations
made prior to September 18, 1985." Id. at 1021.
311. See Greg Jaffe & Monica Langley, Fledgling Charities Get Billions from the Sale of Non-
profit Hospitals, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 1996, at Al ("'Foundation assets must be used for real
health care-hospitalization, physician care to the sick, particularly indigents.... Wellness
and prevention may be worthwhile, but they're not part of the trust for which the money
was originally raised.'" (quoting Jim Schwartz, Deputy Attorney General of California)).
For another account, see Meyer, supra note 172, at 15, which states:
Deputy attorney general Jim Schwartz insists that both law and social policy re-
quire the Good Samaritan Charitable Trust to spend its money exclusively for the
same purpose as the old not-for-profit-medical and hospital care, particularly
for needy residents of the areas served by the system's four facilities.
To be precise regarding the sale proceeds of the Good Samaritan transaction, Mr. Schwartz
wrote to me:
Simply put, because non-profit and for-profit hospitals look fairly similar to
us (excluding teaching or academic institutions), we attempted to identify those
activities of the non-profit that made up its "charitable", as distinguished from
.commercial" activities, i.e., its charitable components. The most obvious exam-
ple of this is traditional charity care. Having identified those charitable compo-
nents, we then created separate endowment funds for each component on a
proportional basis reflecting its historic funding.
Our thought was that this approach provides the directors with a reasonable
level of discretion, insures that the sale proceeds will be utilized in a manner
consistent with the articles of incorporation and historic uses, and guarantees that
the community will continue to receive the substantive benefits which it has come
to rely upon.
Letter to Brody, supra note 50, at 2. See also Letter from James R. Schwartz, Deputy Attor-
ney General of California, to California Senator Kenneth L. Maddy 3-4 (Apr. 21, 1997) (on
file with author), which describes the allocation of the $71.8 million in net assets from the
Good Samaritan sale into separate trusts: $6.9 million for "community benefit" and other
general health programs; $10.3 million for "school health centers ... [that] provide[ ]
preventive and primary health services to children and adolescents in the Santa Clara
County public school system"; and $54.6 million into two trusts for "hospital care and out-
patient medical care to the medically indigent" in that county.
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first place,3" 2 it is not obvious that the state should prefer the non-
profit form to deliver hospital services.313 Moreover, one study esti-
312. See David A. Hyman, Hospital Conversions: Fact, Fantasy, and Regulatory Follies, 23J.
CoRP. L. (forthcoming 1998). As the General Accounting Office observed in a recent
study of nonprofit hospital conversions:
Market and institutional factors, such as the growth of managed care and the
need for capital, are often cited as primary reasons for conversions. To be suc-
cessful in a managed care environment, not-for-profit hospitals must be in a com-
petitive position. This position can be achieved by building networks that
guarantee patient flow and increase bargaining power with managed care plans
and physician groups.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NOT-FOR-PROFIT HOSPITALS: CONVERSION ISSUES PROMPT IN-
CREASED STATE OVERSIGHT (GAO/HEHS-98-24) (Jan. 5, 1998) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
Of course, market power can be exercised wholly within the nonprofit sector. See, e.g.,
Judith Graham, Columbia/HCA Came, Saw and Suffered; Health Firm Met Resistance from Not-for-
Profits, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 16, 1997, at CI (describing the difficulty of proprietary hospitals in
making inroads in Chicago, whose "hospital community ... is proud, independent, over-
whelmingly not-for-profit and mostly financially secure"); BruceJapsen & Lisa Scott, System
Growth a Close Race: 1997 Multi-Unit Providers Survey Finds Not-for-Profits Ahead by a Nose,
MOD. HEALTHCARE, May 26, 1997, at 51, 51 (based on self-reported data, in 1996 "the two
biggest acquirers of other hospitals were Catholic Healthcare West . . . and Sisters of the
Sorrowful Mother-U.S. Health System"); Monica Langley, Nuns' Zeal for Profits Shapes Hospi-
tal Chain, Wins Wall Street Fans, WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 1998, at Al (describing the Daughters of
Charity National Health System Inc.-owned by an order of Catholic nuns-as the
"Daughters of Currency," and quoting their approach as "'[n]o margin, no mission'"; due
in part to selling off 11 unprofitable hospitals, "their cash and investments have ballooned
to about $2 billion, believed to be one of the largest reserves of any nonprofit hospital
system in the country").
The March-April 1997 issue of Health Affairs magazine contains 22 articles on non-
profit hospital and HMO conversions. The term "conversion" embraces all manner of
change of control over hospital assets-including asset sales, joint ventures, and long-term
leases-but in all cases limited to change in sectoral ownership status. See Gary Claxton et
al., Public Policy Issues in Nonprofit Conversions: An Overview, HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr. 1997, at
9, 10-11. Thus, a merger between two nonprofit hospitals, or a sale of assets from one for-
profit hospital to another, would not count as a conversion. See id. (defining "conversion"
as "any type of transaction that results in the shift of all or a substantial portion of the assets
of nonprofit health care organizations to for-profit use"). This definition undercounts hos-
pital restructuring activity, because "[miost mergers were between hospitals of the same
ownership type." Jack Needleman et al., Hospital Conversion Trends, HEALTH APE., Mar.-Apr.
1997, at 187, 188. Given this definition, one study found that about one percent of hospi-
tals changed ownership status per year since 1980. See id. at 187. Most nonprofit hospitals
that changed ownership status converted to for-profit, rather than public, status. Id. at 190.
The biggest story, however, is what has been happening in the public hospital sector: Over
half of the total conversions were from public hospital status, most to nonprofit status but a
good number to for-profit. Id. at 189-90. Surprisingly, a significant percentage of conver-
sions went from for-profit to nonprofit or public. Id. at 190.
313. Many nonprofit hospitals provide little charity care. The bulk of community bene-
fits come from public facilities and major teaching hospitals. The "acquisition of nonprofit
hospitals by investor-owned corporations does not lead uniformly to less uncompensated
care." Gary J. Young et al., Does the Sale of Nonprofit Hospitals Threaten Health Care for the
Poor?, HEALTH APT., Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 137, 140. This result is consistent with other studies
that find "that investor-owned hospitals provide no less uncompensated care than do non-
profits, given their locational choices, which typically are in relatively affluent communi-
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mates that the new foundations already have resources of $8.5
billion.3" 4 Why should the wishes of the long-ago donors of what is
now a small percentage of financial resources force the duplication of
hospital services?
3 1 5
A nonprofit hospital can be one of the largest charities in a com-
munity. Increasingly, communities worry about behind-closed-doors
sales of nonprofit hospital assets-that the community might be short-
changed either in the amount paid for the assets (and hence the
funds available for future charity) or in the quality and price of future,
for-profit hospital services. Some also suspect conflicts of interest on
the part of the nonprofit's trustees and officers, who might receive
ties." Id. Moreover, the proprietary hospitals provide greater community benefits if the
taxes they pay are taken into account. See Claxton et al., supra note 312, at 18 (suggesting,
however, that it might be more appropriate "to count only those taxes that are specifically
earmarked for health services" in the community benefit comparison).
Indeed, the desire to keep nonprofit hospital assets in the nonprofit sector might
reduce community benefit. For example, the Massachusetts Attorney General requires a
charity selling its assets to "receive fair value and fair transaction terms for its charitable
assets." Richard C. Allen, The Massachusetts Experience, HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 85,
87. (Assistant Attorney General Allen is the Director of Public Charities in the Attorney
General's office. Id. at 85.) Moreover, "[t]he charity should be able to demonstrate that it
obtained the best possible deal." Id. at 87. Yet, rather than sell its assets to the proprietary
Columbia/HCA, the New England Medical Center (NEMC) decided to affiliate, for less
money, with a Rhode Island nonprofit. The Attorney General approved the deal:
"[A]ssuming that NEMC had followed a careful, prudent decision-making process, its
choosing a viable nonprofit option instead of an apparently more lucrative for-profit alter-
native comported with the Massachusetts charities law requirement to select the least dras-
tic viable alternative for the charity." Id. at 86.
314. SeeJon Craig, An $8.5-Billion Infusion for Philanthropy, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Apr.
17, 1997, at 49 (describing a forthcoming study by the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation
addressing nonprofit health care institution conversions). These figures also include con-
version proceeds from health maintenance organizations, which were usually federally tax
exempt as Internal Revenue Code section 501(c)(4) social-welfare organizations rather
than as charities, and nonprofit health insurers (such as Blue Cross/Blue Shield), which
lost their federal income tax exemption in 1986. See also Conversion Foundations: A Listing,
HEALTH AFl., Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 238, 238-42. Columbia/HCA estimates that $2 billion in
foundation assets can be attributed to its deals. See Tamar Lewin & Martin Gottlieb, In
Hospital Sales, an Overlooked Side Effect, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1997, at Al, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Nyt File ("Though most of Columbia's hospitals were acquired in three huge
corporate mergers, the hospitals now run by the company have spawned more than two
dozen foundations.").
315. See Robert A. Boisture & Douglas N. Varley, State Attorneys General's Legal Authority to
Police the Sale of Nonprofit Hospitals and HMOs, 13 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REv. 227, 227 (1996)
(noting that hospitals must obtain court approval before making major changes in their
charitable purposes); Thomas Silk, Conversions of Tax-Exempt Nonprofit Organizations: Federal
Tax Law and State Charitable Law Issues, 13 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 745, 746 (1996) (sug-
gesting, hopefully, that "[t]he sector-shift is likely to encourage courts to take into account
changed circumstances and thereby modify the original charitable purpose as warranted").
As to the wisdom of charitable perpetuities in general, see Brody, Charitable Endowments,
supra note 284.
1470
1998] THE LIMITS OF CHARITY FIDUCIARY LAW 1471
positions either in the new hospital management or in the resulting
foundation. 16 In response, states have begun to adopt versions of a
"Nonprofit Hospital Sale Act."3 17 Such proposals attract a great deal
of controversy; in April 1997, the governor of New Mexico vetoed his
legislature's version on the ground that sufficient safeguards already
exist.3" 8 Typically, these statutes require that the nonprofit hospital
316. See generally Lewin & Gottlieb, supra note 314 (describing conversion transactions,
the resulting foundations, some suspicious deals, the "[ljure" of "[l]anding [t]op U]obs
[i]n [p]hilanthropy," commingling of interests, and the legislative backlash). According to
a state senator in Nebraska (and former board member of a rural hospital), the legislature
"originally was going to outlaw all conflicts of interest but found that this was totally im-
practical and that the best protection for the public was to bring conflicts of interest out
into the light of day by requiring public disclosure." Gerald E. Matzke, A Road Map from
Nebraska, HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 89, 90.
317. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 5914-5919 (West Supp. 1998) (enacted Sept. 29, 1996)
(regulating transfers of assets by nonprofit "health facilities"); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-7-89.1,
31-7-400 to -412 (Supp. 1997) (enacted Apr. 22, 1997) (requiring notification of the Attor-
ney General for certain transfers of assets from nonprofit corporations controlling hospi-
tals); Nonprofit Hospital Sale Act, NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 71-20,102 to -20,109 (1996) (enacted
Apr. 16, 1996) ("Since the effective date of this law, there have been no sales of nonprofit
hospitals in Nebraska to for-profit commercial corporations." Matzke, supra note 316, at
91); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-531 to -533 (Michie Supp. 1997) (enacted Mar. 20, 1997) (re-
quiring any nonprofit hospital or HMO to notify the attorney general of proposed sale so
"that the Attorney General may exercise his common law and statutory authority" over the
transaction). The Arizona nonprofit hospital sale law uniquely applies regardless of
whether the buyer is for-profit or nonprofit. Aruz. REv. STAT. §§ 10-11251 to -11254 (West
Supp. 1997); accord Ron Shinkman, No Secrets in Arizona: Law Means All Not-for-Profit Sales
Will Face Public Hearings, MoD. HEALTHCARE, Apr. 14, 1997, at 14, 14. See generally GAO
REPORT, supra note 312, app. III (summarizing the laws of 25 states regarding conversion
concerns, not all specific to hospitals). The Ohio proposal "has teeth": "Any organization
or person who closes a transaction without adhering to the notification guidelines of the
law is subject to a $10 million civil penalty or conviction for a felony of the third degree."
Craig R. Mayton, The View from Ohio, HEALTH Arr., Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 92, 95; accord OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. § 109.23 (Anderson 1994). (Assistant Attorney General Mayton is the sec-
tion chief of the Charitable Foundations Section of the Ohio attorney general's office. See
Mayton, supra, at 92.) While the Massachusetts legislature is debating such bills, the Massa-
chusetts Attorney General, as part of his general authority, has been demanding participa-
tion in the terms of conversion deals (with appraisals paid for by the parties) and
representation for the community on the board of the new foundation. Comments of
Richard Allen at a Conference on "Nonprofit Conversions," Program on Philanthropy and
the Law, New York University School of Law (Oct. 18, 1996) (author's notes).
In addition, at the federal level, California Congressman Pete Stark introduced H.R.
4433, "Medicare Non-profit Hospital Protection Act of 1997," onJanuary 9, 1997, to ensure
that "conversions are carried out in the sunshine of public information and debate" and
produce fair prices. 143 CONG. Rrc. E82-83 (daily ed. Jan. 9, 1997) (statement of Pete
Stark).
318. Governor of N. Mex., Veto Message (Apr. 11, 1997); see also Louis Lyons, D.C.
Lawmakers Critical of Nonprofit Hospital Conversion Bill, TAx NOTES TODAY, Apr. 24, 1997,
available in LEXIS, Taxana Library, Taxtxt File (reporting that proposed legislation impos-
ing additional government review for conversions of nonprofit hospitals to for-profit enter-
prises in the District of Columbia came under intense criticism by city council members).
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inform the attorney general of the terms of the proposed deal, and,
after a public hearing, give the attorney general the right to disap-
prove it as against the public interest (disappointed parties may ap-
peal to court) .319 The parties must usually pay for the attorney
general's costs of investigating the fairness of the deal, including ex-
pert appraisers..3 " Legal problems remain because statutes define
"conversion" differently, and political problems can arise if different
state officials have overlapping jurisdictions.3 "2  No doubt Columbia/
HCA's recent woes, leading to a retrenchment of hostile bids for non-
profit hospitals, will slow the momentum for legal change.322
319. See, e.g., supra note 317 (citing state statutes regulating sales of nonprofit hospitals);
cf Tennessee ex rel. Adventist Health Care Sys. v. Nashville Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 914 S.W.2d
903, 908-09 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the
sale of a not-for-profit hospital approved by the attorney general who had determined,
after careful investigation, that the sale served the public interest, and who had obtained a
consent decree from the Chancery Court approving the sale). The Tennessee appeals
court quoted the attorney general's approval of the board actions, which could prove a
model to nonprofit directors in sale-of-control situations:
"The members of the boards themselves devoted substantial time, effort, and en-
ergy to analyzing, pondering, and considering the ramifications of the proposed
sale. They thought about their constituents, about the implications of not selling
the hospital's assets, about a sale to others, about other options such as network-
ing, about continuing to stand alone, and other alternatives, and the affects [sic]
upon the members of the public who utilize the hospital and the community
itself. They reflected upon the consequences to the patients, the employees, the
businesses in the community which encourage or direct employees to utilize the
hospital, and to the continued availability of primary care and specialized physi-
cians for the community."
Id. at 909 (quoting from an attorney general opinion). But see Shinkman, supra note 317,
at 14 (the Arizona legislature eliminated the proposal to allow the attorney general veto
power).
320. See, e.g., CAL. CoRu'. CODE § 5919(b) (West 1997) ("The nonprofit public benefit
corporation, upon request, shall pay the Attorney General promptly for all contract
costs.").
321. See, e.g., Patricia A. Buder, State Policy Issues in Nonprofit Conversions, HEALTH AFF.,
Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 69, 75 (comparing California's subjective standard for conversion with
Nebraska's bright-line test); Donald Shriber, State Experience in Regulating a Changing Health
Care System, HEALTH Air., Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 48, 53 (explaining how state laws that focus on
the form of the transaction rather than its function "provide an incentive for making trans-
actions overly complex and confusing, since a conversion that is structured or labeled in a
more straightforward manner may be easier to regulate"); id. at 59-60 (describing lack of
clear regulatory authority, particularly in Blue Cross conversions, exacerbated by politics:
"insurance commissioners and attorneys general may be elected officials who regard them-
selves as wholly independent of one another and even of the state's governor," and the
attorney general might also have to represent the insurance department in litigation).
322. See, e.g., Kurt Eichenwald, A Makeover May Change More Than Columbia, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 8, 1997, at DI, available in LEXIS, News Library, Nyt File (stating that the new chair-
man of Columbia "said that Columbia would drop its adversarial approach to not-for-profit
hospitals, and instead reach out to them, both for advice and for cooperative ventures");
Mishap in the Operating Theatre, ECONOMIST, Aug. 2, 1997, at 48, 49 (arguing that new man-
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Should a nonprofit hospital conversion be allowed to proceed,
under the typical nonprofit-hospital sale statute, the resulting funds
must be used for "health care purposes" in the community that the
hospital currently serves.123 Moreover, some states are considering
barring the old hospital trustees from controlling the board of the
resulting foundation.324 In any event, foundation leaders recommend
agement will "tone down Columbia's high-pressure marketing tactics and limit the firm's
expansion into communities where Columbia has met (and often steamrollered) local op-
position"); Linda Sandier & George Anders, Columbia/HCA Stock Lures Some Big Buyers Amid
Bets That Company May Be Broken Up, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 1997, at C2, available in 1997 WL-
WSJ 14168823 (reporting that although Columbia/HCA is under government investiga-
tion for potential wrongdoing and there are reports of the company dumping some of its
assets and taking the rest private, some investors have significantly increased their stakes in
the company).
323. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-20,108 (1996) ("An acquisition is not in the public
interest unless appropriate steps have been taken to safeguard the value of charitable assets
and ensure that any proceeds of the transaction are used for appropriate charitable health
care purposes as provided in subdivision (8) of this section."). Subdivision (8) asks:
Whether the sale proceeds will be used for appropriate charitable health care
purposes consistent with the seller's original purpose or for the support and pro-
motion of health care in the affected community and whether the proceeds will
be controlled as charitable funds independently of the purchaser or parties to the
acquisition.
Id. Nebraska also requires the attorney general to consider whether the parties "have
made a commitment to provide health care to the disadvantaged, the uninsured, and the
underinsured and to provide benefits to the affected community to promote improved
health care." NEB. REv. STAT. § 71-20,109(2) (1996).
The preamble to the California legislation declares: "Charitable, nonprofit health fa-
cilities, including nonprofit hospitals, hold all of their assets in trust, and those assets are
irrevocably dedicated, as a condition of their tax-exempt status, to the specific charitable
purposes set forth in the articles of incorporation of nonprofit entities." 1996 Cal. Legis.
Serv., ch. 1105, § 1(a) (West). The California attorney general's office opposed a recent
legislative proposal, now withdrawn, to liberalize the cy pres standard as it applies to hospi-
tal conversions. The bill would have permitted the use of hospital sale proceeds for any
"community benefit," defined to include health prevention and promotion, adult and
child day care, medical research and training, home-delivered meals to the housebound,
and free food, shelter, and clothing to the homeless. See Letter to Brody, supra note 50, at
2; Letter from Peter K. Shack to California Senator Kenneth L. Maddy 2 (Mar. 27, 1997)
(on file with author). In letters to the bill's sponsor, the attorney general's office objected
to (and questioned the constitutionality of) the proposed "authorization to breach the
trust and disavow the commitments made to those whose money, work, and efforts built
these community hospitals." Letter from James R. Schwartz to California Senator Kenneth
L. Maddy, supra note 311, at 4; accord Letter from Peter K. Shack to California Senator
Kenneth L. Maddy, supra, at 5-7. But see Barbara Marsh, Eyeing the Money Trail in Hospital
Sale, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1997, at D1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Lat File (describing
the unhappiness of acceding to the attorney general's demand that the foundation adhere
as closely as possible to the hospital's original mission). The chairman of this foundation
complained: "'If we don't have hospitals anymore, how do we give money to in-patient
care?' ... 'That means we have to work with other not-for-profit hospitals. Why should we
hand over money to people that used to be our competitors?'" Id.
324. See, e.g., Ellen Hale, Some States Taking Steps to Protect Not-for-Profit Hospitals, GANNETr
NEWS SERVICE, Nov. 20, 1996, at S12, available in 1996 WL 4391192. Hale notes that: "If
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that new members be brought in to provide grant-making expertise
and to help avoid potential conflicts of interest.32 5
Not all trustees hew to the original charity's path. Having deter-
mined that federal and state programs adequately meet the needs of
most uninsured patients, one Tennessee foundation that resulted
from the sale of hospital assets intends now to shift its focus from
health care to education." 6 A foundation in Venice, Florida, makes
passed, the Colorado legislation being drafted would be among the most comprehensive,
requiring an independent new board of trustees for the new charity created by the sale of a
not-for-profit hospital. In many conversions so far, the old hospital board simply moves to
the new foundation." Id. However, Nancy Kane observed, "many boards feel that the char-
itable asset value of the conversion is a direct result of their stewardship and that it is their
obligation to maintain the charitable mission of those assets in their new form." Nancy M.
Kane, Some Guidelines for Managing Charitable Assets from Conversions, HEALTH AlT., Mar.-Apr.
1997, at 229, 234.
325. Indeed, Judith Bell, a lawyer at Consumers Union, suggests that more nonprofit
hospitals might be maintained if the board members could not stay on with the founda-
tion: "If the choice is to cut the nursing staff, lay people off, and do all the tough, unpopu-
lar things it would take to put the hospital back in shape, or, alternatively, to sell, get a
glamorous new foundation and have lots of money to give away, it's clear which way they'll
go." Lewin & Gottlieb, supra note 314 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In general, the old hospital trustees have no particular expertise in foundation man-
agement and grant-making. One commentator observes:
The potential for misuse of the assets worries the traditional philanthropic
community, which is racing to study the new foundations and educate newcomers
about the elusive task of funding and operating effective charitable programs.
Most foundation leaders are former hospital executives and trustees jumping into
social programming that's far different from the health care delivery they know
best. They usually lack experience in grant-making and managing large invest-
ment funds.
Meyer, supra note 172, at 14. For further support, see Craig Havighurst, Solid Foundations,
HEALTH SYSTEMS REV., July-Aug. 1996, at 33, 37, commenting:
Board members will have a bias towards protecting or subsidizing their former
hospital and will be pressured to do so by the new investor....
Foundation leaders interviewed for this article acknowledged that this is per-
haps the most real danger to an effective foundation. All recommended a com-
plete severing of ties.
See also Harris Meyer, From Giving Care to Giving Grants, FOUND. NEWS & COMMEN'TARY, July-
Aug. 1996, at 40, 43 (expressing skepticism over new foundations keeping the same board
members or executives as the previous hospital or HMO).
326. SeeJaffe & Langley, supra note 311; see also Meyer, supra note 172, at 17 (reporting
that the Rose Foundation in Denver, in asking the community about its priorities, discov-
ered that education and children and family programs ranked far higher than health care:
"In the macro view," the foundation president said, "everything is health related.... If the
kids aren't educated and aren't eating, what's more important for us to address than
that?"); accord Meyer, supra note 325, at 42 (explaining that the Rose hospital's origin in
the 1940s was "a place forJewish doctors to practice at a time when they weren't allowed on
staff anywhere else," and as a result, the Rose Foundation officials have also decided to
focus "on preserving Jewish identity").
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grants to arts organizations, to human service organizations, and for
civic affairs. 32
7
4. Timken Mercy Medical Center.--In the Timken hospital case de-
scribed at the beginning of this Article, the $200 million proceeds of
the sale of the nonprofit hospital assets will be held by grant-making
foundations.3 28 These foundations plan to redirect the purposes of
the charity by using the proceeds, according to a news report, "to act
on issues that affect the quality of life, change attitudes and structures
that oppress people, provide direct relief to the poor and listen to the
poor and educate others to their needs.31 29 Such a broad construc-
tion of charitable purposes raises the issues just discussed.
The Timken story raises an additional fiduciary legal issue. News
accounts described how, prior to the board vote on the sale, the twelve
community members of the board were "removed," leaving the board
with only the four members representing the Sisters of Charity of St.
Augustine (CSA) Health System and the president/CEO. 3 ' Under
nonprofit law, board members can be removed so easily only if they
are appointed by, and serve at the pleasure of, one or more "mem-
bers" of the nonprofit.3 3 1 It appears that the CSA system was the sole
member of the Timken hospital, akin to making Timken its subsidi-
ary. This situation should not bother those who advocate for a strong
membership role in charities, but it does raise concerns if other con-
stituencies, such as the community, are to be entided to independent
representation.
5. Summay.-This subpart examined the aspect of a fiduciary's
duty of care that relates to what some commentators call the duty of
obedience, and which this Article argues is an aspect of the duty of
care. In the absence of shareholders, and assuming no members,
when can the directors on their own determine that the purposes of
the charity may be changed? When must the directors receive ap-
proval from the attorney general or the courts, or both? The recent
wave of nonprofit hospital conversions has led many state legislatures
to enact statutes requiring attorney general-and in some cases com-
munity-involvement. Some states also involve the community in the
"back end" cy pres issue: deciding how to use the resulting sale pro-
ceeds. The amount of deference to grant nonprofit directors requires
327. Havighurst, supra note 325, at 34.
328. McIntyre, supra note 13.
329. Id.
330. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
331. See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. Acr § 8.09 (1987).
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balancing the public interest against the desirability of an independ-
ent charitable sector. These issues, at least in the hospital context, are
only beginning to be debated.
C. The Reader's Digest Foundations: Investment Duties and
Commingled Purposes
1. Prudent Man Versus Legal List.-A trustee's duty of care in-
cludes the duty to make trust assets productive. We owe the develop-
ment of the "prudent man rule" to an 1830 Massachusetts Supreme
Court case involving Harvard College. 3 2 Judge Putnam declared in
dictum a standard of investment that most states, in court decisions or
legislation, came to adopt for all trustees, private or charitable:
[Trustees must] observe how men of prudence, discretion
and intelligence manage their own affairs, not in regard to
speculation, but in regard to the permanent disposition of
their funds, considering the probable income, as well as the
probable safety of the capital to be invested. 33
Dubbing this the "prudent-man rule," the Second Restatement of the Law
of Trusts declared the trustee's duty "to make such investments and
only such investments as a prudent man would make of his own prop-
erty having in view the preservation of the estate and the amount and
regularity of the income to be derived. 3 3 4
Commentators hailed Judge Putnam's opinion in Amory as a
model of flexibility regarding the trustee's investment powers. The
authors of the various Restatements, too, believed that they had ex-
pressed the rule as one of trustee flexibility. 3 5 However, to Professor
Lawrence Friedman, the prudent investor rule "presupposes a certain
class of trustees: men of business ability, whose social and economic
position allows them easily to observe how their peers manage large
estates for themselves or others."336 Moreover, the rule originated in
Boston, in which a "special institution was developing, the so-called
Boston trustee, a professional manager of other people's fortunes-
332. See Harvard College v. Amory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446 (1830).
333. Id. at 461.
334. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227 (1959).
335. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS (THE PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE) § 227
general notes at 59 (1992) (stating that the rule lessens the dangers of unwarranted con-
servatism); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227 cmt. a (indicating the flexibility of the
rule based on the increased skill level of certain trustees).
336. Lawrence M. Friedman, The Dynastic Trust, 73 YALE L.J. 547, 554 (1964).
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the living embodiment of the prudent investor. '33 7 Most states took
many years to accept the prudent investor rule (for private as well as
charitable trustees).33 The legislative and judicial quest to distin-
guish permissible "investing" from impermissible "speculating" led to
extreme conservatism. Courts and legislatures often relied instead on
"legal lists"-generally consisting of government bonds and usually ex-
cluding as too risky both equities and debt issued by corporations.3 3 9
This approach continued until, by the turn of the nineteenth century,
trust companies had developed to provide "a rational, institutional
base for legal and business experience in drafting, forming, managing
and perpetuating long-term trusts. 31 4  Other court decisions second-
guessed trustees by examining the losing investment in isolation from
the entire portfolio, so that losses on hedging instruments suddenly
appeared speculative.3 41 Finally, trustees were barred from delegating
their duties (unlike corporations, which by definition act through
others), lending further encouragement to buying and holding "safe"
assets.
34 2
We continue to find examples of the disgraceful inefficiencies
that these narrow interpretations can produce. For over fifty years, a
337. Id. In a footnote, Professor Friedman argued that there was a division of trustee
labor in Massachusetts: "[P]rivate trustees for dynastic trusts, and corporate trustees and
savings banks for small depositors (roughly equivalent to caretaker trusts)." Id. n.27.
338. See id. at 554 (stating in 1964 that although the prudent investor standard was more
than 130 years old, it had not become generally accepted in the majority of jurisdictions
until the last 20 years).
339. SeeJohn H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Market Funds and Trust-Investment Law,
1976 Am. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1, 3-4. In restricting investments to government bonds, states
conveniently provided a source of funds for the public sector. See id. at 5 n.18 (comparing
the English chancellor's concern for providing a broad market for government securities
with American state legislatures' statutory lists authorizing state and local obligations); see
also Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered, 93
COLUM. L. REV. 795, 799-820 (1993) (analyzing the problems of political influences over
public pension funds). Describing the hazards of relying on the legislature to authorize
particular investments, Professor Friedman observed: "It must have been clear to all where
the impetus for these laws arose. This was not a plain and narrow path but an invitation to
corruption. The power to prescribe 'legals' was a power to control or at least influence the
flow of investment money." Friedman, supra note 336, at 562. Professor Friedman con-
cluded that the Depression provided the spur to final repeal of legal lists: "One might
seriously question . . . the social utility of rules which kept funds out of channels which
might conceivably restore business confidence, enhance stock prices, and help get the
country back on its feet." Id. at 571.
340. Friedman, supra note 336, at 563.
341. See, e.g., id. at 566-67 (discussing Simmons v. Oliver, 43 N.W. 561 (Wis. 1889), where a
trustee invested a portion of the trust in a business that failed and the court imposed its
own strict standards to govern investment policy for trustees).
342. See BEvIS LONGSTRETH, MODERN INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT AND THE PRUDENT MAN
RULE 72-73 (1986) (discussing the rule against delegation).
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1945 testamentary devise by the progressive Macon newspaper pub-
lisher W.T. Anderson had yet to result in the formation of the stipu-
lated charitable foundation for the health needs of poor local
blacks.14 ' Because living heirs were still entitled to small stipends, the
trust's bank trustees, rather than purchasing annuities for these heirs,
accumulated all of the capital and earnings.344 Nor were these earn-
ings anything to boast of: They averaged a mere three-percent annual
return. The Georgia Attorney General's office investigated whether
the trustees breached their duty of care by failing to achieve even a
conservative level of return.34 5 The bank, in turn, finally petitioned,
successfully, for court approval to lift the restrictions in the will that
limited investments to "lawful instruments," such as municipal bonds,
certificates of deposit, and United States Treasury securities.146 Those
fighting to fund the charity contended, however, that the bank could
have sought the same deviation in 1972, when Georgia liberalized the
investment powers of executors and trustees. 347 On February 6, 1998,
the Georgia Attorney General, who sought damages to the estate of
over $4.5 million, settled the dispute for a payment by the bank of
$150,000 to the charitable trust, and an agreement that the bank will
create an advisory board to help the trust review grant applications.3 48
343. Monica Langley, Man's Last Wish to Help Poor Blacks on Hold 50 Years, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 27, 1996, at Al; NationsBank Announces Commitment to Contribute $500,000 for the Health
Needs of Indigent African Americans in Macon, Georgia Area, PR NEWSWIRE, Oct. 16, 1996, avail-
able in LEXIS, News Library, Prnews File (describing a court decision on October 3, 1996 to
permit the funding of the charitable trust from the Anderson estate); Karen M. Thomas,
Georgia Octogenarians Push Bank to Follow Will: Relative Devoted Funds to Medical Care for Blacks,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 19, 1997, at Al, available in 1997 W"L 2640228 (explaining the
legal barriers preventing the release of $2.4 million from W.T. Anderson's estate to provide
medical care for blacks at Macon's only nonprofit hospital).
344. The bank changed hands three times during this period. For a long time, the bank
trustee appeared to have a conflicting interest, given that one of the members of the bank
board was the brother of a living heir:
Her brother, Peyton Anderson, who died in 1988, had become a household
name in the area through his inheritance of the newspaper and a charitable fund
set up in his name. The younger Anderson sold the paper to the Knight-Ridder
chain. The women [heirs] found it bittersweet that Peyton would be
remembered, while W.T. would not.
Thomas, supra note 343.
345. See Langley, supra note 343.
346. Id.
347. The living heirs' legal costs have been funded by the only remaining nonprofit
hospital in Macon, and thus the only charity that qualifies as a beneficiary under the terms
of the will. See id.
348. See NationsBank, Georgia Reach a Settlement on Publisher's Estate, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9,
1998, at B5.
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2. Modern Portfolio Theory.-Over the last few decades, the tradi-
tional formulations of the prudent man rule suffered the death of a
thousand cuts by advances in investment theory.34 9 Again, change be-
gan in the charitable sector. University trustees believed that they
could spend only income, while appreciation belonged to the endow-
ment, and so they tended to invest in bonds rather than stock.350 Af-
ter finding that no court decision on the income-versus-appreciation
question involved a charitable endowment fund, a study sponsored by
the Ford Foundation in 1969 urged trustees to focus on "total return"
rather than on legally defined "income.3 51
Shortly thereafter, in 1972, the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws adopted the Uniform Management of
Institutional Funds Act (UMIFA), which permits charity fiduciaries to
"invest and reinvest an institutional fund in any real or personal prop-
erty deemed advisable by the governing board, whether or not it pro-
duces a current return. '3 52 About the same time, the United States
349. See LONGSTRETH, supra note 342. Even after significant recent reforms in trust in-
vestment law, a fiduciary must still exercise prudence in setting investment policy and in
choosing and supervising any investment advisors or managers to whom investment deci-
sions are delegated.
350. Cf WILLIAM L. CARY & CRAIG B. BRIGHT, THE LAW AND THE LORE OF ENDOWMENT
FUNDS 7 (1969) ("'We may be in a period in which the mores regarding these matters are
gradually shifting. Fifty years ago most trustees would have argued that it was immoral to
purchase common stocks with endowment funds. At present nearly half of college endow-
ment funds are in common stocks, and a similar shift with respect to [the utilization of]
capital gains may be occurring.'" (alteration in original) (quoting Bible Inst. Colportage
Ass'n v. St. Joseph's B & T Co., 75 N.E.2d 666 (Ind. Ct. App. 1947))).
351. See id. at 6, explaining the goal of the study:
It should be stressed at the outset that the purpose of this report is not to advo-
cate either the expenditure or the preservation of capital gains.... The object of
our inquiry is merely to determine whether the directors of an educational insti-
tution are circumscribed by the law or are free to adopt the investment policy
they regard as soundest for their institution, unhampered by legal impediments,
prohibitions or restrictions.
Some commentators fault charities less for their outdated investment practices than for
resisting changing their traditional spending policies. See, e.g.,J. PETER WILLIAMSON, FUNDS
FOR THE FUTURE: COLLEGE ENDOWMENT MANAGEMENT FOR THE 1990's, at 5-104 (1993)
("While there was some reluctance to modify the traditional, rather conservative invest-
ment policies pursued by most endowments, the real resistance was to the idea of changing
the traditional spending policies."). Williamson described the subterfuge opportunity:
"The institutions that prided themselves on spending only income yield, and invested all of
their endowment assets in high-yielding fixed-income securities, gave up all chance of ap-
preciation, even appreciation to cope with inflation, but operated entirely within the limits
of traditional spending practices." Id. at 5-104 to 5-105.
352. UMIFA § 4(1), 7A U.L.A. 719 (1985). This authority, however, is "subject to any
specific limitations set forth in the applicable gift instrument" or in other law. Id. § 4, 7A
U.L.A. 719. UMIFA's standard of conduct is one of "ordinary business care and prudence
under the facts and circumstances prevailing at the time of the action or decision." Id. § 6,
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Treasury Department issued regulations describing which investments
made by a private foundation would jeopardize the foundation's tax-
exempt status (and thus attract an excise tax).353 The regulations
adopted a total-return approach, as well as a policy of examining in-
vestment decisions in the context of the entire portfolio. 54 This flexi-
ble approach found favor in the 1974 federal legislation governing
pension trustees.3"5 Most recently, several states have adopted legisla-
tion similarly liberalizing the investment powers of private trustees.356
Meanwhile, in 1990, the American Law Institute adopted and
promulgated the first volume of the Third Restatement of the Law of
7A U.L.A. 721. UMIFA has been adopted in 40 states and the District of Columbia. See
UNIFORM MANAGEMENT OF INST. FUNDS ACT, 7A U.L.A. 316 (Supp. 1997).
353. See Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-1 (as amended in 1973).
354. Id. The regulations provide:
In the exercise of the requisite standard of care and prudence the foundation
managers may take into account the expected return (including both income and
appreciation of capital), the risks of rising and falling price levels, and the need
for diversification .... The determination whether the investment of a particular
amountjeopardizes the carrying out of the exempt purposes of a foundation shall
be made on an investment by investment basis, in each case taking into account
the foundation's portfolio as a whole. No category of investments shall be treated
as a per se violation of section 4944. However, the following are examples of
types or methods of investment which will be closely scrutinized to determine
whether the foundation managers have met the requisite standard of care and
prudence: Trading in securities on margin, trading in commodity futures,... the
purchase of "puts," "calls," and "straddles," the purchase of warrants, and selling
short.
Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-1 (a) (2) (i). Compare this flexible formulation to an earlier Treasury
Department proposal that would have prohibited private foundations from trading in any
"inherently speculative devices such as the purchase of 'puts,' 'calls,' 'straddles,' 'spreads,'
'strips,' 'straps,' and 'special options.' Selling short and trading commodity futures would
also be prohibited." HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS & SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 91ST
CONG., TAX REFORM STUDIES AND PROPOSALS: U.S. TREAS. DEPT. 305 (Comm. Print, Part 3,
Feb. 5, 1969).
A foundation manager who knowingly participates in making a jeopardizing invest-
ment, without reasonable cause, faces a penalty of 5% of the amount involved, but not
more than $5000, and up to another $10,000 if he or she refuses to agree to part or all of
the removal from jeopardy. I.R.C. § 4944(a)(2), (b)(2), (d)(2) (West 1997). A similar
scheme operates under I.R.C. § 4945 (West 1997); entitled "Taxes on Taxable
Expenditures."
355. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.) adopted the corporate standard of care and
prudence.
356. Cf UNIP. PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT, 7B U.L.A. 1 (Supp. 1997) (listingjurisdictions
which have adopted the Act); UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT, 7B U.L.A. 18 (Supp. 1997)
(commenting that the Act has been substantially adopted in Florida, Illinois, New York,
and Virginia). The Uniform Principal and Income Act is needed because the Uniform Manage-
ment of Institutional Funds Act does not apply to outside holders of funds, such as banks or
trust companies, even if a charitable institution is the sole beneficiary. See UMIFA § 1 cmt.
1, 7A U.L.A. 713 (1985).
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Trusts, which is devoted exclusively to revisions in. the prudent man
rule. 57 The Reporter, Professor Edward C. Halbach, Jr., explained its
genesis in excessively hidebound interpretations, including commen-
tary in earlier Restatements:
The "black letter" of the potentially and intendedly flexible,
traditional rule is not objectionable, nor is it inconsistent
with modernization .... What has led to widespread criti-
cism in the last quarter of a century, to the enactment and
consideration of modernized statutes .... and to The Ameri-
can Law Institute's prudent-investor project is the way in
which the rule has previously been elaborated in Restate-
ment commentary or other treatises and applied by courts in
most of the states.358
The Third Restatement embodies modern portfolio theory in its
amended section 227: The general standard of prudent investment
"requires the exercise of reasonable care, skill, and caution, and is to
be applied to investments not in isolation but in the context of the
trust portfolio and as a part of an overall investment strategy, which
should incorporate risk and return objectives reasonably suitable to
the trust."3 59 Ignoring the differences between private trusts and char-
itable trusts, section 389 states simply: "In making decisions and tak-
ing actions with respect to the investment of trust funds, the trustee of
a charitable trust is under a duty similar to that of the trustee of a
private trust. '3 60 Of course, all Restatements, however influential, "are
not law but depend on the willingness of courts to follow them." '361
Modern portfolio theory concludes that increased return comes
from taking on increased risk, where the "riskless" return is the inter-
est income one can earn on Treasury securities. 62 However, only a
certain type of risk is compensated through higher returns-specifi-
357. See RESTATEMENT (THiRD) OF TRUSTS (THE PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE) (1992). Ac-
cording to the Reporter for the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, Edward Halbach, future
projects will restate other aspects of trust law. See Halbach, supra note 102, at 1176 (sug-
gesting that future work on the Restatement (Third) of Trusts will cover the subjects of modifi-
cation and termination of trusts, including issues relating to dead hand control and
equitable deviation).
358. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS (THE PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE) § 227 reporter's
notes, general notes at 59. But see Gordon, supra note 92, at 54-55 (arguing that cases could
also be read to be consistent with modern views of prudent investment practices).
359. RESTATEMENT (THiRD) OF TRUSTS (THE PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE) § 227.
360. Id. § 389.
361. Halbach, supra note 102, at 1184.
362. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS (THE PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE) § 227 re-
porter's general note on cmts. e-h, at 78 ("[T]he only allowable means of increasing or
decreasing the market portfolio's return is by increasing or decreasing risk.").
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cally, the risk that the market will go up or down (systemic or system-
atic risk).'63 The risk from holding any particular publicly traded
stock enjoys little compensation, because all but its market risk can be
diversified away.364 In an artificial but fundamental model, the only
way to increase return is to shift assets from Treasury bills to stock;
additional risk can be taken on by borrowing and buying more
stock.365 (Borrowing-indeed, the notion of increasing risk-has tra-
ditionally been verboten to trustees; the Third Restatement reverses this
rule.366) The way to reduce risk is to shift from stock to Treasuries, or
to lend against stock. A fiduciary's most important investment deci-
sion is selecting a level of risk and the appropriate asset allocation:
"[E] ndowment trustees should be spending the majority of their time
on investment objectives and asset allocation because tactical consid-
erations, such as security selection, are of minor importance. "367
Indeed, one key feature of modern portfolio theory is the "effi-
cient market hypothesis," implying that in major central markets in-
363. See id.
364. See id. at 77.
365. As Edward Halbach cautions, no one can hold all of "the market" because there are
many different markets for financial instruments. Telephone Interview with Edward
Halbach, supra note 86. Only short-term Treasuries are risk-free because of the risk of
inflation. Id. Borrowing provides not rewarded market risk, but rather leverage. Id.
366. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS (THE PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE) § 191, at 154; see
also id. § 227 cmt. h, at 29 ("Borrowing may play an inverse role to that of lending and is
permissible for trustees, provided the tactic is employed selectively and cautiously."). See
generally Langbein & Posner, supra note 339, at 33, explaining:
In most cases where borrowing has been at issue, the trustee was using trust funds
to carry on a business. But the trustee who levers a market fund, like a trustee
who buys levered common stock, remains a passive investor .... Obviously, lever-
age increases the risk of the trust assets .... But the proper question is whether
the risk is excessive, not whether it is achieved by leverage. It is more prudent to
give the trust assets a beta of 1.5 by levering a market portfolio than by limiting
the portfolio to common stocks having an average beta of 1.5, thereby sacrificing
diversification.
Congress subjects most "debt-financed income" of pension funds, charities, and other
exempt organizations to the tax on unrelated business income (UBI). (This treatment
appears to be motivated by Congress's fear that exempt organizations can otherwise grow
too large. See generally Brody, Of Sovereignty and Subsidy, supra note 29.) A special rule
applies to securities lending. See I.R.C. § 514(c) (8) (West 1997) and the Treasury Regula-
tions thereunder. In addition, universities and pension funds may generally leverage real
property investments without generating UBI. See I.R.C. § 514(c) (9) and the regulations
thereunder.
367. WILLIAM T. SPITZ, SELECTING AND EVALUATING AN INVESTMENT MANAGER 3 (1992).
Spitz also advises: "Because the return on an endowment is determined primarily by asset
mix and investment philosophy decisions, trustees should not delegate these decisions to
investment managers." Id.
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creased effort does not increase the odds of "beating the market. 368
As a result, increasingly throughout the 1980s "individual and institu-
tional investors threw in the stock-picking towel and opted for index-
ing-that is, simply buying and holding one or more of the broad
market indexes such as the Standard & Poor's 500-Stock Index." '369
Surprisingly, however, only about 10 percent of the shares constitut-
ing the S&P 500 are held in index funds, and the typical endowment
allocates only 1.2 percent of assets to index funds. 7 ° Yale University
recently found itself the subject of a Harvard Business School case
study for shifting the half of its portfolio invested in index funds into
active management. Asserted its chief investment officer: "We started
out owning the market, but over time we convinced ourselves that we
have the ability to find people who can beat the market. '37 1 One
might expect that under such a "conservative" paradigm as a trust, the
modern prudent investor rule would forbid active investing strategies.
Professor Halbach tries to explain why the Third Restatement does not
require passive investing:
Assessments also tend to discourage incurring heavy investi-
gative and transaction costs . . . in pursuit of strategies
designed to beat the market through "timing" or "stock pick-
ing" in major central markets. On the other hand, these as-
sessments have not prevented all intelligent and careful
investors from including active management strategies in the
investment programs for which they are responsible. Like-
368. See, e.g., BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET 194 (rev. ed.
1996) ("Even a dart-throwing chimpanzee can select a portfolio that performs as well as
one carefully selected by the experts."). For example, in 1995, the Standard & Poor's 500-
Stock Index (S&P 500) produced a 37.53% return (including reinvested dividends), beat-
ing over 85% of domestic stock mutual funds. Robert McGough, It's Strange! It's Pricey! It's
a Winner!, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 1996, at R4, available in 1996 WL-WSJ 3085768. Of course,
the S&P 500 does not reflect the entire investment market: "Investors in S&P 500 index
funds are, whether they know it or not, making an implicit bet that the largest companies
in the nation will be the top performers." Id. Rather than selecting the 500 largest U.S.
companies, however, a committee at Standard & Poors seeks to ensure that each industry is
represented proportionate to its presence among all publicly traded stocks. Id. Commen-
tators generally view active investment strategies as appropriate for less efficient markets,
such as real estate and foreign stock exchanges. See, e.g., Halbach, supra note 102, at 1163
(stating that specialized advice or delegation is necessary when investing in foreign markets
or in venture capital and real estate).
369. MALKIEL, supra note 368, at 194.
370. See SPITZ, supra note 367, at 3.
371. Marlene Givant Star, Yale Endowment Leaves Tradition Behind, PENSIONS & INVEST-
MENTs, Apr. 15, 1996, at 3, 41 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Carolyn L.
Duronio, Fiduciary Concerns Under the Prudent Investor Standard, TR. & EST., Dec. 1996, at 33,
33 (discussing a Harvard Business School case study that analyzed Yale's strategy of invest-
ing approximately 50% of its portfolio in "'alternative investments"').
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wise, these assessments would not justify a legal rule that
would bar fiduciaries from including active management
strategies in investing funds for which they are
responsible.372
3. Investing Versus Charitable Program.--Charities sometimes face
program conflicts when managing their endowments. The Third Re-
statement would permit a charity to take "social considerations" into
account only "to the extent the charitable purposes would justify an
expenditure of trust funds for the social issue or cause in question or
to the extent the investment decision can be justified on grounds of
advancing, financially or operationally, a charitable activity conducted
by the trust. ' 373 "Program-related investments" are made to advance a
charitable purpose rather than to earn a financial return.3 74 At the
other extreme, reasons of conscience might induce a charity to divest
or shun holdings in corporations whose activities clash with the chari-
table purpose. In the 1980s, institutions divested stock in companies
doing business in South Africa.3 75 Recently, institutions have been
372. Halbach, supra note 102, at 1162 (footnote omitted); accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TRUSTS (THE PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE) § 227 reporter's general note on cmts. e-h, at 79
(1992) ("The greater the trustee's departure from one of the valid passive strategies, the
greater is likely to be the burden of justification and also of continuous monitoring.").
Yale's active strategy relies, in large part, on its investment in illiquid markets. Its chief
investment officer, David Swensen, commented: "'More than half the portfolio is in asset
classes where you couldn't or wouldn't want to buy the market," and "You can be paid for
accepting illiquidity. The markets overvalue liquidity to a degree that's hard to under-
stand.'" Star, supra note 371, at 41.
373. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS (THE PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE) § 227 cmt. c.
374. The private foundation rules under the Internal Revenue Code prohibit excess
business holdings. See infra note 390. The definition of "business holdings" carves out an
exception for "functionally related business [es] "-those businesses or activities that relate
(aside from the organization's need for money) to the exempt purpose of the organiza-
tion. Treas. Reg. § 53.4943-10(b) (as amended in 1984). For example, the regulations
describe "investments in small businesses in central cities or in corporations to assist in
neighborhood renovation." Id. Similarly, jeopardizing investments do not include "pro-
gram-related investments"-where the primary purpose of the investment is to accomplish
an exempt purpose rather than to produce income or property appreciation. I.R.C.
§ 4944(c) (West 1997). See generally David S. Chernoff, Some Practical Observations About
Making, Documenting and Closing Program Related Investments, PHILANTHROPY MONTHLY, Mar.
1996, at 23 (advising foundations about making program-related investments).
375. See, e.g., Op. Haw. Att'y Gen., No. 85-26, 1985 Haw. AG LEXIS 4, at *23 (Nov. 25,
1985) ("Primary consideration must be given to safety of the trust corpus and production
of an adequate return on investment .... However, if the [University of Hawaii] Board [of
Regents] reasonably concludes that two investment alternatives are economically
equivalent, the Board may choose between them on social grounds."). See generally RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS (THE PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE) § 227 reporter's note c (dis-
cussing social investing cases and commentaries regarding the duty of loyalty); Daniel
Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA 's Fundamental Contradiction: The Exclusive Benefit Rule,
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choosing to invest in mutual funds that exclude stocks of tobacco
companies. 376 One wonders how far charities will take this "tainted
money" concern-recall Shaw's Salvation Army Major Barbara and
her repugnance at accepting a donation proffered by a wealthy distil-
ler and arms merchant.
377
4. Donor Direction Versus Diversification.-As described in Part I, a
donor can restrict or enlarge the trustee's investment powers. A lib-
eral grant would relieve trustees from being confined to conservative
investments.37 ' A restrictive grant would obligate trustees to make
specified investments, such as limiting investments to government
bonds or stock in the family business. For example, the trust inden-
ture of the Duke Endowment, established in perpetuity in 1932 by
James B. Duke, prohibited the trustees from both disposing of any of
the contributed shares in Duke Power Company, and from investing
55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1105, 1143-49 (1988) (discussing social investing and the controversy
that it has created over the past decade); see also Basich v. Board of Pensions, 540 N.W.2d
82, 87 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that the courts could not constitutionally interfere
with the church's and pension board's policy, based on social and doctrinal grounds, to
divest stock in companies doing business in South Africa).
Compare the debate over the Department of Labor's rules for "economically targeted
investments" by pension funds. See Department of Labor Interpretive Bull. 94-1, 29 C.F.R.
2509.94-1 (1997) (permitting such investments as long as they do not "subordinat[e] the
interests of participants and beneficiaries in their retirement income to unrelated objec-
tives"). House Bill 1594, which passed the House on September 12, 1995, but died with the
104th Congress, would have nullified this Interpretive Bulletin: "It is the sense of the Con-
gress that it is inappropriate for the Department of Labor... to take any action to promote
or otherwise encourage economically targeted investments [ETIs]." See generally Alvin D.
Lurie, ETIs: A Scheme for the Rescue of City and Country with Pension Funds, 5 CORNELLJ.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 315 (1996) (discussing the debate between the House of Representatives and
the Department of Labor over ETIs); Edward A. Zelinsky, ETI, Phone the Department of Labor:
Economically Targeted Investments, IB 94-1 and the Reincarnation of Industrial Policy, 16 BERKE-
LEYJ. Emp. & LAB. L. 333 (1995) (criticizing the Department of Labor's position on ETIs).
376. See Glenn Collins, S.E. C. Allows Priests'Bid for Vote on Nabisco Spinoff N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
3, 1996, at D3, available in LEXIS, News Library, Nyt File.
377. See GEORGE BERNARD SHAW, MAJOR BjABA 25-26 (Dan. H. Lawrence ed., Penguin
Books 1957) (1907) (preface), declaring:
[The Salvation Army] would take money from the devil himself and be only too
glad to get it out of his hands and into God's....
... [The Army] must take the money because it cannot exist without money,
and there is no other money to be had. Practically all the spare money in the
country consists of a mass of rent, interest, and profit, every penny of which is
bound up with crime, drink, prostitution, disease, and all the evil fruits of poverty,
as inextricably as with enterprise, wealth, commercial probity, and national pros-
perity. The notion that you can earmark certain coins as tainted is an unpractical
individualist superstition.
378. A 1963 study in New York found that because of settlor waivers, only 9% of trust
assets (20% of the trusts) were subject to the statutory "legal list" investments. See Gordon,
supra note 92, at 76 n.99.
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any income "in any property- of any kind except in securities of said
Duke Power Company, or of a subsidiary thereof, or in bonds validly
issued by the United States of America, or by a State thereof, or by a
district, county, town or city."
3 79
During the 1960s, congressman Wright Patman held numerous
hearings investigating how tax-exempt foundations could be used to
further private interests.3"' He called for, among other things, sus-
pending the creation of new foundations, limiting the life of founda-
tions to twenty-five years, imposing a twenty percent tax on foundation
income, and requiring that all contributions and capital gains be
spent currently.381 The Patman Report also proposed that a founda-
tion should not be permitted to invest more than three percent of its
assets in the stock of any one corporation.38 2 The Treasury Depart-
ment responded with a report in 1965. 38" Far milder than the Patman
proposals, but radical nonetheless, the Treasury Report recom-
mended such major legislative changes as prohibiting business deal-
ings between donors and foundations, limiting foundation ownership
of voting control of businesses, restricting the deductibility of donor-
controlled gifts, and regulating the number of years that donors and
their families could serve on governing boards.3 84 Several of Treas-
ury's proposals found their way into the Tax Reform Act of 1969.385
379. Indenture of James B. Duke Establishing the Duke Endowment, art. 3, Dec. 11,
1924, in LEGAL INSTRUMENTS OF FOUNDATIONS 91, 94 (F. Emerson Andrews ed., 1958). Sim-
ilarly, the Kellogg Trust declared: "The trustees are authorized to hold and retain all
shares of stock of said Kellogg Company at any time constituting a part of the trust estate, it
being the intention that said shares of stock at all times shall constitute a proper invest-
ment by the trustees." W.K. Kellogg Foundation: Provisions of Trust Agreement, art. 4.05,
in LEGAL INSTRUMENTS OF FOUNDATIONS, supra, at 112.
380. See HALL, supra note 39, at 70-71.
381. Id. at 71.
382. See Ronald E. Gother, Analysis and Criticism of the Treasury Proposal to Limit Stock
Ownership by Private Foundations, 13 UCLA L. REV. 1017, 1019 & n.9 (1966) (citing CHAIR-
MAN'S REPORT TO THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS, 88TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
TAx-EXEMPT FOUNDATIONS AND CHARITABLE TRUSTS: THEIR IMPACT ON OUR ECONOMY,
THIRD INSTALLMENT 133 (Comm. Print 1964)). In 1950, the House would have adopted a
50% limit on the percentage of stock a foundation could own along with the family con-
trolling the foundation, but the plan was rejected by the Senate. See id. at 1018. In 1995,
the Reece Report suggested a 5% or 10% limit. See id. at 1018-19.
383. TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT ON PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS, PRINTED FOR USE OF THE
HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANs, 89TH CONG., lST SESS. (Comm. Print, Feb. 2, 1965).
384. Id. at 36-37, 4145, 56-57.
385. See, e.g., Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 101, 83 Stat. 487, 507-11
(1969) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 4943 (West 1997)) (imposing taxes on founda-
tions' "excess business holdings"); id. § 201, 83 Stat. at 556-58 (codified as amended in
I.R.C. § 170) (disallowing deduction for certain foundation contributions).
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These limitations apply only to private'foundations, and not to univer-
sities, hospitals, or other "public" charities.386
As just illustrated, under prior law, a donor could, and often
would, endow the foundation with voting stock in his closely held cor-
poration. 387 This preserved control in the hands of the founder (and
the trusted foundation managers) .388 Nor would the controlled foun-
dation make untoward demands for dividends from the corpora-
tion.38 9 The 1969 Act requires private foundations to divest control
stock, thereby permitting them, generally, to own no more than
twenty percent of an unrelated business (reduced by the percentage
owned by "disqualified persons") .39 ° However, this rule ignores any
ownership interest not exceeding two percent of a company.391 Thus,
if the company is big enough, a foundation can be invested 100 per-
cent in it without violating section 4943 of the Internal Revenue
Code.392 Separately, though, Code section 4944 imposes tax on in-
386. Id. § 101, 83 Stat. at 492, 496-98 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 509). The Tax
Reform Act of 1969 also contained restrictions on political activities by private foundations
and public charities. See id. § 201, 83 Stat. at 561-62 (codified in amendments to I.R.C.
§§ 2055, 2106, 2522).
387. See supra notes 380-386 and accompanying text. As of the end of 1968, stock in
which the donor and his family owned at least 20% "accounted for 44 percent of all contri-
butions to foundations and 70 percent of the contributions to foundations with over $100
million in assets." FOUNDATIONS, PRIVATE GIVING, AND PUBLIC POICv REPORT AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS OF THE COMMISSION ON FOUNDATIONS AND PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY 72 (1970).
In some cases, foundations were endowed with, and remained invested in, "specific assets
in the form of land, buildings, or mineral rights." WALDEMAR A. NIELSEN, THE BIG FOUNDA-
TIONS 279 (1972).
388. For example, as of 1968, $482 million of the Duke Endowment's $629 million in
assets remained in Duke Power Company stock, representing a 55% interest. NIELSEN,
supra note 387, at 184. Duke Power was also heavily represented on the foundation's
board. Id. In 1963, the North Carolina Supreme Court denied the trustee's petition to
revise the investment provisions of the trust indenture in order to permit diversification
into other equities and not just government bonds. See Cocke v. Duke Univ., 131 S.E.2d
909, 922 (N.C. 1963). Because of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, however, the court permit-
ted the endowment both to divest itself of excess business holdings and to reinvest in other
stocks in order to meet the minimum payout obligation. See Davison v. Duke Univ., 194
S.E.2d 761, 777 (N.C. 1973).
389. See Thomas Parrish, The Foundation: "A Special American Institution," in THE FUTURE
OF FOUNDATIONS 7, 28 (Fritz F. Heimann ed. 1973) (quoting Robert Bremner's observation
that, before the 1969 Act, " ' the foundation was irresistible'").
390. See I.R.C. § 4943 (taxes on excess business holdings). Specifically, a foundation can
own up to 20% of the voting shares of any one business, reduced by shares held by disquali-
fied persons; if a third party has effective control of the business, the foundation and dis-
qualified persons may together own up to 35%. See I.R.C. § 4943(c) (2) (A), (B).
391. See I.R.C. § 4943(c) (2) (C).
392. For example, in 1971 over 40% of the Rockefeller Foundation was invested in three
Rockefeller oil companies, but held only 1.5% of their stock. See NIELSEN, supra note 387,
at 72.
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vestments that jeopardize charitable purposes, 93 which in theory
should include an undiversified portfolio.394 Nevertheless, the Treas-
ury regulations disregard investments gratuitously transferred to the
private foundations, and so private foundations holding large concen-
trations of donor-contributed stock do not violate the jeopardy invest-
ment regime.
Moreover, the private foundation excise taxes apply neither to
public charities-such as universities-nor to organizations funded
like foundations but whose income is dedicated to specified public
charities.396 The seven Wallace foundations (described at the begin-
393. See I.R.C. § 4944. Boris Bittker complained that Congress never explained, either
in 1950 or 1969, why it saddled only private foundations, and not publicly supported chari-
ties, with this restriction:
Perhaps it was thought that organizations with widespread public support must
function in a glass bowl that will discourage speculative investments, and that the
trustees of educational, religious, and medical institutions are so dedicated to
their exempt functions that they will avoid excessive risks in the investment of
their resources.
Boris I. Bittker, Should Foundations Be Third Class Charities , in THE FUTURE OF FOUNDATIONS,
supra note 389, at 132, 154. Bittker observed that the contrary proposition is equally likely
to be true:
[T]he day-to-day demands of a college, hospital, or church may tug so insistently
at the heartstrings of its trustees as to cause them to throw prudence to the winds
in a desperate effort to maximize the return on the organization's resources,
whereas the trustees of grant-making foundations, having no obligation to meet a
weekly payroll, will be inclined to avoid undue risks.
Id. at 155.
394. See Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-1 (a) (2) (i) (as amended in 1973) (indicating that the pru-
dent trustee standard includes the need to diversify); cf Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,537 (July 18,
1986), concurring in Tech. Adv. Mem. 86-31-004 (Apr. 14, 1986) (concluding that a highly
leveraged investment of 75% of a foundation's assets in a single company of which founda-
tion managers are employees, although less than 2% of the stock, violates section 4944).
395. See the first sentence of Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-1(a) (2) (ii) (a) (as amended in
1973).
396. The complex rules governing supporting organizations under Code section
509(a) (3) are beyond the scope of this Article. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-4 (as
amended in 1981). See also Ron Shoemaker & Bill Brockner, Public Charity Status on the
Razor's Edge: IRC 509(a)(3) and the Complexities of the Operated in Connection with Integral Part
Test, and Miscellaneous IRC 509(a)(3) Issues, in 1996 (FOR FY 1997) IRS EXEMPT ORGANIZA-
TIONS CPE TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM TEXTBOOK, pt. I, ch. I, at 105-30; Rochelle
Korman & William F. Gaske, Supporting Organizations to Community Foundations: A Little-Used
Alternative to Private Foundations, 10 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REv. 1327 (1994); John F. Reilly &
David W. Jones, Basic Determination Rules for Publicly Supported Organizations and Supporting
Organizations, in 1992 (FOR FY 1993) IRS EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CPE TECHNICAL INSTRUC-
TION PROGRAM TEXTBOOK, pt. I, ch. J, at 216-47.
These rules contain a prohibition on direct or indirect control by "disqualified per-
sons," including substantial contributors to the organization. I.R.C. § 509(a) (3) (C); Treas.
Reg. § 1.509(a)-4(j). Finding indirect control, the IRS denied supporting- organization
status to an entity having a four-member board of directors, one of whom was a substantial
contributor and two of whom were employees of a business corporation of which more
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ning of this Article) " 7-initially funded with Reader's Digest Associa-
tion nonvoting stock and established to support seven charities
including the Metropolitan Museum of Art and Lincoln Center-en-
joy classification as such "supporting organizations. 398 By contrast,
the two main Wallace foundations (which are private foundations) are
required by law to divest themselves of their control of Reader's Digest
Association voting stock by the year 2000."' 9
5. Conclusion.-In most states, prudence generally requires di-
versification,4 °° but the donor's instructions trump 40 1 (except for a
private foundation's excess business holdings). As the Wallace foun-
dation's woes illustrate, however, donor direction to concentrate in-
than 35% of the voting power was owned by that substantial contributor. Rev. Rul. 80-207,
1980-2 C.B. 193.
397. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
398. See IR.S. Publication 78 (Cumulative List of Organizations Exempt Under Section
501(c)(3)), <http://www.irs.ustreas.gov/prod/businfo/eo/eosearch.html//>.
399. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. Under a grandfather rule in Internal
Revenue Code section 4943, the DeWitt Wallace-Reader's Digest Fund and the Lila Wal-
lace-Reader's Digest Fund may continue to hold no more than 50%. See I.R.C.
§ 4943(c)(4)(A)(i) (West 1997). The funds reduced their holdings to over 70% in 1992,
and announced plans to reach the 50% target by increasing the percentage owned by the
Reader's Digest Employee Stock Ownership Plan to 20%. See Offering of Reader's Digest Vot-
ing Stock Priced at $48.00 Per Share, PR NEwswinu, Mar. 5, 1992, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Prnews File. In February 1998, several of the supporting organizations were au-
thorized to sell additional stock in the form of a hybrid security, for only 75% of the mar-
ket value but carrying a three-year entitlement to any declared dividends and a portion of
appreciation during that period. See Reader's Digest Completes Successful Secondary Hybrid Eq-
uity Offering Involving Six Charitable Organizations, Bus. Wisa, Feb. 13, 1998, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. Until this offering, about 51% of the assets of the sell-
ing supporting organizations comprised Reader's Digest nonvoting stock. See Stehle, supra
note 22, at 21. Two of the supporting organizations declined to participate. See Geraldine
Fabrikant, Faith Ebbs on Reader's Digest Stock, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1998, at D1, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Nyt File ("Saying no to the deal are two wealthy institutions with
hefty endowments: the Metropolitan Museum of Art and Colonial Williamsburg .... 'We
think the potential value of the stock is higher,' said William Leurs, president of the Metro-
politan Museum. 'And we don't need the cash that much right now.'").
400. See, for example, Duronio, supra note 371, at 34:
The diversification requirement [in the Unifor Prudent Investor Act] likely will
make life somewhat more difficult for fiduciaries of charitable entities holding
large amounts of a donor's family business. In some states, such as Pennsylvania,
diversification is not required, with the result that the fiduciaries could usually
justify holding the family business interests (subject to the private foundation
rules on excess business holdings), but retention will be much more difficult in
the future under the prudent investor standard.
401. See Sara Stadler, An Investment Model for the Future, CONN. L. TRIB., Mar. 10, 1997, at
20 ("Unless the underlying document authorizes or directs the fiduciary to maintain cer-
tain assets or, because of special circumstances, the purposes of the trust are better served
without their diversification, the [ Uniform Prudent Investor Act] imposes a duty to diversify
investments."); see also supra note 356 (describing the Act).
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vestments in donor-company stock cannot be justified as being solely
in the best interests of the charity's beneficiaries.4 °2 It is time for the
law to declare affirmatively that diversification is a necessary compo-
nent of the charity fiduciary's duty of care.40 3 Imposing an obligation
to diversify-at both the state and federal levels, for both private foun-
dations and publicly supported charities-would be a welcome signal
to the philanthropic world that the beneficiaries' interests take prece-
dence over the donor's desire to place her family business in friendly
hands.4 °4
D. Foundation for New Era Philanthropy: Fundraising Desperation
From a legal scholar's perspective, the unhappy saga of the Foun-
dation for New Era Philanthropy presents that rare case: a likely ex-
traordinary breach of the duty of care-multiplied by the dozens-
untainted by any hint of a breach of loyalty or complex business judg-
ment. Will state regulators have the stomach to find charity trustees
liable for the consequences of their gross negligence or nonfeasance?
402. According to a former chief investment officer of the Ford Foundation: "'The first
rule of investing is to diversify, the second rule of investing is to diversify, and the third rule
of investing is to diversify .... Nobody in their right mind.., would have all their assets in
a single stock.'" Marina Dundjerski & Holly Hall, Lilly Now No. 1 Among Foundations,
CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Jan. 29, 1998, at 1, 11 (quotingJohn English). See also id. (noting
that while the Lilly Endowment's nearly exclusive investment in Eli Lilly and Company
stock now makes it the country's wealthiest foundation, "[i]n 1992, the Lilly company's
stock did poorly, causing the endowment's value to tumble from $3.9 billion to $2.9
billion").
403. Similarly, federal law permits an Employee Stock Ownership Plan to invest dispro-
portionately in employer stock. See I.R.C. § 4975(e)(7) (West 1997). The law generally
requires the plan to permit employees to diversify at least 25% of their accounts when they
reach age 55 (and 50% for their last election). See I.R.C. § 401 (a) (28) (b). These rules
should be revisited for the same reason: to ensure that trustees act out of undivided loyalty
for the beneficiaries.
404. Again, this is one area where attorney-general jawboning might exert force even in
the absence of a specific statute. For example, lack of diversification was one of the objec-
tions raised by the California Attorney General to the proposed (and now-abandoned)
conversion of Sharp Memorial Hospital in San Diego:
Were one to assume this to be a real joint venture proposal, it would, in our
view, raise serious issues of imprudent investment. We doubt that it is ever pru-
dent for a non-profit public benefit corporation to invest virtually all of its assets
in a single investment, let alone [a for-profit limited liability company] in which it
is not the managing partner, which has virtually no capital appreciation potential,
which is virtually unmarketable after three years, and which yields a return which
the charity itself projects at well below the expected rate of return for a properly-
managed portfolio.
Letter from James R. Schwartz, California Deputy Attorney General, to John F. Walker, Jr.
5 (Nov. 8, 1996) (on file with author).
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The Wall Street Journal broke the story, with a May 15, 1995 cover
story subtitled "Some Say Matching Grants by New Era Foundation
Resemble Ponzi Scheme. 4 °5 Created by John Bennett in 1989, the
Foundation for New Era Philanthropy had been inviting selected char-
ities to contribute funds-but only for a short period.4" 6 At the end of
six months, New Era would return the "contributed" amount, plus a
matching amount of money from anonymous donors.40 7 The six-
month deposit, New Era said, would generate income to defray oper-
ating expenses. The article disclosed storm clouds, however. Pruden-
tial Securities Inc. had just sued New Era for failing to repay a loan
secured by the charities' "contributions, 4 0 8 and the Journal also re-
ported that "suspicion is growing that the anonymous group of philan-
thropists who supposedly provide the matching funds doesn't really
exist.' '4 0 Claimed Andrew Cunningham, New Era's outside auditor:
"'There is so much widespread cynicism in the world that people can-
not accept that there's a wealthy philanthropist who has a net worth in
the hundreds of millions who is willing to give away substantial
amounts and get no credit for it.'410
Quite to the contrary. Hundreds of millions of dollars poured in
from about 180 charities-as well as from about 150 individual do-
nors, including such wealthy businessmen as John C. Whitehead (for-
mer co-chairman of Goldman Sachs), Laurance Rockefeller (brother
of David), andJohn M. Templeton,Jr. (son of the mutual-funds man-
ager), whose contributions to other charities were also to be doubled.
Participating charities praised the program, and passed the word, be-
cause New Era had always come through as promised. New Era's 1989
contributions of $306,000 exploded to about $100 million in 1994.
(The Journal compared that figure to the Rockefeller Foundation's
1994 grants of $95 million.)4 1 1
According to this first story, many of the participating charities
claimed to have first conducted "'due diligence' checks on New Era
through references and financial records, including federal tax re-
405. Steve Stecklow, A Big Charity Faces Tough New Questions About Its Financing, WALL ST.
J., May 15, 1996, at Al, available in 1995 WL-WSJ 8711270 [hereinafter Stecklow, Big
Charity].
406. Id.
407. The article opened with a story about the University of Pennsylvania. After a
trustee endorsed the program and the University learned that two Philadelphia museums
received double their money, the University deposited $600,000 and, as promised, received
back $1.2 million six months later. Id.
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. Id.
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turns. ' 4 12 The Journal, however, wondered why New Era's 1993 tax
return declared income of only $33,788 on $41.3 million in contribu-
tions, which were supposed to be invested in Treasury bills and certifi-
cates of deposit. Furthermore, New Era showed only $31,821 in
liabilities, describing funds received from other charities for doubling
as contributions to itself.4 13 Evidently, "[s]ome nonprofit groups
seem concerned that if they raise too many questions about New Era
they might lose the opportunity to participate. 41 4 Albert Meyer, an
accounting professor at Spring Arbor College, fought against his
school's participating in this "Ponzi scheme," and wrote to the Inter-
nal Revenue Service, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and
the Pennsylvania Attorney General.4 15 His unappreciative president
stated, "I have indicated to [New Era's] Mr. Bennett that Albert's ac-
tions should in no way be interpreted as coming from Spring Arbor
College." '4 1 6 However, it was Meyer's tip that cut the scheme short; the
SEC's prompt investigation triggered Prudential Securities to inquire
where New Era's funds had gone.41 7
The next day, the Journals front-page cascading headlines told it
all: "Crumbling Pyramid: Owing $500 Million, New Era Charity Seeks
Refuge from Creditors: Mystery Donors Don't Exist, Founder Tells
His Staff; Colleges Face Big Losses-A Hard Blow to Good Works." '41 8
Details emerged: The Coalition of Christian Colleges and Universities
hoped to double $350,000; the Academy of Natural Sciences, in Phila-
412. Id.
413. Id. Indeed, New Era's 1993 tax return was its first tax filing. See Steve Stecklow,
False Profit: How New Era's Boss Led Rich and Gullible into a Web of Deceit, WALL ST. J., May 19,
1995, at Al [hereinafter Stecklow, False Profit]. Nor did New Era register with the Penn-
sylvania charities bureau until 1993. See id.
414. Stecklow, Big Charity, supra note 405.
415. See also Barbara Carton, Unlikely Hero: A Persistent Accountant Brought New Era's
Problems to Light, WALL ST. J., May 19, 1995, at BI, available in 1995 WL-WSJ 8712690 ("Mr.
Meyer told his wife he was going to 'test the limits of tenure."').
416. Stecklow, Big Charity, supra note 405.
417. The SEC subsequently accused Bennett of selling unregistered securities, as well as
diverting over $4 million from New Era to private companies he controlled. See SEC v.
Bennett, 889 F. Supp. 804, 806 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (mem.); SEC v. Bennett, 904 F. Supp. 435,
436 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (mem.); see also L. Stuart Ditzen & Daniel Rubin, SEC: Bennett Diverted
$4.2 Million, PHILA. INQUIRER, May 19, 1995, at Al (chronicling the numerous organiza-
tions from which Bennett diverted the funds). Later figures show a diversion of at least
$6.6 million. See Steve Stecklow, Trustee's Filing Identifies 46 Creditors That Made Money Before
New Era's Fall, WALL ST. J., June 19, 1995, at A2, available in 1995 WL-WSJ 8730231 [herein-
after Stecklow, Trustee's Filing] (quoting George L. Miller, an accountant working with New
Era's bankruptcy trustee, as stating that $6.6 million in New Era's funds had been trans-
ferred to an entity controlled by Bennett).
418. Steve Stecklow, Crumbling Pyramid: Owing $500 Million, New Era Charity Seeks Refuge
from Creditors, WALL ST.J., May 16, 1995, at Al, available in 1995 WL-WSJ 8711671.
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delphia, had deposited $2.7 million-over one-tenth of its endow-
ment.41 New Era's attorney asked the bankruptcy court to keep the
list of creditors under seal, but the court later declined to spare par-
ticipants this publicity.42 °
The New Era matching-donation program began in the trusting
world of churches and evangelical organizations, where founder John
Bennett was prominent.421 John Templeton, a devout Christian, was
so favorably impressed with Bennett that he invited him to serve as a
director or trustee of twenty-four of the Templeton Funds, but the
billionaire mutual-fund manager was falsely listed on tax filings as a
New Era board member and was not, as rumored, the mystery do-
nor.422 As one seminary president described Bennett, "He comes
across as a person of sterling character and for the kingdom of
God. '42" The seminary encouraged other schools to apply. Its pastor
observed: "It will be worst for organizations that hired personnel on
the basis of the [anticipated] matches, or those that have done any
rebuilding based on what they expect to receive."4 24 Near the end,
New Era asked for some charities' entire endowments to hold for
doubling.425
419. Id.
420. See In re Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, No. 95-13729F, 1995 WL 478841, at
*1, 7 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. May 18, 1995) (mem.); see alsoJulie Stoiber & Daniel Rubin, Bank-
ruptcy Court Teeming with Lawyers, PHILA. INQUIRER, May 19, 1995, at A23 ("'We don't want
to embarrass all the executive directors who p-ed their charities' money away'" (quoting a
lawyer at the proceeding who paraphrased New Era's motion)). Net amounts lost were
much smaller. See supra note 15.
421. "'It's amazing,'" commented a Big Six accountant with participating clients, "'Any-
body who's significant in the evangelical community has been involved in this thing.'"
Stecklow, Big Charity, supra note 405. Spring Arbor College had recently added $1 million,
one-sixth of its total endowment, to the several hundred thousand dollars already held by
New Era. Id.
422. See Peter Dobrin et al., New Era Played on Dire Need for Cash, and Nonprofits Swallowed
Their Doubts, PHILA. INQUIRER, May 21, 1995, at Al (quoting one participant as stating, "I
think the reason we and other organizations got sucked into this was that we all really
believed this organization was set up by Sir John Templeton to give away $1 billion ....
We couldn't figure out where else the money was coming from."); Stecklow, False Profit,
supra note 413 (describing the relationship between Bennett and Templeton); cf REvlSED
MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. AcT § 2.02(c) & cmt. 3(b) (1987) ("In nonprofit corporations
incorporators sometimes name respected or famous individuals as directors in the hope
that they will serve as directors.").
423. Stecklow, Trustee's Filing, supra note 417.
424. Id.
425. Id.
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The Pennsylvania Attorney General quickly charged New Era with
violating various state nonprofit and charitable solicitation laws. 42 6
However, as early as July 1993, the Attorney General had received a
suggestion to investigate New Era's matching program.427 New Era
had not yet registered with the charities bureau. 428 After a meeting
with the Chief Deputy Attorney General, John Bennett registered New
Era as a charity, but refused to register as a professional fundraiser,
claiming he was merely offering "opportunities." He also worried that
he might have to disclose the names of his secret donors.4 2 9 Accord-
ing to the Journal, the Attorney General's office closed its investigation
because it could not find any complaining donors who lost money.43 °
However, the Bureau of Charitable Organizations continued to re-
ceive questions about the legitimacy of the matching program, and
began an inquiry in early May 1995 when New Era failed to file a prop-
erly audited financial statement.431 A Pennsylvania legislative investi-
gation found that both the Attorney General's office and the
Department of State "should have been more vigilant" in the way they
registered and tracked New Era, concluding that current state law
should have been sufficient to forestall the latter part of the fraud.432
A class of bilked charities soon filed suit in federal court against
Bennett, New Era's accounting firm, and six people listed by Bennett
as members of New Era's board.433 But what about the "winners-
those early participants that doubled their money or received
matched donors' contributions? New Era's bankruptcy trustee hopes
426. Gary Putka, Pennsylvania Seeks to Freeze New Era Assets, WALL ST. J., May 17, 1995, at
A3, available in 1995 WL-WSJ 8711980 (describing the Attorney General's action to freeze
the assets of both New Era and Bennett).
427. Stecklow, False Profit, supra note 413 (describing a letter, written in July 1993 on
behalf of the International Research Institute on Value Changes, urging the Attorney Gen-
eral to examine New Era).
428. Id.
429. Id.
430. Id. The SEC, as well, found its initial investigation hard going because of lack of
cooperation from participants. Said one official: "We were trying to help them, and they
didn't want any help, because they thought if we kept quiet they'd be able to double their
money." Knecht & Taylor, supra note 23 (internal quotation marks omitted).
431. L. Stuart Ditzen & Robert Moran, Judge Freezes Assets of Failed New Era Foundation,
PHILA. INQUIRER, May 18, 1995, at Al.
432. STAFF REP. TO THE GEN. ASSEMBLY OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PA., JOINT STATE
GOV'T COMM'N, THE COLLAPSE OF THE FOUNDATION FOR NEW ERA PHILANTHROPY 50 (1995).
433. See Museum of Am. Jewish History v. Bennett, Civ. Action No. 95-3003, 1995 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 7632, at *6 (E.D. Pa. June 2, 1995) (mem.) (permitting withdrawal of the civil
suit, filed May 18, 1995, on the condition that the museum file a motion in the bankruptcy
court that the bankruptcy trustee elect to assert or abandon the museum's claims within a
short enough time period that, in the event of abandonment, the museum can reassert its
claims within the statute of limitations).
1494 [VOL. 57:1400
1998] THE LIMITS OF CHARITY FIDUCIARY LAW 1495
to avoid prolonged litigation by asking for charities to return funds
voluntarily to help make whole those that lost money.43 4 To their
shame (or perhaps because they've already spent the money), some
are fighting; hundreds of others, however, have complied.435 Adding
the $41 million repaid to the $30 million still on hand and an ex-
pected $15-18 million settlement from Prudential Securities, bank-
ruptcy officials are now estimating losses at $100 million.4" 6 In 1997,
Bennett pleaded no contest to federal charges of fraud and money
laundering, and he was sentenced to twelve years in prison.437 The
SEC settled its lawsuit against Bennett without seeking civil penalties,
on the ground that after returning his remaining $1.5 million in assets
to the bankruptcy trustee, he could not pay any penalties.438
Turning from Bennett, the perpetrator, to the duped charities,
what fiduciary obligations did their trustees and directors breach?
Presumably none violated the duty of loyalty. Rather, each was hop-
ing that this was the golden goose that would keep the organization
going. However, a violation of the separate duty of care occurs if the
434. The bankruptcy trustee is also suing New Era's law firm for $100,000 for "aiding
and abetting" Bennett. New Era Trustee Files 2 Lawsuits to Seek Funds, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY,
Feb. 6, 1997, at 32.
435. New Era Lawsuits Aim to Recoup Funds, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Apr. 17, 1997, at 49
(stating that the trustee has begun to bring suit against the more than 100 groups that did
not participate in the group settlement, having already filed 15 suits).
436. See Robert Franklin, Bankruptcy Trustee Wants Grants Repaid, STAR TRJB. (Minneapo-
lis), Jan. 23, 1996, at IB, available in LEXIS, News Library, Strib File (stating that trustee
recently demanded $175 million in "'fraudulent grants'" received by nearly 1300 nonprof-
its and individuals); New Era Trustee Reaches Refund Agreement with Landis Homes; May Begin
Litigation Against Other Non-Profit Institutions, PR NEWSWIRE, Dec. 14, 1995, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Prnews File (indicating that Princeton agreed to return $2.1 million
and Harvard agreed to return $467,000 in order to avoid being sued by New Era's bank-
ruptcy trustee); Princeton and Harvard Are to Return Money, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1996, at A19,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Nyt File (reporting that 23 organizations have agreed to
return a total of $8.5 million to creditors); Pyramid Scheme, supra note 24 (reporting that
hundreds of organizations that profited from New Era have agreed to repay $41 million);
Stecklow, Trustee's Filing, supra note 417 (noting that the latest court filing involves prelimi-
nary losses of at least $98 million).
437. See United States v. Bennett, Crim. Action No. 96-503, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3092,
at *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 18, 1997) (mem.) (listing some of the 82 counts filed against Bennett);
Charity Chief Sentenced for Part in Ponzi Scheme, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1997, at A23, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Nyt File; Head of Bankrupt Charity Fund Pleads No Contest in Fraud Case,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1997, at D17, available in LEXIS, News Library, Nyt File (reporting that
the prosecutor expects Bennett to be sentenced to 10 to 30 years); Steve Stecklow, New
Era's Bennett Gets 12 Years in Prison for Defrauding Charities, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 1997, at
B15, available in 1997 WL 14167231.
438. See Feds Settle Lawsuit Over New Era Scam, CHATTANOOGA FREE PRESS, Feb. 8, 1998, at
Al (reporting that the SEC reserved the right to seek penalties should the agency discover
any hidden assets, and also bars Bennett from again violating securities law, on pain of
penalties).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
fiduciary fails to exercise the care of a reasonable, prudent person
under the circumstances, in good faith and with due diligence. 9
While we cannot pass a law against greed,44 ° these fiduciary stan-
dards are supposed to protect charities from their directors' willful
stupidity. Perhaps "faith" is the bigger concern. The Wall Street Journal
observed: "New Era's matching program was glorious news to reli-
gious nonprofits, which often don't qualify for grants from major sec-
ular foundations. . . . [S]ays Robert Andriga, president of the
Coalition of Christian Colleges and Universities, 'It's almost a gift
from heaven, in a religious sense. '"'441 Or perhaps this amazing story
reveals the desperation born of the competition to survive. Main-
stream organizations became involved when word of New Era's per-
formance spread in the Philadelphia nonprofit community. "The
city's cozy relationships between institutions became a double-edged
sword," observed the Journal.4 42 "Because of lost money and crippled
fund-raising efforts, the city is hoping that corporate leaders will pick
up the slack from the New Era void. But many of the leaders are the
same people who championed Mr. Bennett and now appear-in hind-
sight-to have used poor judgment." '443  The Philadelphia Inquirer
wondered:
[H] ow could these trustees, many of them so cautious, savvy
and worldwise, still give the foundation their millions? How
could they believe its claims?
439. Moreover, Pennsylvania law treats even charity directors as trustees. See 15 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5547(a) (West 1995).
440. Commented one rare skeptic, Tony Carnes, vice president of the nonprofit re-
search group International Research Institute on Value Changes: " 'They could just taste
the money. I've never seen anything like it.... The weakness around the mouth, the
desire in the eyes. I've always heard the expression, "You can see greed written," but I've
seen the reality.'" Stecklow, False Profit, supra note 413.
441. Id. Mr. Andriga later stated that 14 of the 80 Christian Colleges in the coalition
had lost about $25 million in the scheme. See L. Stuart Ditzen et al., New Era to Liquidate,
Not Regroup, Bennett's Lawoyer: Success 'Unlikely', PHILA. INQUIRER, May 20, 1995, at Al ("'Is it
scriptural to sue one another?'" (quoting Andriga)); see also David O'Reilly, New Era's Woes
Baffle Religious Groups, PHILA. INQUIRER, May 17, 1995, at A10 ("Some of the biggest names
in Christian philanthropy were Bennett's clients or grant recipients, including Billy Gra-
ham's Evangelistic Association, Campus Crusade for Christ and World Vision . . ").
442. Stecklow, False Profit, supra note 413. Philadelphia's recent explosion in cultural
institutions means many operate "on a shoestring" while individual, corporate, and govern-
ment contributions are shrinking. William Power, Philanthropy: Philadelphia Wonders How It
Got Fooled by New Era-and What Lies Ahead, WALL ST. J., May 18, 1995, at Bi, available in
1995 WL-WSJ 8712448.
443. Power, supra note 442.
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The full answer is complex, according to the dozens of
trustees and New Era recipients interviewed last week.
Boiled down, it was this: They wanted to believe.
444
As Professor Harvey Dale points out, the hard part of the fiduci-
ary liability question is the conflation of fundraising and investing. 445
No trustee or director would have seriously entertained a double-your-
money offer in the context of an investment return. But, after all,
anonymous donors do exist.446 Does this mean, though, that the char-
itable solicitation business should be measured by a different standard
from the one that applies to portfolio management? To use the old
portfolio management standard, if anything was speculation as op-
posed to investment, this looks like it. Scoffed Robert 0. Bothwell,
executive director of the National Committee for Responsive Philan-
thropy: " [W] hat checks and balances do we have to make certain we
give due consideration to reject this outlandish idea of matching
grants from heaven?
44 7
444. Dobrin et al., supra note 422 (emphasis added). A lone Cassandra, the president of
the Philadelphia Museum of Art became almost a social nuisance. As quoted in The Wall
Street Journal, Robert Montgomery Scott would ask, "'Show me the prospectus .... Show
me where the money would go.... I've been involved in raising money enough that I
know there isn't a wide pool of anonymous donors.'" Power, supra note 442. After the
scheme collapsed, Scott graciously said, "I feel like the person lucky enough to have missed
the Titanic." B.J. Phillips, Sophisticated Rich . . .Rubes, PHILA. INQUIRER, May 17, 1995, at
Cl. Ironically, New Era president John Bennett made his initial reputation in the philan-
thropy world by running a training program for nonprofit managers. See Steve Stecklow,
Payback Time: New Era's Bennett Took Others' Millions; Now He's Giving Back, WALL ST. J., Jan.
24, 1996, at Al, available in 1996 WL-WSJ 3088206.
445. See Jennifer Moore et al., A Debacle for Charities' Credibility, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY,
June 1, 1995, at 1, 29 (quoting Professor Dale as observing that the New Era scheme
"'mixed up for the charities the question of how to invest their assets with the question of
how to get donations'").
446. As Kevin Kearns puts it: "Should the investors in the New Era fund have taken
responsibility for ensuring that the anonymous donors did indeed exist... ? How could
they have received these assurances as long as there is an accepted practice in philan-
thropic circles of ensuring anonymity for donors who request it?" KEVIN P. KEARNS, MANAG-
ING FOR ACCOUNTABILITY. PRESERVING THE PUBLIC TRUST IN PUBLIC AND NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS 8 (1996). Moreover, the materials prepared by New Era and provided to
prospective "beneficiary donors" are thorough and professional, making the offer seem
almost plausible. See Foundation for New Era Philanthropy Manual (March 1994), in Ste-
phen K. Urice, Non-Traditional Funding Sources: Understanding and Managing Risks: The "New
Era" of Investments, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS: LEGAL PROBLEMS OF MUSEUM
ADMINISTRATION 19, 31-82 (1996).
447. Moore et al., supra note 445, at 29 (internal quotation marks omitted). Com-
pounding the imprudence, some participants "were so tempted by the promises of match-
ing funds that they borrowed the money to give New Era, and have nothing to show for it
but their debt." Sharon Walsh, New Era Foundation: Red Flags, Red Ink, Red Faces, WASH.
POST, May 20, 1995, at Al, available in 1995 WL 2094703.
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What procedures would defending fiduciaries need to show they
followed? The business judgment rule requires information-gather-
ing, studying, and deliberation.448 In looking at process, the unusual
nature of the arrangement should bar a simple defense that "every-
body was doing it."449 Presumably scale is a factor: How important
was the amount staked compared with the enterprise's overall budget?
Moreover, a director or trustee who failed to exercise judgment, by
definition, falls out of the protection of the business judgment rule.
However, with no question of divided loyalty, in the case of a corpo-
rate charity, the burden would probably fall on the plaintiff to demon-
strate that the director's behavior could not rationally have been in
the best interests of the charity.
As discussed above, breach does not necessarily translate into lia-
bility. The questions then become whether the fiduciary's action
caused the loss, and how great that loss was. Assuming these problems
of proof are overcome, for what would the breaching fiduciaries be
liable, assuming the organization cannot fully recover its loss from the
bankruptcy estate of New Era? What happens if some of these chari-
ties are so weakened by losses that they themselves must file for bank-
ruptcy? For those charities that are trusts, the Third Restatement of
Trusts would measure damages based on the "total return experience
(positive or negative) for other investments of the trust in question, or
possibly that of portfolios of other trusts having comparable objectives
and circumstances."45 Observes Professor Halbach: "In theory, the
extension is also appropriate to the traditionally avowed objective of
restoring the trust estate and its beneficiaries to the position they
would have been in had the trust been properly administered. '451
Worst of all, if a charity sent funds to New Era more than once,
will the transfers be viewed as separate transactions, so that the trustee
448. See supra Part III.A.
449. Compare Gordon, supra note 92, at 71, which notes that in Chase v. Pevear, 419
N.E.2d 1358, 1369 (Mass. 1981), the court did not surcharge a trustee for Penn Central
stock, because the stock was widely held by other financial institutions. In fact, the "court
did not consider the proportion of the questioned investments either to the trust as a
whole or to the other investments in the portfolio." Gordon, supra note 92, at 71.
450. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS (THE PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE) § 205 cmt. a
(1992).
451. Halbach, supra note 102, at 1182 (citations omitted). Professor Halbach adds:
Restatement Third's total return rule can be implemented by referring to:
(a) The performance of all or relevant parts of the proper investments of the trust
in question; (b) the performance of all or suitable parts of the portfolios of com-
parable trusts; or (c) the performance of some suitable securities index or other
benchmark portfolio.
Id. at 1183.
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cannot offset the eventual loss by the gains the charity earlier en-
joyed?45 The commentary to the Third Restatement urges reducing the
incentive for multiple breaches: "[A] trustee whose breach of trust
has resulted in exceptional profits might be tempted later to take ex-
cessive risks if the prior success provided a degree of insulation from
surcharge.453
If the fiduciaries are liable, can their organizations reimburse
them? Can the charity's directors' and officers' liability policy cover
this? Is it likely that it does? Any charity that had enacted a monetary
shield for directors who breach their duty of care could probably not
obtain a money recovery unless the act were intentional or in bad
faith, but a few statutes also exclude gross negligence.
Finally, a court can abate or eliminate liability. In the case of a
trust, the Third Restatement suggests the following: "In the absence of a
statute it would seem that a court of equity may have power to excuse
the trustee in whole or in part from liability where he has acted hon-
estly and reasonably and ought fairly to be excused."4 5 4
What if the attorneys general supervising the defrauded charities
feel sorry for them-and worry about the political fallout-and so de-
cline to bring suit against their fiduciaries? As discussed in Part II.C,
above, it is unlikely that the beneficiaries, donors, or alumni (many
were schools and colleges) could instead bring a derivative suit. Ap-
parently, if they could they would: A survey conducted by the Chronicle
of Philanthropy soon after the scandal broke found, among other
things, that of wealthy donors across the country, 60.1% "are very will-
ing to take legal action against a charity's senior officers and trustees
for mismanagement.
' ' 41 5
So do we just leave punishment to the marketplace of donations?
Commented the president of the Pew Charitable Trusts: "'It's a dark
day for Philadelphia' . .. . 'I'm afraid that people won't trust the
ability of nonprofits to manage themselves and will be afraid to give
452. The Third Restatement provides:
A trustee who is liable for a loss caused by a breach of trust may not reduce
the amount of the liability by deducting the amount of a profit that accrued
through another and distinct breach of trust; but if the breaches of trust are not
separate and distinct, the trustee is accountable only for the net gain or charge-
able only with the net loss resulting therefrom.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS (THE PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE) § 213.
453. Id. § 213 cmt. f.
454. Id. § 205 cmt. g.
455. Moore et al., supra note 445, at 24.
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money."'456 The Chronicle of Philanthropy survey found that 76.9% of
donors believed "they need to take greater control over how the
money they donate is used. '4 5 7 In the end, our laws and legal enforce-
ment mechanism can go only so far. JamesJ. Bausch, president of the
National Charities Information Bureau, a private watchdog, expressed
his views to the Chronicle
The fact that a regulator doesn't kick up a big question
about New Era doesn't excuse the boards of charities that
were involved from questioning the investment of millions of
dollars with New Era .... You can't enact laws and regula-
tions that lead everybody by the hand to do things they
ought to be doing when they take the pledge to be a board
member.4
51
Moreover, even totally self-sufficient charities need institutional legiti-
macy. Worse than no legislation might be bad legislation, and the
entire sector, as visible and large as it has become, remains politically
vulnerable.459
IV. CONCLUSION
On the eve of the four hundredth anniversary of the monumen-
tal Statute of Charitable Uses,46° we seem no closer to devising a relia-
ble legal mechanism for prodding charitable fiduciaries to carry out
their duties. Trustees of charitable trusts and directors of nonprofit
corporations operate under legal regimes designed for their proprie-
tary cousins. In the absence of private beneficiaries or shareholders to
look after their own interests, however, charity fiduciaries frequently
escape accountability for their self-dealing and neglect or mismanage-
ment. Few charities have members endowed with voting rights, and
state attorneys general have limited resources to devote to monitoring
the nonprofit sector. Similarly, at the federal level, the Internal Reve-
nue Service is a tax collector, not a policing agency (although its new
456. Julia M. Klein & Peter Dobrin, Cultural Leaders Say Collapse Won't Harm Major Pro-
grams, PHIA. INQUIRER, May 21, 1995, at Al9 (quoting Rebecca Rimel, president of the Pew
Charitable Trusts).
457. Moore et al., supra note 445, at 24 (stating that 97.4% of donors "have less respect
for the managerial skills of senior non-profit executives").
458. Elizabeth Greene & Grant Williams, Asleep on the Watch?, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY,
July 27, 1995, at 1, 36 (internal quotation marks omitted).
459. See Brody, Institutional Dissonance, supra note 25, at 503.
460. Statute of Charitable Uses, 1601, 43 Eliz. 1, ch. 4 (Eng.) (providing a mechanism
for the enforcement of charitable trusts); see also Fishman, Development of Nonprofit Law,
supra note 44, at 621 & n.19 ("The new procedure was little employed after a period of
time and, the importance of the law of charitable trusts lies in the preamble of the statute,
which contains an enumeration of charitable purposes." (citation omitted)).
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powers to tax "excess benefits" will undoubtedly draw it further into
charity operations, akin to its long-standing supervisory role over pri-
vate foundations).
This Article makes modest proposals for legal reform. First, to
avoid degrading the standard of care required of nonprofit directors
while eliminating the risk that board service could mean impoverish-
ment, it suggests that we impose a (low) maximum monetary sanction
on nonprofit directors for breaches of their duty of care. Injunctive
remedies, such as removal, would remain, and such a rule would have
no effect on breaches of the duty of loyalty. Second, it suggests that
the recent wave of nonprofit hospital sales statutes moves the control
of these charities too far from the private discretion of hospital direc-
tors and invites too much political risk in the determination of how
best to use these assets.4 6 1 Third, it suggests that the duty of care in-
cludes an affirmative duty to diversify investments, regardless of donor
direction to retain stock in the family business. In the end, however,
there are limits to the law. As a result, the charitable sector must im-
prove its own efforts to educate and review the behavior of fiduciaries
in order to retain the confidence of the donating public and the inde-
pendence so cherished by all charities.462
461. Public subsidy is a separate question. Elsewhere, I examine the appropriateness of
tax exemption for nonprofit hospitals. See Evelyn Brody, Charities in Tax Reform: Threats
to Subsidies Overt and Covert (manuscript on file with author).
462. See, e.g., Robert Franklin, State Foundations Propose Self-Regulation, STAR TRaB. (Minne-
apolis),Jan. 27, 1996, at IB, available in LEXIS, News Library, Strib File (reporting that the
Minnesota Council on Foundations proposed to its membership the "tightest self-regula-
tion of grant makers in the nation."). See generally Brody, Institutional Dissonance, supra note
25 (highlighting the need for nonprofits to monitor their own efficiency in light of the lack
of accountability inherent in the nonprofit form).
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